Mihai Giboi
Since a Russian titanium flag was planted in the Arctic Ocean in 2007, Western academic circles have grown more interested in the Kremlin’s position in the circumpolar North, sparking an ongoing debate about its regional interests. Traditionally, discourse has been divided between neorealist and neoliberal paradigms that either suggest Moscow aims to militarily dominate the region, or is a cooperative actor despite behaving aggressively elsewhere, respectively. However, new perspectives have emerged that offer a middle ground, and explore Moscow’s use of its military to project power outside the Arctic, particularly towards the GIUK Gap. Despite this shift in the literature, it has not yet discussed how the North fits within Russia’s wider geopolitical ambitions, and why it is interested in projecting naval power against the West. Consequently, this paper argues that, as demonstrated by the Kremlin’s response to the mere mention of NATO enlargement, its core interests are not in the Arctic, but in maintaining its great power status, which it believes is being threatened in Europe. This does not dismiss the region’s geostrategic value, because it will play an important supporting role in bypassing the strategic encirclement if NATO-Russian tensions escalate to war. Russian strategic documents also reveal that while the literature has correctly identified the Kremlin’s intention to disrupt NATO operations by contesting control over the GIUK Gap, another likely objective is to conduct precision strikes on Western military and economic infrastructure to support ground operations in Europe.
