Mihai Giboi
Since a Russian titanium flag was planted in the Arctic Ocean in 2007, Western academic circles have grown more interested in the Kremlin’s position in the circumpolar North, sparking an ongoing debate about its regional interests. Traditionally, discourse has been divided between neorealist and neoliberal paradigms that either suggest Moscow aims to militarily dominate the region, or is a cooperative actor despite behaving aggressively elsewhere, respectively. However, new perspectives have emerged that offer a middle ground, and explore Moscow’s use of its military to project power outside the Arctic, particularly towards the GIUK Gap. Despite this shift in the literature, it has not yet discussed how the North fits within Russia’s wider geopolitical ambitions, and why it is interested in projecting naval power against the West. Consequently, this paper argues that, as demonstrated by the Kremlin’s response to the mere mention of NATO enlargement, its core interests are not in the Arctic, but in maintaining its great power status, which it believes is being threatened in Europe. This does not dismiss the region’s geostrategic value, because it will play an important supporting role in bypassing the strategic encirclement if NATO-Russian tensions escalate to war. Russian strategic documents also reveal that while the literature has correctly identified the Kremlin’s intention to disrupt NATO operations by contesting control over the GIUK Gap, another likely objective is to conduct precision strikes on Western military and economic infrastructure to support ground operations in Europe.
Natia Tsaritova
Arctic Governance relies on relations between different Arctic and global actors. As the Arctic Council is a key actor within Arctic Governance, this study takes a closer look at its inter-organizational relations with its non-state observers and explores how observers actually observe. Because of the tense situation in Arctic cooperation, it is again necessary to reflect on the observers’ contribution to the Arctic Council and consequentially to Arctic Governance. This way, conclusions can be drawn about the extent to which specifically non-state observers will continue to be relevant in the future. Building on the STAPAC dataset from Knecht (2017), where stakeholder participation in Arctic Council and sub-body meetings are summarized, this study adds data of observer participation after 2017. Here, I take the PAME working group of the Arctic Council as starting point and analyse observer attendance of ministerial, SAO and working group meetings. Apart from the participation data, the basis for analysis are observers reports and reviews, and other official documents from the Arctic Council. This article aims at revealing patterns and mechanisms of observing. Drawing on the sociological neo-institutionalist perspective, observers are conceptualized as an organizational field that relates to the Arctic Council. This relational perspective allows us to gain an understanding of how non-state observers participate and what roles they can have within the Arctic Council. This study shows that non-state observers play a vital role in embedding Arctic issues in the larger global context.
Hanna K. Lappalainen, Timo Vihma, Eija Asmi, Alexander Baklanov, Peter Bauer, Paul Arthur Berkman, Federico Bianchi, Nicole Biebow, Jaana Bäck, Torben Røjle Christensen, Richard Davy, Igor Esauj, Ekaterina Ezhova, Huadong Guo, Torill Hamre, Angelika Humbert, Veli-Matti Kerminen, Lukas Kohl, Lars Kullerud, Kirsty Langley, Jan Rene Larsen, Heikki Lihavainen, Lisa Loseto, Risto Makkonen, Cecilie Mauritzen, Outi Meinander, Geir Ottersen, Peter Pulsifer, Yubao Qiu, Arja Rautio, Stein Sandven, Britta K. Sannel, Sandy Starkweather, Mikko Strahlendorff, Lise Lotte Sørensen, Jennie L. Thomas, Michael Tjernström, Petteri Uotila, Manfred Wendisch, Markku Kulmala and Tuukka Petäjä
A better understanding of land-atmosphere-ocean feedbacks and interactions is essential for developing effective strategies for sustainable development of the Arctic region. Further, this understanding is crucial for improving mitigation and adaptation plans and transforming them into actionable services for Arctic stakeholders and Indigenous communities. In this paper, we highlight key topics in Arctic research from atmospheric, oceanic, and cryospheric perspectives and offer insights into the latest research on interactions and feedback mechanisms in the Arctic region, particularly from the natural sciences perspective. Our approach synthesizes insights from the Arena for the Gap Analysis of Existing Arctic Science Co-Operations (AASCO-1) project (2020–2022), which calls for further development of integrated observation systems and the fusion of data from diverse sources, extending beyond traditional scientific boundaries.
Elena Kavanagh
The Arctic region is of global importance due to the escalating impact of climate change, emerging economic opportunities and geopolitical dynamics. These changes in the Arctic affect Ireland because of its proximity to the region and its location in the North Atlantic. Despite being on a Northern periphery, Ireland lacks a transparent model for its involvement in Arctic governance. Irish interest in the Arctic is growing due to the country's rich polar tradition and strong research base on oceanography, biodiversity, and climate change impact. There is a clear “gap in Ireland’s engagement in the Arctic, and successful stewarding of the Arctic is in Ireland’s best interest” (Cronin, 2021). Therefore, two research questions arise. Firstly, given Ireland’s experience as a proactive “global actor and bridge builder” (Government of Ireland, 2020) in the international arena, what role could it play, and what can it contribute to the Arctic? Secondly, as the Global Ireland multi-year Strategy to 2025 (Government of Ireland, 2023) comes to an end, should Ireland develop its Arctic regional Strategy? The main strategic Arctic themes for Ireland are ripe for exploration. The political landscape of the Arctic region is rapidly changing and being reimagined (Koivurova et al., 2022). It is, therefore, important to review Ireland’s position in this context. This paper serves as an initial step towards a more comprehensive policy analysis of Ireland’s role in the Arctic. The main findings of the paper highlight the growing significance of the Arctic region due to climate change and geopolitical dynamics, emphasising Ireland's strategic interest in the area. The paper also underscores the need for Ireland to eliminate the current fragmented approach to Arctic policy and formulate a comprehensive Arctic Strategy to proactively engage with the evolving Arctic political landscape, environmental protection and economic opportunities.
Alexander MacDonald
Proposals to denuclearize the Arctic region span a time frame of 1964 to 2012, yet no substantial progress has been made towards denuclearizing the region. This is partly due to the proposals’ consistent failure to present a series of viable confidence building measures (CBMs) and arms control measures to precede denuclearization. This paper seeks to fill the strategic gap of Arctic denuclearization proposals by presenting a menu of Arctic specific arms control and CBMs which seek to address the strategic and political gaps of previous Arctic denuclearization proposals, using both historic and modern works and ultimately offering a framework to advance the goal of an Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ). The formulation of this menu was guided by the key contention that the foundation of confidence is communication and information sharing. That is, arms control measures, to even be negotiated, must first be preceded by confidence building measures. Arms control measures require trust both in the negotiation and execution phase which can be provided for through established dialogue forums and confidence building measures. This menu for Arctic arms control and CBMs has been in development for several decades, starting with Franklyn Griffiths’ 1979 partial Arctic demilitarization proposal, and has enjoyed an increasing amount of academic commentary, especially in the wake of the 2014 collapse of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and Arctic Chief of Defense Staff (ACDS) meetings. These measures, however, have never been assembled into a comprehensive menu for consideration. Efforts towards comprehensive Arctic denuclearization can immensely benefit from this work if it is harnessed, harmonized and orientated towards denuclearizing the Arctic region. Doing so would begin charting the course of strategic stability leading towards cooperation and arms reduction which is absolutely crucial for any serious consideration of Arctic denuclearization.
Ana Teresa Cardoso
Shipping activities in the Arctic region pose a wide range of pressures on its marine environment, including underwater noise, light disturbance, ship strikes with marine mammals, pollution from operations and accidents, and socioeconomic impacts on coastal communities. The IMO has adopted the Polar Code to manage shipping in the Arctic Ocean. Protecting the Arctic marine environment from shipping impacts is essential for all stakeholders, including seafarers. Shipping, including cruise tourism, serves societal drivers such as trade, commerce, and recreation, and global shipping is expected to increase, particularly if climate change continues to result in sea ice losses, potentially opening up new trade routes. Increases in shipping activity in the Arctic region have already been observed, raising concerns about potential impacts on sensitive Arctic marine ecosystems, particularly on marine mammals reliant on sound for communication and navigation. Climate change increases navigational risks in the Arctic due to mobile sea ice and limited hydrographic charting in newly opened areas. The WMO and IMO provide seafarers with weather, wave, and ice warnings and forecasts to mitigate these risks, extending the global maritime distress safety system. HFO has been identified as the most significant pressure exerted by ships in the Arctic, with fishing vessels, general cargo vessels, and service vessels being the top emitters of black carbon. The Arctic states should develop a integrated strategy for navigation in the Arctic to improve this region's sustainability and to guide the non-Arctic states.
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