Arctic Yearbook 2013
India‘s Arctic Engagement
37
3.
To conduct research on the dynamics and mass budget of Arctic glaciers focusing on the
effect of glaciers on sea-level change.
4.
To carry out a comprehensive assessment of the flora and fauna of the Arctic vis-à-vis their
response to anthropogenic activities. In addition, it is proposed to undertake a comparative
study of the life forms from both the Polar Regions. (MEA, 2013)
The following year, the Indian National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research (NCAOR)
opened the Himadri research facility at the International Arctic Research Base at Ny-
Ålesund
,
Svalbard, to conduct work in glaciology, atmospheric sciences, biochemistry, geological mapping,
and paleoclimatology (Sunderarajan, 2008; NCAOR). India also reached an agreement with the
Norwegian Polar Research Institute for scientific cooperation and a Norwegian state-owned
company for logistical support and maintenance at the research base. The country joined the
Council of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in 2012 and has committed more
than $12 million (US) to Arctic research over the next five years (MEA, 2013).
India has not articulated an official ―Arctic policy.‖ In June 2013, the Ministry of External Affairs
did release a short document outlining the country‘s interests. ―Arctic region, the enormous area
around the North Pole spreading over one-sixth of the earth‘s landmass (approximately the size of
Russia, China and India put together!), is increasingly being affected by external global forces –
environmental, commercial and strategic and in turn is poised to play an increasingly greater role in
shaping the course of world affairs,‖ it notes. ―India has been closely following the developments in
the Arctic region in the light of the new opportunities and challenges emerging for the international
community due to global warming induced melting of Arctic‘s ice cap. Today India‘s interests in the
Arctic region are scientific, environmental, commercial as well as strategic‖ (MEA, 2013). While
identifying climate change as the main driver of international attention, New Delhi offers no
specifics on its particular commercial and geostrategic interests.
This reflects India‘s pragmatic and cautiously idealistic approach to foreign policy. Despite an
understandable fixation on immediate challenges from its neighbours, Sanjay Chaturvedi (2012a: 50-
51) explains, India‘s developing geopolitical vision is not rooted in a ―strategic culture,‖ thus
precluding ―institutionalization of the country‘s foreign policymaking.‖ Without a grand strategy to
―provide the nation‘s multiple policy strands a cohesive form, consistency and orientation,‖ it is
unsurprising that this inconsistency is reflected in India‘s emerging Arctic policy discourse (see also
Brady, 2011). Most commentators perpetuate the popular narrative of an ―Arctic race,‖ anticipating
that as the ―great game moves north‖ (Borgerson, 2009) Indian interests will be affected by global
shipping through the region, as well as newly accessible energy and mineral resources – although
there is no consensus what stance Indians should take on development of the latter. There is general
agreement, however, that India can and should play a central role in insisting that the world preserve
and protect Arctic ecosystems, given the global implications of climate change. The Arctic also plays
into India‘s strategic calculations regarding its rivalry with China, its perceived obligations as a
spokesperson for non-Arctic states in the developing world, and as an aspiring global power seeking
prestige through multilateral engagement.