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Kopra
heavily dependent on international shipping (energy imports and finished goods exports) for its
economic, social, and political stability; if and when the Arctic proves to be truly valuable for its
natural resources and sea routes, Beijing will likely become much more assertive‖ (Ibid.).
Furthermore, Jakobson (2013: 15)
points out that Xi Jinping has to take the ―strong nationalist
sentiments amongst Chinese elites‖ into consideration and he cannot take the risk of
―
being
perceived as a leader who allows China to be humiliated by foreigners‖. Therefore, we can expect
that the new generation of Chinese leadership will assert its rights and interests globally, including
China‘s ―right to speak up‖ in Arctic affairs.
China‘s observer status in the Arctic Council not only brings privileges but also responsibilities.
Hopefully it will encourage China to contribute more on polar research, pay more attention to the
protection of the fragile Arctic nature, better respect indigenous people‘s rights, and shoulder more
global responsibility. Besides, as Heininen (2011) puts it, ―together with the rapid, and partly man
‐
made, climate change, ice as a natural phenomenon is becoming a concept of global politics‖. We
may even understand ice as a common heritage of humankind, and ―a ‗World Without Ice‘ would
not only look different, but would bring environmental, economic, cultural and political
consequences which have more problems and challenges than possibilities‖ (Ibid.). It is important to
not deny China a seat at the table when discussing any global problems. To use Nye‘s (2013) piece
of advice, the world should ―work with China‖, not just ―contain it‖. Thus, China‘s voice should be
given more attention in global and regional forums, including Arctic affairs, in order to fully engage
them with international society.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professor Lassi Heininen (University of Lapland) and two
anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments, and the participants of the Calotte Academy
2013 for the inspiring discussions. Financial support for the research on which this article is based
was provided by the Doctoral Program of Contemporary Asian Studies and University of Tampere,
which is gratefully acknowledged herewith.
Notes
1.
See, for example,
The Economist
. (2012, September 1). Snow Dragons.
2.
For a comprehensive review of the evolution of the ―China threat theory‖, the Chinese
interpretations of it and China‘s political and rhetorical responses to it, see Deng, Y. (2006:
186-214). Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory.
In: Johnston, A. I. & R. S
.
Ross (Eds.). (2006).
New Directions in the Study of China‘s Foreign
Policy
, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
3.
The concept of responsible stakeholder was introduced to international politics by Robert B.
Zoellick, US Deputy Secretary of State during the George W. Bush administration, in 2005.
He defined a responsible stakeholder as the following: ―All nations conduct diplomacy to