Arctic Yearbook 2013
Lackenbauer
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Saran (2012) suggests that, if current trends remain unchecked, the main beneficiaries of this power
reorientation will be the five Arctic coastal states. His logic flow is revealing:
These five states do have territorial disputes among them, but are united in rejecting
the view that Arctic Ocean constitutes a common heritage of mankind. The role of
any international agency in the management of a very fragile ecology is also rejected.
This is despite the fact that any alteration in that ecology will have significant impact
across the globe. There is no counterpart to the Antarctica Treaty (to which India is a
party), which constitutes a global compact to preserve the pristine ecology of the
southern ice-continent by foreswearing any resource exploration or exploitation.
The language of the ―common heritage of mankind,‖ a principle of international law suggesting that
certain territorial areas should be held in trust for all humanity and protected from national or
corporate exploitation (see Hardin, 1968; Baslar, 1997), is deeply engrained in India‘s approach to
Antarctic governance. For example, Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee proclaimed
in 2007 that the southern continent ―being a common heritage of mankind and the foremost symbol
of peaceful use and cooperation needs to be protected for posterity.‖ As Chaturvedi observes (2012:
50), this concept finds favour with Indians who believe that their country should ―act as a major
catalyst for critical post-colonial engagement with the southern polar region‖ and democratization of
the Antarctic Treaty System ―in the best interests of entire humankind.‖ On the other hand, it also
resurrects external concerns and frustrations about India‘s past attempts to act as a revisionist actor
seeking to undermine developed states‘ national interests in Antarctica and impose a global
trusteeship model.
In accusing the Arctic coastal states of rejecting international authority over the Arctic environment,
Saran (12 June 2011) envisages a critical leading role for India in protecting an ecologically ―pristine‖
zone. In his view, the benchmark of responsible management is the Antarctic Treaty. Ironically,
nowhere does Saran make any mention of the Arctic Council despite its obvious role in existing
Arctic governance and its alternative model to the ATS. By overlooking this existing reality, setting
up the Arctic states as self-interested actors, and encouraging India, China, and ―other emerging
countries‖ to place the Arctic ―on the international agenda‖ (suggesting the next G-20 Summit to do
so),
Saran constructs a governance vacuum that non-Arctic states must fill as responsible global
stewards.
In emphasizing an internationalizing role for non-Arctic countries, he also plays up the idea that
heightened regional stability may actually threaten Indian interests. The settlement of Arctic
boundary disputes – such as the maritime delimitation agreement between Russia and Norway in
2010 – opens the door for resource development ―in a resource-constrained world.‖ With
concomitant increases in shipping traffic, he anticipates that ―the importance of countries that lie
astride these routes will be enhanced‖ (Saran, 12 June 2011). If their agenda proceeds as expected,
―the Arctic or Northern Tier countries, including the US, Canada, Russia, Norway and newly
emergent Greenland,‖ will benefit from new infrastructure, modern ports and harbours, and military
and naval facilities designed ―to safeguard these new and expanding economic assets.‖ In turn,
Arctic development will become a major driver of global climate change. Melting Arctic ice would
raise sea levels, change ocean chemistry and current, and disrupt weather cycles (including ―tropical