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59
Arctic Yearbook 2013
The Drivers of Chinese Arctic Interests
out are not necessarily economically or technologically underdeveloped or those with
a low level of culture. Rather, they are most often those nations who forgo the need
to apply their national strength to national defense and therefore do not possess
sufficient strategic capability (Zhang, 2006: 17).
Maritime Transportation Security
As iterated above, China‘s economic growth depends not only on active participation in
international markets and trade, but on access to global energy and raw materials (Xu, 2006;
Erickson & Collins, 2007; Leung, 2011; Hong, 2012b; Zhang, 2011, 2012; Blunden, 2012; Cao &
Bluth, 2013; Rainwater, 2013). Despite post-Mao leader Deng Xiaoping‘s advice ―Tao Guang Yang
Hui‖ (hide one‘s capacities and bide one‘s time), it is becoming difficult for China to avoid involving
itself in the world‘s most conflict-ridden regions where the United States has historically been the
key player and where the world‘s oil and gas resources and maritime routes are located:
Consequently, China will become heavily dependent upon the Persian Gulf to supply
a large share of its future oil needs, and an increasing share of China‘s oil imports will
have to transit vulnerable maritime choke points. The IEA predicts that, as of 2015,
70% of China‘s oil imports will come from the Middle East, with other significant
shares coming by tanker from Africa, by pipeline and rail from Russia, and by
pipeline from Central Asia.
More than 50% of China‘s oil will have to transit the
Malacca Straits (Lieberthal and Herberg, 2006: 12).
Today, on the global scale, more than 90% of intercontinental trade is transported by sea, mainly by
ocean shipping and its related services, such as freight forwarding and cargo handling. Most of the
global merchandise is carried in sea containers. China has an ambitious plan aiming to become the
world‘s largest shipbuilding nation by 2015, with a capacity of 24 mil. DWT (deadweight tonnage) or
35% of global capacity (Mackey, 2006
)
. China‘s coastal line areas are the heart of its economic
growth and the frontier of its international trade. Maritime transport has been the lifeline of China‘s
economic development. The nation already boasts the world‘s fourth largest merchant fleet,
contributing 6.8% to global tonnage (UNCTAD, 2005).
Maritime transport, with its close connection with international trade, has become a matter of
China‘s national interest as evidenced by the priority given by the Chinese government to develop its
ports under its 11
th
Five-Year Development Plan to support the country‘s spectacular trade and
economic growth. One of the concrete outcomes is the impressive growth of China‘s port sector,
such as the spectacular rise of the Shanghai port. In 2010, Shanghai port overtook Singapore as the
busiest container port in the world, handling 29.05 mil. TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent unit)(Straits
Times, 2011).
However, Chinese maritime transportation security is not only challenged by strategic rivalry with
the USA and the global hegemony of the US Navy, it is also challenged by non-state actors. Piracy in
the Gulf of Aden, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca are all threats to international shipping,
which are all on the sea-lanes connecting China to energy suppliers in the Middle East and consumer
markets in Europe. According to the statistics of the Kenya-based Seafarers Assistance Program,
about 40 ships and more than 600 crews were hijacked by Somalia pirates off the Somali coast in the