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Arctic Yearbook 2013
China‘s Arctic Interests
standing principles of respect for sovereignty and the internal affairs of other
states.
However, it should be noted that China has never disputed the Arctic states‘ sovereign rights over
their EEZs, but emphasizes the global dimensions of the Arctic region outside of the EEZs.
Although Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo‘s statement in 2010 has been considered alarming by the
West, this has been mainly due to an incorrect translation in some Western media.
6
According to
China News Service (2010, March 5), Yin declared that ―According to the UN law of the Sea, the
North Pole and areas surrounding it do not belong to any country but are common wealth of the
whole human population‖ (author‘s translation).
7
More recently, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong
Lei has said that ―Arctic-related issues are not only regional matters, but also cross-regional matters
involving climate change and navigation‖ (as cited in
Xinhua
, 2013, January 22).
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 to promote cooperation and to coordinate interaction
amongst the eight Arctic states and Arctic indigenous communities on sustainable development and
environment protection. Since 2007, China has been an ad hoc observer at Arctic Council meetings.
At the Nuuk Ministerial meeting in 2011, the ―criteria for admitting observers and role for their
participation in the Arctic Council‖ was published. According to the criteria, new observers have to
―recognize Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic‖, for instance
(Arctic Council, 2011). Officially, the Chinese government did not comment on the criteria but
various Chinese scholars criticised it (Jakobson & Peng, 2012: 14). For instance, Guo Peiqing (2011,
author‘s translation), professor of the Law and Politics School, Ocean University of China, argued:
―Arctic states announce to the world: The Arctic is ―Arctic-states‘‖ Arctic. They oppose the idea
that the Arctic is a common property of the whole humankind and desire to advance their own
interests and to impair the participation of non-Arctic states through Monroe Doctrine.‖ In May of
2013, China gained an observer status in the Arctic Council. Observer status does not allow China
to participate in decision-making, but it guarantees access to all Arctic Council meetings and
activities. From the Chinese government perspective, the new status means that ―China supports the
[Arctic] Council's principles and purposes, recognizes Arctic countries' sovereignty, sovereign rights
and jurisdiction in the Arctic region as well as their leading role in the Council and respects the
values, interests, culture and tradition of the indigenous people and other people living in the Arctic
region‖ (Hong, 2013).
It seems that a majority of Chinese scholars agree that China should seek the ―right to speak up‖ (
话
语
权
) in Arctic affairs (Wright, 2011: 7). Like many other specialists from non-Arctic states, several
Chinese Arctic scholars have criticised the Arctic Council‘s position as the sole decision-maker for
the region (Jakobson & Peng, 2012: 13-14). For example, Cheng Baozhi (2011), a scholar from
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, writes, ―It is unimaginable that non-Arctic states will
remain users of Arctic shipping routes and consumers of Arctic energy without playing a role in the
decision-making process, and an end to the Arctic states' monopoly of Arctic affairs is now
imperative‖. Other Chinese scholars have also noted that if the Arctic Council had not accepted new
permanent observers, it would have weakened its legitimacy and questioned its position as the
primary institution to negotiate Arctic affairs (Jakobson & Peng, 2012: 14). This was understood by