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Arctic Yearbook 2013
Scramble for the Arctic Offshore Oli & Gas Resources in Russia
Primork will allow Gazprom to circumvent regulations of the EU Third Energy Package
(Solodovnikova, 2013).
Simultaneously, Gazprom continues to strengthen its positions on the Arctic continental shelf. One
of the major outcomes of Vladimir Putin‘s recent visit to the Netherlands was the signing of a
memorandum on cooperation between Gazprom and Shell, setting out principles for collaboration
in the exploration and development of hydrocarbon reserves on the Russian Arctic shelf. The
agreement with Shell, after the misfortune with the Shtokman project, is likely to be seen as a certain
confirmation of the company‘s intention to be present on the Arctic continental shelf. It is likely
that the agreement between the companies will turn into a practical collaboration in offshore energy
projects, including a possibility of Shtokman field development, as it was planned by Gazprom after
Statoil had left the project. The signed agreement could be also seen as a counterbalance to
Rosneft‘s partnership with foreign companies. In the continuation of the agreement concluded with
Shell, Gazprom has recently been granted four subsoil sites in the Barents and has won a dispute
with Rosneft where seven out of eight disputed sites in the Kara Sea were granted to Gazprom. The
two companies also agreed on splitting the disputed site in East Siberian Sea. Gazprom will acquire
licenses for East-Siberian-2 block and Rosneft will obtain licenses for East Siberian-1 block.
Conclusion
In general the offshore energy development in Russia is characterized by rivalry
within
business and
political structures and
between
them, although there are certain issues where everyone‘s opinions
coincide. The government, backed by the state-controlled companies Rosneft and Gazprom, follows
a rather rigid stance towards preservation of the state monopoly on the offshore sector through
privileges granted to Rosneft and Gazprom. A certain divergence from this position could be seen in
the policy of Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology, which lobbied for the liberalization of the
current subsoil legislation. The position is mostly backed by the strong necessity to speed up
geological surveys and to re-orient energy production from the gradually depleting fields in West
Siberia to new areas, including the Arctic continental shelf. It is rather doubtful that the government
will expand the number of actors to conduct oil and gas exploitation on the shelf. There is a small
possibility that the private companies will be allowed to conduct geological surveys under the joint
agreement with Rosneft or Gazprom, while the state-owned companies will be responsible for
extraction and production.
The political rivalry is also fueled by the hostile relations between Rosneft and Gazrom. While
providing a certain degree of support to Rosneft, for instance, by allowing the TNK-BP company
purchase, the President has leaned towards the protection of Gazprom‘s gas export policy by stating
that LNG export liberalization should not harm Gazprom‘s export positions. Thus, a further
expansion of Rosneft in the gas market and on the continental shelf, in particular, will depend on the
ability of its President, Igor Sechin, to lobby its interests and influence the decisions of the President
and the government concerning the future development of Gazprom and the energy sector as a
whole.