Arctic Yearbook 2013
Lackenbauer
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More generally, Chaturvedi points to a trust deficit in Arctic geopolitics. He laments that Arctic
states and indigenous groups ask the question: ―Why should India be trusted in the Arctic?‖
Reminded of the reaction to India‘s application for consultative status in the ATS in early 1980s, he
raises the counter-question: Can Asian states trust the Arctic states? Perhaps not. Similar to Chinese
commentators (eg. Peiqing, 2012), Chaturvedi problematizes the Arctic Council member states‘
insistence that new observers recognize Arctic coastal state sovereignty when the Arctic states
themselves cannot reach consensus on outstanding legal disputes over straits and continental
shelves. Although he upholds the Law of the Sea as a ―solid foundation for responsible management
of this ocean,‖ he is clearly wary of Arctic states‘ exclusionary predilections – particularly in the
―Asian century.‖ Accordingly, Chaturvedi appeals for Sino-Indian cooperation and collaboration on
Arctic issues. Yet his narratives also fixate on China‘s voracious appetite for energy, minerals, and
fish and how this will ―create its own geographies of excess and scarcity‖ (Chaturvedi, 9 May 2013).
Accordingly, his intervention produces its own paradoxes related to the political, human and cultural
geographies of a region in transition.
Final Reflections
―The Indian narrative on the Arctic region is ... still in its infancy and evolving,‖ Vijay Sakhuja
(October 2012: 6) observes. Accordingly, Indian policy discourse has yet to produce a coherent or
―dominant‖ opinion on the country‘s place in Arctic affairs. Nevertheless, several trends are evident.
Indian commentators seem to rely heavily on the ―polar race‖ narrative, anticipating regional tension
and even conflict, rather than expectations of a ―polar saga‖ promoted by other Western
commentators (Lackenbauer, 2009; Brigham, 2010; Vasiliev, 14 January 2013). Thus setting up a
straw man argument of Arctic state-generated securitization, militarization, and exclusionary politics,
Indian commentators insist on the need for non-Arctic intervention to arrest the coastal states‘
―rampant economic [and territorial] greed and consequent degradation of the region‖ (Kumar,
2013). Some promote the idea that India, as a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament, should
advocate for a military – or nuclear-free Arctic (akin to the situation in Antarctica). Others
encourage India to anticipate and prepare for strategic impacts of the melting Arctic ice on South
Asian regional security.
Most Indian commentators envisage the Arctic as a ―global commons‖ or a ―common heritage of
mankind‖ in need of protection. Accordingly, India insists that it has a right to conduct scientific
research and contribute to responsible environmental management. Although this concept resonates
with India‘s experiences in Antarctica, it bristles against the perspectives of Arctic coastal states and
Northern peoples who exercise sovereignty and sovereign rights to Arctic lands, waters, and seabed
resources in conformity with international law. Saran‘s warnings that Arctic Council observer status
is tantamount to accepting ―the sovereign rights of the Arctic Council members over the Arctic
Ocean‖ (1 February 2012) is misleading insofar as these rights are derived from UNCLOS and
customary international law, not the Council. The extent to which the ―global commons‖ envisaged
by Indian commentators seeks to diminish Arctic state rights – both geographically and functionally
– remains unclear.