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Arctic Yearbook 2013
Kopra
will increase energy cooperation with multinational oil enterprises and the Arctic states. China
already has extensive energy ties with Russia and the two countries have pledged to boost their
energy cooperation in the future (
Xinhua
, 2013, February 19). China has also invested heavily in
Canada‘s tar sands (Levitt, 2013). In addition, Norway could provide China with important energy
know-how, but diplomatic relations between China and Norway have been frosty after the Oslo-
based Nobel Committee awarded Chinese dissident Liu Xiabo the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010.
Secondly, China has an enormous appetite for other natural resources as well, and there are plenty of
important, untapped, minerals such as gold, copper, iron, lead, platinum, nickel, zinc, and diamond
in the Arctic (Lindholt, 2006). Presently, China is the biggest supplier of rare-earths in the world.
Since 2011, it has set quotas to rare-earth exports to reduce environmental degradation and to
preserve resources for domestic consumption, and global prices of rare-earths have climbed sharply
(Perkowski, 2012). To consolidate China‘s monopoly position, Chinese companies have become
interested in Greenland‘s rare-earth deposits (Jun, 2011). For example, a Chinese company has
recently sought permission to establish an iron ore mine in Greenland. If sanctioned, the project
would be the biggest industrial project in Greenland (Acher & Fraende, 2012). China‘s huge
industrial investments would increase Greenland‘s economic independence, which ―is the path to
complete independence from Denmark‖ (Briscoe, 2013). For China, Greenland‘s increasing
economic dependency on China would provide a ―proxy voice‖ in Arctic affairs (Ibid.).
Thirdly, international shipping plays a very important role in China‘s economic development. The
melting Arctic will offer three main shipping routes which all are of interest to China. For example,
the use of the Northern Passage, which is most likely to be open for commercial maritime
transportation during summertime, would offer a 6 400 km shorter route to Europe and alleviate
China‘s ―Malacca dilemma‖.
11
Xuelong
was the first Chinese icebreaker to cross the Arctic Ocean in
2012. According to a statement of the Polar Research Institute of China (as cited in
The Huffington
Post
, 2012), the trip gained ―first-hand information about navigation in Arctic sea lanes as well as the
oceanic environment, and carried out useful exploration and practice for our nation's ships that use
Arctic passages in the future.‖ Recently, Huigen Yang, Director General of the Polar Research
Institute of China, has optimistically estimated that 5 - 15% of China‘s international trade would use
an Arctic shipping route by 2020 (as cited in Doyle, 2013).
Pursuit of International Status
China is attempting to become a more influential player in international politics, yet its increasing
international status is often referred to as a negative phenomenon – the ―China threat‖. For this
reason, the Chinese government has given a lot of attention to this perception in attempts to lessen
global fear and improve the state‘s international image. For instance, Deng (2008: 8) argues that
since the mid-1990s, the Chinese government has actively projected the state‘s international status
―as if it were the most desirable value, the one that leads to power, security, and respect‖. In
addition, Gries (2005: 103 -105) states that nationalism, which he defines as ―any behaviour designed
to restore, maintain, or advance public images of the nation‖, is ―a key – if not
the
key – motivator of
Chinese foreign policy‖.