Alexander MacDonald
Proposals to denuclearize the Arctic region span a time frame of 1964 to 2012, yet no substantial progress has been made towards denuclearizing the region. This is partly due to the proposals’ consistent failure to present a series of viable confidence building measures (CBMs) and arms control measures to precede denuclearization. This paper seeks to fill the strategic gap of Arctic denuclearization proposals by presenting a menu of Arctic specific arms control and CBMs which seek to address the strategic and political gaps of previous Arctic denuclearization proposals, using both historic and modern works and ultimately offering a framework to advance the goal of an Arctic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ). The formulation of this menu was guided by the key contention that the foundation of confidence is communication and information sharing. That is, arms control measures, to even be negotiated, must first be preceded by confidence building measures. Arms control measures require trust both in the negotiation and execution phase which can be provided for through established dialogue forums and confidence building measures. This menu for Arctic arms control and CBMs has been in development for several decades, starting with Franklyn Griffiths’ 1979 partial Arctic demilitarization proposal, and has enjoyed an increasing amount of academic commentary, especially in the wake of the 2014 collapse of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) and Arctic Chief of Defense Staff (ACDS) meetings. These measures, however, have never been assembled into a comprehensive menu for consideration. Efforts towards comprehensive Arctic denuclearization can immensely benefit from this work if it is harnessed, harmonized and orientated towards denuclearizing the Arctic region. Doing so would begin charting the course of strategic stability leading towards cooperation and arms reduction which is absolutely crucial for any serious consideration of Arctic denuclearization.
