Lassi Heininen
Freedom of science is stated as belonging to the core of Nordic/European values in speeches (e.g. the 55th anniversary of Finnish Union of University Professors in October 2024), communiques and declarations (e.g. the European Higher Education Area Ministerial Meeting in May 2024) and academic gatherings (e.g. the Helsinki Collegium event on academic freedom in November 2024; the Nordic Meeting in May 2018) as a leading principle in Academia. Recently, based on a substantial report Nordic academic trade unions stated that academic freedom is “under pressure from a range of factors... [when] challenges such as managerialism, external funding dependence, undue political interference,... threaten the core principles of academic freedom”, as they united their commitment to protect it (Nordic Academic Trade Unions 2024). So far, so good.
The real value and importance of an independent scientific community, however, is measured by if the freedom is implemented in a real life. This is particularly relevant when there is a ‘storm’ of turbulent times in world politics either due to geopolitical tensions or wars; or severe natural disasters or man-made environmental catastrophes indicating that the “‘Anthropocene’ is already at play” (Finger 2016) and is threatening the entire planet.
There is now a perfect storm with multiple crises consisting of great power rivalry, including a trade war between China and USA; New East-West tension with related tit-for-tat responses, an arms race and frozen arms control between Russia and USA; a hot/proxy war in Ukraine with propaganda, war-mongering and supplies of military hardware, from ammunitions to strategic long-range missiles, between Russia and NATO member states; constant occupations, armed conflicts and civil wars in the Middle East, in particular between Israel and Palestine, and in Africa with massive bombardments and ongoing genocides.
At the same time, the entire world is thoroughly affected by the climate crisis, together with a loss of biodiversity and the mass-scale utilization of resources as well as the political inability of states to mitigate climate change, as seen at the latest COP-29 summit. Permafrost thaw is an important consequence of global warming and is representative of the rapid warming of the Arctic climate at 3-4 times the rate of the rest of the Planet: it destroys infrastructure (roads, airfields, factories, pipelines), causes accidents and pollution, releases carbon dioxide and methane (possibly old frozen viruses), makes Indigenous peoples’ and other residents’ everyday life more vulnerable, and is having direct and indirect consequences by accelerating global warming around the world.
On the one hand, all this requires the political ability and willingness to recognize the environment as the “material basis for human existence” (Haila 2001) and put it as the first priority because it serves “as a signifier for everything which is gone wrong in society” (Albrow 1996, 71). On the other, it is largely recognized that better scientific and interdisciplinary research are required and advanced technologies need to be applied in addition to more scientific cooperation across borders, including the sharing of scientific results and data globally.
On the contrary, since early-2020s, under the pressure of great power rivalries and geopolitical tensions due to the rise of China, the strengthening of the BRICS+ integration, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a fear rather than courage ”dominates among Western leaders” (Wieslander 2023). This fear plays a significant role in world politics, though cooperation is still a motivating factor in the longer run (e.g. Heininen 2024). This has made Western governments pause scientific cooperation, including cooperation in monitoring and information- and data-sharing between the West and Russia, and now with China.
In difficult times, if not always, it would be good for the geopolitical situation to be analyzed holistically and thoroughly by experts and debated honestly among policymakers, and for academic freedom to be properly implemented. It would also be good to remind ourselves about lessons learned from the past when formulating and implementing new policies and restrictions, and to take into consideration their consequences. This commentary - as a part of the volume on transformations, legacies and futures, and a sort of continuity of the discussions at the 2022 Arctic Yearbook “The Russian Arctic: Economics, politics & peoples” (e.g. Introduction, Heininen, Wheelersburg, Paul, Knyshev, Devyatkin, Enomoto, Parlato et al) - discusses the consequences of securitizing open science and restricting scientific cooperation in democratic societies, raises ethical questions of undermining academic freedom, and finally, provides a reminder about the importance of cooperation in Arctic research and its benefits for maintaining peace and stability in the region.
Securitizing science and restricting scientific cooperation
Regardless of the existing reality of environmental catastrophe, including the risk of an “irreversible collapse” of the industrial civilisation and the entire global system (e.g. Ahmed 2014), great power rivalries and geopolitical tensions are being allowed to securitize open science, undermine academic integrity, and violate freedom of science in Western democratic states. Consequently, this securitization process has led governments of most EU and NATO member states “to impose direct and indirect restrictions on research concerning Russia and China” as Nojonen writes in this volume.
First, members of the scientific community who have continued cooperation between individuals, across the NATO-Russian / Chinese borders are been punished or threatened with punishment (e.g. Wråkberg in this volume). Similarly, those academic networks and platforms, with open discussion and excursions as main methods which are keeping connections functioning across a new ‘Iron Curtain’ are facing unprecedented challenges. It seems to be that mainstream academic institutions put these activities into a margin by terminating funding, cancelling agreed visits, undermining academic qualifications, and attractiveness among young researchers towards cooperation across different borders.
Damage is already seen in Arctic research, for example, where cross-border, pan-Arctic cooperation, knowledge-building and transdisciplinarity (e.g. Arctic Yearbook 2023, Introduction) has been flourishing for decades. Due to a pause in monitoring and data-sharing, we do not know enough about the recent impacts of climate change. As the Russian Federation covers half of the Circumpolar Arctic and its rimlands and around 50% of the world’s permafrost is located there (mostly in Siberia), it is not scientifically credible and politically wise to neglect that half by excluding it from scientific cooperation and diplomacy (e.g. Konyshev 2023). In addition, several Western researchers and research institutions, having done research in the Russian Arctic and / or among Indigenous peoples, as well as cooperating with Russian colleagues, have benefitted professionally and from fundraising by leaning on Russian data and assisted by Russians (Zaika 2024).
There is peripheral damage (though critical) to the scientific community as it is losing its independence – i.e. the right to decide the goals, objectives and methods of research – to policymakers, secret services and media. This has already been seen in critical fields of science, such as climate and environmental sciences, security and strategic studies, and IR. Universities are allowing media, including yellow press, to influence research by politicizing it. Consequently, scientific cooperation across Western-Russian / Western-Sino borders is becoming an increasingly sensitive issue within Western research communities, including those with academic freedom in their constitution.
The fact that new policies and restrictions – often formulated quickly and accepted without assessment and detailed guidelines on how they should be implemented – are not necessarily thoroughly thought-out or logical, and this does not help here. For example, the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture (2022) declared in March 2022 that universities and higher education institutions are recommended to restrain “from all cooperation with Russian partner organisations in higher education and science... new projects should not be initiated and existing cooperation between organisations should be suspended”. Yet in a statement regarding institutional cooperation, there is nothing about cooperation between individual researchers or how to implement the policies.
The UArctic Board, on the other hand, stated in April 2022 that “collaboration between individual researchers in Thematic Networks and educational activities for students shall continue where possible.” Similarly, the Human Rights committee of the Council of Finnish Academies recommended in August 2022 that sanctions targeted to states and institutions should not be extended to scientific cooperation between individual researchers.
The results so far: two Finnish universities contradictorily implemented the new policies in the case of the same person: one punished by terminating an emeritus contract, unlike the other that decided to continue a visiting researcher contract. University leaders in Norway threatened publicly to punish a staff and emeritus faculty member, yet after a strong public response by the scientific community, the move was withdrawn. After an outcry and pressure from a loud group of staff members and universities leaders in Estonia, a decision was made to terminate an emeritus contract.
University leaders of another Finnish university withdrew an already promised honorary doctoral degree from a former minister who is currently an individual researcher.
In each of these cases, and there are a few more, a citizen of these countries paid a visit to Russia as an individual researcher.
Ethical questions of undermining freedom of science
All this raises at least three ethical questions: Firstly, although juristically universities have a right to terminate contracts, ethically it is very problematic to claim that a fact-finding trip of an individual researcher, or contacts between individuals, would be against the values of science and the commitments of universities if contacts are related to discussions on fundamental and timely issues, such as nuclear weapon systems, the climate crisis and other related risks. It is also artificial and hypocritical to argue that information-sharing and discussion between Western and non-Western experts on scientific research, methods, monitoring and data-sharing would threaten national security of EU / NATO member-states and support the Russian war in Ukraine.
Secondly, when it comes to freedom of science and the independence of the scientific community, there is concern about a growing influence of media over academia and universities. Research and higher education should keep their neutrality from any influence or pressure from outside the science community and be independent (see Laakso 2024). Hence, it cannot be so that universities make important decisions on research based on the media, or a single news report in yellow press, as has happened in Finland.
Yet, what would be a motive of universities (rectors, deans, heads of administration) to overreact or press a panic button and implement new policies and forget freedom of science? To please a ministry / government when hoping for more financial support, perhaps. Or, simply to play by the book, when trying to interpret how new policies should be implemented. Or, to punish certain individuals, who are being vocal either in public by asking critical questions (e.g. concerning Western double-standards) or critical within a university / faculty.
Thirdly, as wicked global problems cause severe, actually the severest, security threats to people and societies on the Planet, they should be debated publicly and discussed between researchers and other experts - through interdisciplinary research and internationally - all the time and without (self)censorship. We academics are educated and trained either to reveal a problem or find a new approach / angle to a known phenomenon, and then analyze it critically as well as submit our findings and conclusions, after a peer-review process, to be published without a fear of censorship or authoritarianism, or to be silenced under the pressure of geopolitical tensions. Yet, decisionmakers will make the final decisions based on that.
As science is universal, new approaches, analyses and findings should be shared among members of the international scientific community. Or, this used to be the normative scientific environment, and would be useful and beneficial to all parties in the future, too.
In a such stormy situation, when hegemonic competition and geopolitical tensions accelerate rivalries between major nuclear weapon powers, and when the last arms control agreement expires next year, scientific cooperation, as a field of low-politics, has the capability on the one hand to give insights into societies and implemented policies beyond the closed borders. On the other hand, it has the ability to provide a common ground for dialogue. A dialogue between researchers and other experts is, or could also be used for, confidence-building by indicating the social relevance of science.
This, also called ‘science diplomacy’, is an emerging topic in recent international policy-oriented gatherings on the Arctic; yet it is important to remember that researchers are not diplomats, and according to the division of labour, diplomats should be allowed to do their work where they are the best experts.
The thinking behind this goes that if cooperation between authorities and institutions is not possible, members of the scientific community (for example, emeritus / emerita and other retired experts) can, and should be allowed, to use other channels to continue cooperation. Though, not much discussed in this hostile atmosphere to highlight the importance of national security, researchers are more citizens of the international scientific community than those of a certain state (Saarikivi 2024). Similarly, ethics says that to emphasize national interests over moral points of view, such as human rights, is neither always allowed (Sihvola 2006), nor beneficial for humankind, even that very nation, in the longer run. This is also one of the features of Globalism, which requires that states would do things globally what they were doing earlier nationally (Albrow 1996).
Finally, even in this very situation, universities have responsibilities to defend their researchers and their academic credentials, and certainty not to violate their academic freedom.
Importance of cooperation in Arctic research
Arctic research - either by researchers of Arctic states and Indigenous peoples, or beyond - has been mutually beneficial and is one of the main indicators of common interests between the eight Arctic states and Indigenous peoples. This has been demonstrated by international scientific organizations, such as International Arctic Science Committee; higher education institutions, such as University of the Arctic; academic journals, such as Arctic Yearbook; and international research networks and fora – annual or ad-hoc – like for example, Calotte Academy, Arctic Frontiers, and the Arctic Circle Assembly.
This international approach to Arctic research was approved, and is supported, by the scientific cooperation agreement (2017) between the Arctic states. It is legally-binding and (still) in force and does not “provide an explicit provision for its termination, withdrawal or suspension because of armed conflict or heightened political tensions” (Konyshev 2023). The approach is also supported by the new guidelines for the Arctic Council Working Groups, agreed to in 2023 and implemented since early-2024 under the Norwegian chairmanship.
Based on its social relevance, Arctic scientific research could also be used for confidence- and peace-building, as a few learned lessons from the Cold War period indicate. Interestingly, in the 1970s new cooperative agreements on environmental protection and arms control were signed across the Iron Curtain multi- and bilaterally: The 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears between the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean is mentioned. Less so bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the USA, such as the 1972 US-Soviet Cooperation Agreement aiming to solve “the most important aspects of the problems of the environment” (Rosen 2023), the Agreement of the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, from the same year (Lynn-Jones 1988). Hence, scientific cooperation “eventually paved the way for the normalisation of state relations” in the Arctic, as Exner-Pirot (2024) writes (see, also Arctic Yearbook 2022).
Concerning learned lessons from the Cold War period – in these days these stories would be told more by those of us who were there – I cannot avoid a temptation to look back to the beginning of my research career and compare the current situation to that of the turn of 1980s-1990s with the pioneering of cross-border and pan-Arctic cooperation on research. Based on scientific curiosity and mutual respect between Nordic, North American, Russian, and Indigenous researchers and other experts, the first research projects on the Arctic had in-person seminars, including dialogues between researchers and civil servants (many experts on arms control), and publications were launched (e.g. TAPRI). Additionally, the first academic institutions on Arctic issues were established, among them the International Arctic Science Committee and Calotte Academy which still function (e.g. Report on Calotte Academy 2024 in this volume).
Despite several uncertainties and poor communication lines, there was much enthusiasm and an open-minded attitude towards cooperation across state and bloc borders. There was also a readiness to share experiences, information and data, and to implement the interplay between science, politics and business (e.g. Heininen 2021). It was a “moment of hope,” as Evangelista (1990) describes the first arms control negotiations in the 1950s between the Soviet Union and the USA.
Prior to the transformation “from military tension into geopolitical stability,” the Arctic states, together with Indigenous peoples and supported by the region’s civil societies, reconstructed their geopolitical reality by putting cross-border cooperation regarding environmental protection as the first main shared interest, as President Mikhail Gorbachev (1987) noted in his famous Murmansk speech in October 1987. Including initiatives for Soviet-Nordic cooperation on both military and civilian issues, some Western politicians took the speech, as well as the speeches by Soviet prime minister Nikolai Ryzhkov (1988) three months later in Sweden and Norway, very cautiously at first, even sceptically, calling it hypocritical or a Trojan Horse (for more details see Archer 1989). Nonetheless, after substantial political discussions and debates, and many speculations, the Nordics, as well as Canada and the USA, were ready to differentiate the proposals and pick that of cooperation on environmental protection, including science, “as an important opening in approaching security and co-operation problems in the Arctic and Nordic areas” (Torstila 1988). The rest is a part of the history of successful Arctic cooperation.
Conversely, in the 2020s, the Western Arctic states have paused official scientific cooperation with Russia, though the Arctic Council’s WGs are functioning on a limited basis. One Arctic state has closed its embassy in Moscow. Another closed all crossing points on the Russian border, unlike another that is keeping its only one open. The last two non-aligned Arctic states have joined NATO, Russia is in a war against Ukraine, and the rest seven are involved in sanctions and a proxy war against Russia. In short, it does not look good – it looks bad – as this kind of total pause between these states did not even happen during the Cold War period; hopefully, the USA is keeping its diplomatic channels open with Moscow.
At the same time, scientific cooperation and cooperation on climate change mitigation is more needed than ever due to the pressure of the ongoing environmental catastrophe. Permafrost thaw, as an effective way to measure a state of the rapid warming of Arctic climate, has made Indigenous peoples and other residents in the Russian Arctic, as well as Russian researchers and authorities, concerned about the situation and eager to share data and cooperate with foreign experts.
If the previous procedures are applied to the current situation: Scientific cooperation and cooperation on climate change mitigation and glaciology, which play a crucial role for the future of the region and that of the entire humankind, could be excluded as targets of the Western sanctions and restrictions. This could be done by differentiating foreign and security policies of Arctic states so that cooperation in these fields could be continued, and flows of research data and knowledge-sharing restarted (Heininen 2024).
As 30-35 years ago things were not expected to go as they did, further processes can go in other directions as well: Arctic cooperation between the eight Arctic states would become fragmented, and Russia would prefer the BRICS+ cooperation also in Arctic research, as we discuss in the introduction (of this volume) (also Zaika 2024). Fresh indicators of this were discussed at the Calotte Academy 2024, in November, when researchers of the Kola Science Center (located in the Western most part of the Russian Arctic) reported on increasing cooperation with Asian partners, namely from China and India, due to a pause of collaboration with Western partners.
Whatever the future options there will be (in Arctic research), an important precondition for science is that academic freedom, as well as the integrity of the scientific community, is being respected - universally, nationally, regionally, locally - among policy-makers, and that all members of the scientific community implement this freedom.
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