Sara Olsvig & Ulrik Pram Gad
The management of foreign and security policy within the Kingdom of Denmark has continually undergone a series of changes in response to shifting great-power dynamics and structural conditions. Not least, Kalaallit Nunaat’s Home Rule Government and later Self-Government has attained increased formal and substantive authority over aspects of foreign policy, as well as a distinct influence on the Realm’s security policy in the Arctic. Both the evolving geopolitical environment and the internal reconfigurations of the Realm generate new strategic challenges for the Kingdom as a whole, for its individual constituent parts, and for external powers. In this context, understanding Kalaallit Nunaat as a security-policy actor becomes essential.
This chapter first outlines the formal frameworks that constitute the Self-Government as an actor, along with the historical developments that produced them. It then characterizes Kalaallit Nunaat’s foreign-policy identity and the central goals and interests pursued on that basis. Finally, it examines the information and decision-making structures between Denmark and Kalaallit Nunaat and within the Self-Government, shaping how these goals and interests are pursued both proactively and reactively in practice. The chapter concludes by discussing how the boundary between “security policy,” on the one hand, and “ordinary” foreign policy withing legislative areas taken home by Kalaallit Nunaat on the other, emerges as the central challenge for both the realization of Kalaallit Nunaat’s long-term ambition for further self-determination and for its internal decision-making structures.
Erdem Lamazhapov & Andreas Østhagen
This article discusses the increase of military exercise activity in, and related statements and attention given to, the Bering Sea and Strait geographical spaces before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Using Chinese, Russian, and U.S. sources, we will argue that growing militarization in the Pacific Arctic, including the proliferation of Russo-Chinese military and paramilitary activities, warrants a reevaluation of the strategic importance of Beringia within the context of great power politics in the Arctic and the Pacific. Theoretically, the article turns to signaling theories. The article uses a mix of official policies and statements, media reports, and expert analyses from Chinese, Russian, and U.S. sources to provide an overview of the increased activity in this space. In doing so, the article also discusses the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the North Pacific in light of great power competition between the U.S., China, and Russia. By examining key events such as the joint Russian Chinese bomber exercise off the coast of Alaska, the entry of the Chinese Coast Guard into the Arctic Ocean via the Bering Strait, and joint Russo-Chinese naval exercises and patrols, we will discuss the motivations behind Russia and China’s military activities near Alaska. We hope to contribute to timely discussions about Arctic military, security, and diplomacy and provide insights into the strategic objectives of major powers, namely the U.S., China, and Russia, in the Arctic writ large.
Heini í Skorini & Tór Marni Weihe
Amid growing geopolitical instability and competition in the Arctic and North Atlantic region, this article investigates how the Faroe Islands – a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark – has pursued a sophisticated and opportunistic balancing act between economic cooperation with Russia and broader alliance commitments vis-à-vis Denmark, EU and NATO. Focusing on the period from 2014 to 2024, the article examines how the Faroe Islands deepened its cooperation with Russia in the field of trade and fishery in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequently benefited from Russian sanctions against EU products. This period illustrates how sub-sovereign entities with extensive self-governing authority can pursue their own national interests that might run against broader Western alliance interests. However, after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Faroese policies towards Russia drastically changed and aligned with broader Western alliance commitments. Drawing on alliance theory and the concept of hedging, the article examines the complexities facing small, autonomous entities within larger political unions when alliance commitments and domestic economic imperatives collide. Furthermore, the article exemplifies how small, self-governing regions can assert meaningful strategic autonomy in a polarised global order. However, as the period after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 reveals, there are definite limits to such autonomy.
Karen Everett & Katharina Koch
Before February 2022, there was a healthy academic debate about Arctic exceptionalism - whether the region was insulated from geopolitical tension, vulnerable to spillover effects, or situated somewhere in between. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, demonstrated that political spillover is not only possible but also has tangible regional and global consequences. This was evident in the temporary suspension of Arctic Council activities and its working groups, as well as Finland’s and Sweden’s historic decision to join NATO. Moreover, security concerns are further confounded with the consequences of climate change, thus increasing the strategic relevance of the Arctic. National Arctic strategies and policies provide insights into how states perceive and position themselves in the region. Similarly, military strategies shape and reflect a country’s broader security priorities. In Canada’s case, key policy documents such as the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) (ANPF) and Strong, Secure, and Engaged (2017) (SSE) were formulated before the invasion of Ukraine, while the Arctic Foreign Policy (2024) and Our North, Strong and Free (2024) were developed and published afterwards. This temporal distinction raises important questions about how security discourses have evolved in response to the shifting geopolitical dynamics affecting relations within the Arctic and with near-Arctic states (e.g., China). To explore these changes, we examine the four policy documents through six key themes: 1) shifting perceptions of adversaries; 2) emerging new threats to the Arctic region; 3) the role of climate change; 4) energy security considerations; 5) investments in procurement and infrastructure; and 6) evolving relationships between Canada and its allies. In addition to analyzing the shifts revolving around these key themes, we also acknowledge a broader challenge inherent in policy-making - the above-cited strategic documents are designed to guide decision-making over multiple years. As a result, they do not account for rapidly changing geopolitical realities, thus raising critical questions about adaptability and effectiveness during times of uncertainty.
Angela Borozna
Several recent studies view the Arctic as a focal point of a new Cold War, characterized by intense competition and confrontation. These studies tend to project Russia’s assertiveness elsewhere to Moscow’s future stance in the North. However, a competing narrative among some scholars suggests that, despite an increasingly assertive Russia, Moscow continued to cooperate and observe international agreements related to the Arctic. To assess these competing claims, this paper addresses the following question: How does geopolitical tension shape Russia’s strategic approach to the Arctic? How has the war in Ukraine and the imposition of international sanctions influenced Russia’s Arctic policy? Can Russia’s assertive posture in the Ukraine conflict coexist with its pursuit of peaceful cooperation in the Arctic region? To answer these questions, this article highlights the intersection of Russia’s state military security perspectives and its economic security. The paper examines the evolution of Russia’s Arctic strategy over time, tracing the country’s shifting perceptions of security threats and increasing assertiveness in the Arctic. By examining Russia’s posture in the region over time, its investment in regional projects, and its cooperation with China, the paper demonstrates that, in response to intensified competition, Russia has adopted a two-pronged Arctic strategy that combines economic and military security. The country is focused on modernizing and strengthening its Arctic-based armed forces, aiming to bolster its security posture and readiness to address potential regional threats. Meanwhile, Moscow uses its military security to protect its economic interests. A critical review of Russia’s strategy in the Arctic is essential, as much of the existing scholarship is shaped by Western interpretations of Russia’s actions. By neglecting Russia’s perspective, analyses of the Arctic risk misrepresenting its behavior and generate policy responses that are ineffective, short-sighted, and at times even dangerous. Russia’s policy in the Arctic cannot be viewed in isolation from the actions of the Western powers in the region. Furthermore, by overlooking Russia’s willingness to cooperate on specific issues while exaggerating security threats, some research on Russia’s Arctic policy reinforces the dynamics of the security dilemma and heightens the likelihood of escalation. This paper seeks to address this imbalance in research on the Arctic by analyzing Russia’s strategy over time and by trying to establish the true causes of Russia’s actions in the region.
Troy Bouffard & Gennaro D'Angelo, Gabrielle F. Gundry, Travis R. Pitts, Stephen F. Price and Andrew F. Roberts
This article examines Russia’s efforts to regulate navigation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and tests the legal premise for those efforts under UNCLOS Article 234 (“ice-covered areas”). We present updated, model-based risk estimates derived from CMIP6 sea-ice projections and the IMO POLARIS framework. Results indicate steadily declining navigation risk for PC6 (and stronger) vessels for six months of the year through the 2030s, undermining Russia’s risk-based justification for expansive regulatory control out to the EEZ. We outline implications for freedom of navigation and the dangers of allowing these practices to calcify into customary international law, and we recommend how user states can incorporate refined risk evidence into legal, diplomatic, and operational responses.
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