Arctic Yearbook 2013
India‘s Arctic Engagement
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Despite his aversion to narratives of fear, it is global warming‘s ―unprecedented challenge‖ to the
planet that, in Chaturvedi‘s view, ―makes [the] Arctic a place where the entire humanity has a very
legitimate right to get interested and involved.‖ Nowhere is the ―materiality‖ of climate change
clearer than at the three poles: the Arctic, Antarctica, and the Himalayas – the latter an obvious
touchstone to indicate Indian experience and competency in understanding massive change.
Accordingly, his postcolonial ideals shape his mental map of the Arctic‘s inherent
―circumpolarness.‖ In his assessment, the region‘s artificial division into sovereign state jurisdictions
produce ―internal colonialisms‖ akin to other parts of the world, thus diminishing its
―exceptionalism‖ as it becomes increasingly intertwined in the ―international geopolitical economy‖
and geostrategic discourse. While Mikhail Gorbachev promoted the Arctic as a ―zone of peace
cooperation‖ in 1987, setting the tone for positive regime-building through the 1990s, the discursive
return to language of a new Arctic Cold War leads Chaturvedi to conclude that ―there is no denying
that we see trends which will lead to, unfortunately, greater securitization and militarization of the
circumpolar north.‖ Just as the emerging concept of the Indo-Pacific blurs the boundaries between
the Indian and Pacific Oceans, he sees energy security and sea lanes of communication are drawing
the Arctic into broader maritime geopolitics (Chaturvedi, 9 May 2013). Like climate change itself,
this problematizes the delineation of what lies within or outside the region, producing broader,
international, vested interests in what is happening in this evolving space.
Chaturvedi also characterizes the Arctic as a ―complex space,‖ alluding to the idea that it is also a
place
. ―Sometimes people forget that Arctic geographies are humanized geographies,‖ he observes,
and the indigenous social-cultural changes also are transforming the region (Chaturvedi, 9 May
2013). In a profound ―think piece‖ on Asia and the Arctic, he concludes:
On the note that as the rising Asian powers prepare and push their cases for observer
status in the Arctic Council, it is vitally important that they give due space and
attention to the ‗human dimension‘ of Arctic governance. In most reasoning advanced
so far, what is missing by and large is the engagement with indigenous peoples of the
circumpolar north; their knowledge systems, world-views and aspirations. It is useful
to be reminded that ‗Arctic‘ (both on land and at sea) is not a ‗strategic void‘ and it is
the
lived in
geographies of the Circumpolar North that are in the front line of adverse
climate change consequences. What might appear as ‗opportunities‘ offered by climate
change may in some cases pose serious ‗threats‘ to the livelihoods of Arctic
communities; especially the indigenous peoples. It is vital in other words that the
Asian efforts at confidence-building and alliance-making go beyond the state actors in
the Arctic Council (Chaturvedi, 2012b: 251)
This message echoes that of the Permanent Participants to the Council, who identify ―a pressing
need for enhanced international exchange and cooperation in relation to the Arctic, particularly in
relation to the dynamics and impacts of climate change and sustainable economic and social
development‖ (Cochran, 2009). Nevertheless, Chaturvedi concedes that northern indigenous
peoples have ―some very genuine concerns‖ about Indian and Chinese interest in the Arctic –
although he does not elaborate on what these are or how they can be resolved.