Arctic Yearbook 2013
Lackenbauer
38
Pragmatism and Prestige: Vijay Sakhuja
Dr. Vijay Sakhuja, a former Indian naval officer and the director of research at the Indian Council of
World Affairs in New Delhi, has been an active commentator on Arctic issues since 2010. His
pioneering March 2010 policy brief, ―The Arctic Council: Is There a Case for India,‖ introduced
many of the themes which he and other commentators would elaborate upon in subsequent articles.
The absence of a question mark is telling. For Sakhuja, the answer is unambiguous: ―by virtue of the
Svalbard Treaty, India is a ‗stakeholder‘ in the region‖ and thus entitled to a voice in governance.
Accordingly, he provides a list of seven recommendations that ―it will be prudent for New Delhi‖ to
follow. A brief examination of each reveals underlying assumptions about India‘s role and interests:
1.
Forge relationships with the Arctic Council members and argue for a permanent membership of the Council
by virtue of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty
.
India‘s right to a governance claim by virtue of historical
engagement is dubious, particularly in linking the Svalbard Treaty and the Council, but this
statement grounds a perception that India has a longstanding interest in the Arctic.
Furthermore, the language of ―permanent membership‖ indicates a superficial understanding
of the Council‘s structure (or may reflect Sakhuja‘s desire for India to acquire equal status to
the Arctic states in this high level forum). The only member states to the Arctic Council are
those states with territory above the Arctic Circle (the Arctic-8) and this is highly unlikely to
change.
2.
Broaden cooperation with Nordic countries and establish bilateral dialogues and discussions to understand the
evolving politico-strategic developments in the Arctic region.
This has also been China‘s strategy
(Alexeeva and Lasserre, 2012), but Sakhuja provides no rationale for targeting the Nordic
countries and not Russia, the United States, or Canada.
3.
Engage in policy related research on the politics of the ‗High North‘ and formulate an ‗Arctic Strategy.‘
This
call for research makes sense, given Sakhuja‘s emphasis that India should take interest in the
Arctic region, and his call for an ―Arctic strategy‖ echoes that of Chinese commentators up
to 2011 (Jakobson, 2011). Since that time, China has adopted a more cautious approach,
downplaying non-scientific research and acknowledging that its release of an explicit ―Arctic
Strategy‖ could unduly alarm the Arctic states and lead them to band together to keep
―outsiders‖ away (Jakobson and Peng, 2012).
4.
Undertake Arctic resource assessment and exploitation studies.
This indicates an obvious interest in
possible economic opportunities for Asian states to exploit living and non-living resources
(see also Sakhuja April-June, 2012), but is vague about what specific resources and where
they lie. This research would presumably take place with the consent and cooperation of the
Arctic coastal states, given that the vast majority of Arctic resources fall within coastal state
jurisdiction (including EEZs and extended continental shelves). Were India to embark on
exploration studies in areas under coastal state jurisdiction according to UNCLOS, this
would undoubtedly generate tensions.
5.
Regular expeditions to the Arctic and consolidate scientific research.
As was the case with India‘s
accession to the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), commentators recognize that India‘s