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Arctic Yearbook 2013
Kopra
have also been greeted with scepticism. For example, a Chinese businessman‘s plan to buy a large
area of land in Iceland was met with a dubious response by the European public in 2011. In the end,
Iceland rejected the bid (Jackson and Hook, 2011). Furthermore, Martin Breum, an expert on
Greenland‘s extractive industries, says: ―Potential Chinese control of the rare earth elements in
Greenland is scary to a lot of governments in the Western world‖ as cited in Acher and Fraende,
2012). In January of 2012, the Japanese newspaper
Sankei Shimbun
claimed that China is ―casting
menacing eyes on‖ the Arctic (as cited in
China Daily
, 2012 February 1). Many studies have suggested
that the Chinese government does not want to be perceived as a threat but wishes to be seen as a
―responsible stakeholder‖ instead.
3
As to China‘s Arctic activities, various Chinese officials and
scholars have assured the world that China‘s Arctic activities ―have nothing to do with resource
plundering and strategic control‖ but are for the ―purposes of regular environmental investigation
and investment‖
(People‘s Daily,
2012). ―It is a normal action for China to broaden the investment in
and trade with Europe‖, says Ruan Zongze, a researcher at the China Institute of International
Studies. ―It is virtually a paranoia to connect China‘s regular commercial activities in northern
Europe with strategic control of the Arctic region‖
(People‘s Daily,
2012).
China and Arctic Governance
Generally, we can define the ―Arctic‖ as the region above the Arctic Circle at 66° 32" N. Thus, the
Arctic includes the North Pole, the Arctic Ocean and parts of the Arctic states (Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States). No country owns the North Pole
or the ice-covered Arctic Ocean surrounding it,
4
but five littoral Arctic states (Canada, Denmark,
Norway, Russia and the United States) have exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extending 200
nautical miles out from their coasts. To some extent, the Arctic states and China pursue different
themes in their Arctic discourses: in contrast to Arctic states‘ focus on national sovereignty over
their Arctic territories, China emphasizes that the Arctic is one of the global commons. For example,
Hu Zhengyue, China‘s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave a speech on the Chinese
government‘s perspective at an Arctic forum in Norway‘s Svalbard Archipelago in 2009. Hu
described the Arctic as a global heritage of humankind (as cited in Wright, 2011: 28):
The Arctic occupies a unique position for all of us as humankind who live on the
blue planet. The changing natural environment in the Arctic is enormously
influential toward the existence and environment of all humankind. The Arctic is
a sensitive region in global climate change. The entire planet in turn reacts to
natural changes in the Arctic, especially the climate of the northern hemisphere.
Although Hu did not question the Arctic states‘ sovereignty rights, his statement is generally
considered contradictory to China‘s overall foreign policy principles
5
.
For example, Jakobson (2010:
13) notes:
China‘s insistence that respect for state sovereignty be a guiding principle of
international relations makes it difficult for China to question the Arctic states‘
sovereignty rights. There is some irony in the statements by Chinese officials
calling on the Arctic states to consider the interests of mankind so that all states
can share the Arctic. These statements appear to be contrary to China‘s long-