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Arctic Yearbook 2013
China‘s Arctic Interests
In his report to the 18
th
national congress of the CPC in November 2012, then Chinese President
Hu Jintao (2012) called for China to ―resolutely safeguard China's maritime rights and interests, and
build China into a maritime power
‖. As Hu‘s announcement raised significantly the profile of
maritime issues on China‘s political agenda, it was greeted with alarm amongst its neighbours and
the US.
12
Certainly, China‘s pursuit of maritime power is mostly a regional issue,
13
but we can also
draw a conclusion that China seeks to safeguard its maritime rights and interests in the Arctic Ocean
in a more determinate manner. According to Hu (2012), China ―should enhance our capacity for
exploiting marine resources, develop the marine economy, [and] protect the marine ecological
environment‖, which can also be seen as instructions for China‘s Arctic activities. In early 2013,
China‘s newly elected President Xi Jinping announced that ―We will stick to the road of peaceful
development, but will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core
interests‖ (as cited in
Xinhua
, 2013, January 29). Hence, Xi continues to follow the mantra of
peaceful development, which has been a central guideline for the party-state since 2004, but he
seems to take a more hard-line posture than his predecessors by adding ―legitimate rights‖ and ―core
interests‖. He makes assurances that China will not harm the interests of other countries but will
―maintain the multilateral trade system and participate in global economic governance‖. However,
he also warned that
―[
n]o country should presume that we will engage in trade involving our core
interests or that we will swallow the 'bitter fruit' of harming our sovereignty, security or development
interests‖ (Ibid.). Naturally, the Arctic is not included amongst China‘s core interests, yet it is
possible that in the future it will play a more important role in the global economy, and thus,
influence China‘s core interests, particularly that of economic development.
In line with China‘s other efforts to have its voice better heard in global affairs, many Chinese
scholars have encouraged China to take a more active role in Arctic affairs. In 2008, Guo Peiqing,
professor of the Law and Politics School, Ocean University of China, suggested that China should
abandon its policy of neutralism because ―being distant from the polar region is not a reason for us
to be indifferent‖ (as cited in
Cankao Xiaoxi
, 2008, author‘s translation). According to Guo, as
―China is now moving on from a regional major power to a global major power, happenings in the
polar regions are of interest to China‖ (Ibid.)
. In addition,
Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo argues
that ―China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world‘s
population‖ (as cited in (Jakobson & Peng, 2012: 15).
Conclusions
From the Chinese perspective, China should have a legitimate right to participate in Arctic
governance as the melting Arctic has global security impacts and offers opportunities for non-Arctic
states as well.
However, the Arctic does not represent a top priority for the Chinese government.
Presently, the
government emphasizes that Chinese Arctic interests are scientific in nature. No doubt, unexploited
oil, gas, and mining reservoirs under the Arctic ice shelves and the forthcoming Arctic shipping
routes are also of interest to China as they would be important to the continuation of China‘s
economic growth. For the time being, the Chinese government pursues cautious Arctic policies in
order to lessen the international fear of China‘s rising status. But as Wright warns, ―this reticence
and restraint on China‘s part will not likely last indefinitely‖ (2011: 38). He argues that ―China is very