58
Arctic Yearbook 2013
Li & Bertelsen
Energy security has become an essential premise for China to achieve its national goal of a
―harmonious society‖ and the ―Chinese dream‖ which is based on continuous growth. There has for
some time been a genuine consensus among Chinese leaders and scholars that energy has become a
key strategic issue for China‘s economic development, social stability, and national security and that
the realization of China‘s core interests
2
is highly dependent on its access to sufficient energy
resources (Liu, 2006, Zhang, 2006). China‘s socialist market economy has locked itself in a ―tiger-
riding dilemma‖, i.e. any slow-down in economic growth would put the country in a risky situation,
which might lead to social unrest and popular resentment. China‘s government fears that domestic
energy shortage and rising energy cost could undermine the country‘s economic growth and thus
seriously jeopardize job creation. Beijing increasingly stakes its political legitimacy on economic
performance and rising standards of living for its people. Consequently, the threat of economic
stagnation due to energy shortage represents real risks of social instability, which could in turn
threaten the continued political authority of the state and the Communist Party. One Chinese
scholar of strategic studies clearly explains the reason why energy security has become a core
component of China‘s core interests:
With external trade accounting for almost 50 percent of China‘s economy, China is
now highly interdependent with a globalized market. This shift also includes hard
social, political and geopolitical choices that deeply impact matters of national
security. The more developed China becomes the greater its dependence grows not
only on foreign trade but also on the resources to fuel the economy. With these
complex and expanding interests, risks to China‘s well-being has not lessened but has
actually increased, making China‘s national security at once both stronger and more
vulnerable (Zhang, 2006).
China‘s sensitivity on the confluence of geopolitics and resources politics is also derived from the
fact that historically China has been a continental power, but a weak sea power (Stratfor, 2012).
Historically, one of China‘s key weaknesses is the lack of a strong navy to safeguard its interests and
this is perhaps one of the major factors leading to China‘s massive investment on raising and
modernizing its naval capabilities (Li, 2009; Ross, 2009). One element in China‘s movement towards
a blue-water navy capability to operate on the ―far seas‖ is the recent acquisition of an aircraft carrier
for training and development purposes. It takes a long time to develop the required battle groups
around carriers, but the perspective is also long-term as are the energy forecasts (Cole, 2006;
Nødskov, 2008).
China has territorial disputes in the East China Sea with Japan and in the South China Sea with
neighboring countries and is concerned about the security of the major maritime transportation
routes through which China transports the majority of its foreign trade, as well as its oil imports
upon which it is highly dependent (Xu, 2006; Erickson & Collins, 2007; Leung, 2011; Zhang, 2011,
2012; Cao & Bluth, 2013; Rainwater, 2013). Based on the historical lessons, China has a clear
understanding on the linkage between its energy security and international geopolitics, which is spelt
out clearly by one scholar:
The history of capitalism and its spread globally have shown that it is often
accompanied by cruel competition between nation states. Those countries that lose