Arctic Yearbook 2013
India‘s Arctic Engagement
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only extended to ―claiming Exclusive Economic Zones so that resources can be exploited, rights
and resources for sea passage and the like.‖ Alleging that they relegated environmental protection to
the sidelines, Gautam predicts that ―their business as usual attitude towards global warming
combined with the prospects of the pollution of the Arctic due to increased shipping is likely to
further degrade the ecology of the region.‖ Accordingly, he advocates assertive Indian leadership on
the Arctic file:
Instead of leaving the issue of the Arctic‘s future to the developed countries,
developing countries like India must begin to play an active role, as they are doing in
negotiations over space and climate change. It is time that a policy on this issue is
debated and evolved in India. The first step in this regard will be for India to become
an ad hoc observer to the Arctic Council. At the same time, India‘s ‗strategic
community‘ needs to take the lead in articulating the debating the idea of including the
Arctic in the discourse on global commons (2011: 9-10).
Gautam‘s discussion of global warming, sovereignty claims, and potential new sea routes draw
largely upon general American sources that emphasized geopolitical and security considerations.
Ironically, his portrait of rampant regional militarization rests on a simple ―race for resources‖
narrative that omits the main findings in several of his key sources (eg. Brosnan et al, 2011; Titley
and St. John, 2010). By confusing and distorting the available evidence, Gautam produces an
unbalanced and highly alarmist portrait of a region on the precipice of conflict. For example, Canada
has allegedly ―beefed up its coastguard with four armed icebreakers,‖ when in reality it has only
committed to building one civilian icebreaker and an unspecified number of ice-strengthened
offshore patrol vessels. He also suggests that Canada ―is setting up military bases and a deep water
port on the shore of the northwest passage with military facilities 595 kilometres from the North
Pole. It is also raising a force made up indigenous and Inuit Indians [sic] to patrol the northern
borders‖ (2011: 6). In reality, Canada has begun refurbished an old deep water docking and refueling
facility and announced a small Arctic warfare training centre co-located with a civilian research
facility in Resolute in the High Arctic. The Canadian Rangers, the largely indigenous military
organization to which Gautam referred, was not new at all: it has existed since 1947 (Lackenbauer,
2013). Thus, while calling upon India‘s ―strategic community‖ to ―take the lead in articulating…the
idea of including the Arctic in the discourse on global commons‖ (Gautam, 2011: 10), Gautam‘s
own limited knowledge indicated that India might not be well positioned to engage the Arctic states
on regional military and security developments.
What happens in the Arctic will, however, have broader geostrategic effects. Retired Indian naval
commander Neil Gadihoke‘s commentaries on the geostrategic implications of the changing
cryosphere emphasize how ―Arctic melt‖ may impact India‘s outlook – particularly in the maritime
domain. Embracing the ―new great game‖ narrative, he points to the Arctic as an emerging shipping
―highway,‖ petroleum province, and source of planetary sea level rise. Given that Arctic sea lanes
could divert maritime traffic away from Indian ports, the country would have to factor regional
developments into its long-term planning. In human security terms, India‘s large coastal population
could be at risk from rising sea levels. Furthermore, its neighbour Bangladesh would likely ―generate