Arctic Yearbook 2013
India‘s Arctic Engagement
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Some Indian commentators suggest that international efforts should be directed towards stopping
Arctic resource development, slowing climate change, and preserving the region. In his latest
intervention, Saran (15 July 2013) urges the United Nations ―to set up its own Arctic body‖ and
suggests that India and other developing states might ―put the Arctic on the agenda of the ongoing
multilateral negotiations on Climate Change under the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change‖ and thus ―ensure that the activities undertaken there do not harm the well-being of the vast
majority of people around the world.‖ He reiterates his earlier arguments that:
[I]t is hypocritical of the developed, industrialized countries, in particular, the rich
Arctic states, to preach low carbon development strategies to poor, developing
countries, while they themselves, rush headlong into ensuring the perpetuation of their
own carbon and fossil fuel intensive patterns of production and consumption. This
hypocrisy lies at the heart of the relentless spoilage and ravaging of one of the last
pristine frontiers of our endangered planet. If we keep silent and look away because of
the prospect of sharing in this unseemly Gold Rush, India‘s credentials as a
responsible member of the international community and as a champion of the
principle of equitable burden-sharing and inter-generational equity, would become
deeply suspect.
Other commentators indicate that India needs to enhance its knowledge and devise a robust strategy
to exploit Arctic resources, prepare for impacts that new Arctic shipping routes may have on
existing trade networks, and pursue opportunities for multilateral and bilateral cooperation with
Arctic states within the existing legal and governance regime. In raising the question of why non-
Arctic states (such as India) should trust the Arctic states, Chaturvedi reverses the question
frequently posed by established regional actors and highlights the trust deficit that persists amongst
and towards the ―outsiders‖ lobbying for a more central role on the Arctic stage (2012b: 232).
India will have to decide whether it believes it can achieve more by proposing ―solutions‖ as the
―conscience-keeper of the world‖ (Sikri, 2009: 89) that go against the expressed wishes of the Arctic
states (akin to the leadership that it tried to assert in Antarctic affairs) or by emphasizing its
willingness to cooperate, collaborate, and participate within the existing Arctic regime. In recent
years, Chinese officials have deliberately avoided contentious issues (particularly resource
development and sovereignty) to allay Arctic state concerns about China as a ―rising power,‖ instead
focusing on climate change and opportunities for scientific collaboration (Jakobson and Peng, 2012).
Several Indian commentators also stress that their country‘s Arctic strategy should be primarily
directed towards scientific research, allowing officials to leverage decades of polar research
experience in articulating India‘s role in Arctic governance (eg. Rajan, 2013). Although critics see
participation in the Arctic Council as a form of ―selling out‖ to the established, Arctic-state-
dominated order, particularly in light of the new criteria for observers, supporters see it as a
―toehold in the region‖ which India can use to ―gradually scale up its capabilities‖ (Sinha, 2013).
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) appears to accept that an Antarctic vision cannot be
projected onto the Arctic. Officials have indicated that they considered applying a southern polar
template to the northern circumpolar region, but decided that it would be inappropriate given the
inherent difference in an uninhabited, continental land mass and an ocean surrounded by nation