Arctic Yearbook 2013
Lackenbauer
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responsibility to managing activities in the region, including both development and environmental
protection.‖
Saran (1 February 2012) is both skeptical and vague about the existing governance regime. Nowhere
does he mention UNCLOS (upon which the Arctic states base their sovereign rights in the Arctic
basin) or other international agreements relevant to regional issues. Given his apprehensiveness
about the motives of the Arctic states, he encourages India to ―consider carefully whether it should
pursue its reported application to join the Arctic Council as a permanent observer.‖ His main
wariness surrounds criteria obliging new observers to explicitly accept the sovereign rights of the
Arctic coastal states ―over the Arctic Ocean.‖ Instead, he encourages India to ―press for the
Antarctic Treaty template where the territorial claims of States have been shelved for the duration of
the Treaty,‖ asserting that the underlying rationale behind the international community‘s support for
the treaty is ―even more compelling and urgent with respect to the Arctic. Placing this on the U.N.
agenda during India‘s term in the Security Council and initiating international action on it could be a
historic contribution by India in its role as a responsible global power.‖
In the end, Saran promotes Arctic activism as a form of idealistic, prestige politics for India,
perpetuating longstanding polar aspirations originally developed for the Antarctic. This idealism also
crosses into his assessment of potential economic benefits from Arctic resource development.
―There may be voices in this country who may argue that India should follow China in seeking a
share in the exploitation of Arctic resources to fuel its continuing economic growth,‖ Saran notes (1
February 2012). ―This would be short-sighted. It ignores the much greater damage compared to any
possible benefits that India may have to bear if the Arctic continues to be ravaged by unchecked
human greed.‖ He also reveals a more pragmatic justification for why India should seek to freeze
Arctic development. As a relative latecomer to the so-called Arctic ―race,‖ Saran conceded that
―India possesses neither the financial nor technological capabilities to match the countries in the
forefront of the current Arctic scramble. The available pickings may prove to be meagre.‖ Although
wrapped in the righteous language of global interest, the former foreign secretary‘s commentaries
also reinforce Indian self-interest and realpolitik.
The Arctic as Geostrategic Pivot: Colonel (retd) P.K. Gautam and Commander
(retd) Neil Gadihoke
Indian commentators, often echoing Western commentators who suggest that the Arctic coastal
states have ―militarized‖ the Arctic (eg. Borgerson, 2008; Huebert et al, 2012; Huebert, 6 May 2013),
have begun discussing the strategic implications of the melting sea ice for Asian security. Their
narratives also intersect with broader critiques about governance, resources, and the Arctic states‘
perceived inadequacies in defending the environment while ―militarizing the Arctic in pursuit of
their narrow national interests‖ (Gautam, 2011: 1).
In a 2011 issue brief from the Indian Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, Colonel (retired)
P.K. Gautam laments that the Arctic-5 countries and the Arctic Council dominated and skewed the
current Arctic discourse. ―The Arctic deserves to be treated as a global common and a common
heritage of mankind,‖ he asserts, rather than as the private preserve of coastal states whose interests