Arctic Yearbook 2013
India‘s Arctic Engagement
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monsoons vital to [India‘s] own survival‖). Furthermore, access to fossil fuels from the Arctic will
shelve and even derail ―the shift to renewable and clean sources of energy,‖ rendering moot broader
multilateral negotiations to reverse climate change. In this light, Saran depicted the Arctic states as
direct threats to Indian and global interests:
Should five countries, which, as an accident of geography, form the Arctic rim, have
the right to play with the world‘s ecological future in pursuit of their economic
interests? If there are significant shifts in the world‘s shipping and, therefore, trade
patterns, what will this mean for countries like India? Will the exploitation of energy
resources in the Arctic improve India‘s energy security or complicate it even more
than currently is the case? There is currently a shift in the centre of gravity of the
global economy from the trans-Atlantic to Asia Pacific. Will there be a reversal of this
shift back to the trans-Atlantic via the Northern Tier? Will Russia re-emerge as a major
power?
Expanding on his analysis of ―India‘s stake‖ in the ―Arctic Cold War‖ in
The Hindu
on 1 February
2012, Saran began with the peculiar and misleading question of whether the Arctic ―will ... be the
next geopolitical battleground or remain the common heritage of mankind?‖ Contrasting the Arctic
and Antarctic experiences, he alleged that northern coastal states ―are keen to monopolise the
resources of the region, shutting out any interlopers including China.‖ Rather than emphasizing the
perils of Arctic state cooperation, his new narrative emphasized ―sharpening tensions arising out of
long-standing territorial disputes among the Arctic countries‖ as a reflection of a ―current scramble‖
for prospective economic and strategic benefits. By contrast, he depicted the Antarctic as a tranquil
realm thanks to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty which shelved competing territorial claims. Although
Saran acknowledges the basic differences between Antarctica (a continent) and the Arctic (an ocean),
he quickly notes that both are covered in a thick layer of ice, hold vast hydrocarbon and mineral
reserves, and are threatened by global warming. Given these similarities, Saran suggested that ―what
happens in the Arctic may well trigger a negative change in the Antarctic‖ – a disconcerting prospect
to India given its longstanding interest in the southern continent.
In linking his discussion to climate change, Saran uses the Arctic as a broader example of why India
and other non-Arctic countries had to assert their right to manage a ―global commons‖ vital to the
earth‘s ecosystem. Alleging that industrialized countries preached a low carbon growth strategy to
developing countries while ―intensifying their own carbon intensive life styles,‖ Saran insisted that
the Arctic coastal states could not claim ―exclusive privilege‖ in managing the circumpolar world. By
drawing an analogy between the Arctic and the Amazon basin, central Africa, and Indonesia, he
insists that ―the preservation of the extremely fragile ecology of the Arctic, whose disturbance may
adversely affect the survival of peoples across the planet, is of vital concern to the international
community.‖ Accordingly, he asserts that the Arctic Ocean was ―as much a ‗global commons‘ as is
the Antarctica,‖ and urges India to ―mobilise international public opinion in favour of declaring the
Arctic a common heritage of mankind and sponsoring an international legal regime on the lines of
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.‖ The Arctic states had explicitly rejected this model in their 2008 Ilulissat
Declaration, which insisted that ―the five nations that border the Arctic Ocean have the primary