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Arctic Yearbook 2013
China‘s Arctic Interests
numerous speculations about whether the rise of China will represent a threat or opportunity for the
world. More recently, debate has increased with China‘s growing interest in the Arctic region (see for
example, Lasserre, 2010; Rainwater, 2013; and Wright, 2011). In the future, it is believed that the
Arctic will provide business opportunities in energy, mining, fishing, and tourism sectors, and Arctic
shipping routes may offer more logistically efficient shipping routes compared to traditional
passages, such as the Suez Canal or Panama Canal. Not surprisingly, China has also become more
and more interested in Arctic affairs. To date, China has not unveiled an Arctic strategy, but has
actively increased its cooperation with Arctic states. In May 2013, China received observer status
within the Arctic Council. In addition, Chinese companies have started to take part in many business
projects within Arctic states, which has raised concerns around the world.
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Concerning international
climate politics, the fate of the Arctic is deeply interconnected with China‘s climate change policies;
while the Arctic is the fastest warming region on the earth (ACIA, 2004), China is the biggest
greenhouse gas emitter in the world (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2007).
This article examines China‘s Arctic activities in the context of the party-state‘s overall foreign policy
objectives. It begins with a review of China‘s rise to global power status, and its perceived
implications for international society, particularly regarding international Arctic politics. It will also
explore China‘s foreign policy objectives and examine how China‘s Arctic activities seek to promote
these goals.
Rise of China and the Arctic
Since 1978, China has gone through a series of economic and political reforms, enabling rapid
economic growth and significantly increasing its international status. Today, China cannot be
ignored in political, economic, socio-cultural or strategic assessments. Its increasing wealth generates
expectations of greater international respect, and China no longer accepts being left in the periphery,
although it still struggles for ―great-power recognition‖ (Deng, 2008: 2). However, due to vague
definitions of great powerhood, there is no consensus whether or not China has achieved a great
power status. China meets most of the material criteria to be seen as a great power – it is
geographically very big, strategically located, ranks as the world‘s second largest economy and has a
large military with nuclear weapons. It is also predicted to become the world‘s largest economy in 20
years, and is the most populous country in the world. Nevertheless, it does not undisputedly enjoy
the status of being a great power.
China‘s rise has heated theoretical and political debates about its implications for the global
economy and world politics. Many studies on international relations (IR) focus on the international
balance of power and security dilemma that China‘s rise causes. Realists debate whether a rising
China is a ―status quo power‖ or an ―imperialist power‖ (Morgenthau, 1993). Moderate approaches
recognise an increasing ―China factor‖ or ―China effect‖ (Hutton, 2005) in world affairs, whereas
some others predict the next century will be the ―Chinese Century‖ and China will ―rule the world‖
(Jasques, 2009). Many China observers have speculated whether or not a rising China will cooperate
with international society according to Western-origin international norms and institutions created
by the US after World War II. The most pessimistic commentators warn about the ―China threat‖
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or even about the ―coming China wars‖ (Navarro, 2007). China‘s increasing interests in the Arctic