

Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Somethings Old, Somethings New

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Introduction

On 6 December 2024, Canada released its revised statement on *Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy* (CAFP),¹ which “supplements” its 2019 *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (ANFP) “international chapter”² given profound geostrategic changes globally that have spilled over into Arctic affairs. Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly’s foreword paints a dramatic picture lamenting how:

for many years, Canada has aimed to manage the Arctic and northern regions cooperatively with other states as a zone of low tension that is free from military competition. ... However, the guardrails that we have depended on to prevent and resolve conflict have weakened. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has made cooperation with it on Arctic issues exceedingly difficult for the foreseeable future. Uncertainty and unpredictability are creating economic consequences that Canadians are facing everyday.³

In this briefing note, I offer some reflections about what remains the same, what has changed, and what is new in the CAFP. Minister Joly was careful neither to cast the 2025 policy as the culmination of a new full-scale co-development process like the one that yielded the ANPF (see my brief note with Peter Kikkert in *Arctic Yearbook 2019*) nor as a full strategy like *Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy* released in 2022.⁴ Instead, the policy statement reiterates that Canada’s desired end state is “a stable, prosperous and secure Arctic” with “strong and resilient Arctic and Northern communities,” with Canada’s foreign policy serving to “advance the interests and priorities of Indigenous Peoples and northerners who call the Arctic home.” Similarly, the Conservatives’ 2010 *Statement on Arctic Foreign Policy* set its vision for the Arctic as “a stable, rules-based region with clearly defined boundaries, dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern communities, and healthy and productive ecosystems.”⁵ In this sense, rather than representing “a fundamental change in how we look at the Arctic”⁶ one might see Canada’s 2024 statement as a logical

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continuation of Canada's Arctic foreign policy since the late 1990s,⁷ albeit with a much stronger emphasis on defence and security.

Framing the 2024 CAFP

The CAFP focuses on three core areas: "asserting Canada's sovereignty, advancing our interests in the region, and promoting a stable, prosperous, and secure North." The policy asserts that emerging threats since the launch of the 2019 ANPF have "triggered a need for a recalibrated approach to advancing Canada's national interests in the region" at present and in the future. Although the document proposes to follow Joly's concept of "pragmatic diplomacy"⁸ – the idea that Canada must "be pragmatic and resist the temptation to divide the world into rigid ideological camps" of "democracies versus autocracies,"⁹ thus allowing it to serve as a broker for non-aligned countries – the overall tenor of the CAFP places Canada as firmly in the NATO-US-Western democratic camp. There is no question in this document who Canada considers its core Arctic allies: the United States, Greenland, and the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). Other partners include non-Arctic European and North Pacific states (with Japan and South Korea singled out for particular attention).

Prospects for truly circumpolar cooperation are also constrained by geopolitical realities. Russia, which was framed as a potential Arctic partner in Canada's 2019 policy framework, is now clearly acknowledged as an adversary or competitor with whom there can be no "business as usual" given its brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine and disregard for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law. The "guard rails" that prevent conflict are "increasingly under strain" when it comes to the Arctic, Joly proclaimed at the launch of the policy on 6 December 2024. "The Arctic is no longer a low-tension region,"¹⁰ suggesting that any lingering notions of "Arctic exceptionalism"¹¹ – the idea that the region is insulated from global geopolitical dynamics – are now out of date. Furthermore, "threats to Canada's security are no longer bound by geography; change is accelerating rapidly; and non-Arctic states, including China, are also seeking great influence in the governance of the Arctic," Joly asserted in the foreword to the strategy. "To respond, Canada must be strong in the North American Arctic, and it requires deeper collaboration with its greatest ally, the United States. Canada must also maintain strong ties with its 5 Nordic allies, which are now also all NATO members."¹²

What is the same

CAFP reinforces that "Canada remains deeply committed to the full implementation of the ANPF, to Arctic state primacy and to upholding the rules-based international order in the Arctic." The first part affirms that Canadian Arctic foreign policy remains linked to its domestic Arctic and Northern policy, thus ensuring that the CAFP cannot be misconstrued as trumping the federal government's domestic agenda. The desire for "Arctic state primacy" is a longstanding priority, insisting that the Arctic states are best positioned and equipped to understand the region and its peoples. Reiterating that Canada remains committed to "ensuring that maritime claims are addressed in a manner that is consistent with international law" also gestures to the legality of Canada's position on the Northwest Passage as historic internal waters as well as its submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in support of its extended continental shelf in the Arctic.

The promise to “secure [Canada’s] national interests and ensure stability and prosperity for the Indigenous Peoples who live in the Arctic and the North” is also a longstanding staple of its domestic and foreign Arctic policies.¹³ While the Trudeau Government has prioritized reconciliation in its Arctic agenda,¹⁴ commentators should not overlook how previous governments (including the Martin Liberals and Harper Conservatives) expressed a similar strategic intent. Nonetheless, enhancing financial support for Canadian Indigenous organizations to participate fully in international Arctic fora¹⁵ and integrating traditional knowledge in research and policy development are key elements in the CAFP. The policy also reinforces the Government of Canada’s commitment to create opportunities for Northern and Indigenous youth and amplify their voices by funding youth initiatives in the Arctic Council and offering a paid internship program for Arctic and Northern Indigenous youth at Global Affairs Canada.

The summary of key Arctic and continental defence and security investments are largely a rehash of *Our North, Strong and Free*, but the narrative frames how promised investments will protect NATO’s “Northern and Western flanks” to ensure “that Canada can engage the world and deploy from a secure based in support of NATO allies.” How exactly Canada intends to deploy *from* the Arctic, given that it does not base expeditionary forces in its Arctic, is unspecified but may relate to defence against threats *through* the Arctic.

The United States is framed as Canada’s “greatest ally” and “closest partner and ally in the Arctic,” which resonates with previous descriptions of the US as Canada’s “premier partner” in the region.¹⁶ The CAFP reinforces how “close partnership with the United States is essential to the maintenance of a secure, strong and well-defended North American homeland, on which the 2 countries’ mutual prosperity depends.” The re-election of Donald Trump introduces uncertainty into the mix, however, as his criticisms of NATO and unpredictable behaviour with allies may disrupt our countries’ “unique relationship shaped by geography, history, shared values, common interests and strong people-to-people connections.”

The CAFP retains language designating the Arctic Council as the “pre-eminent forum for Arctic cooperation,” while explaining that the Minister and Senior Arctic Official (SAO) meetings remain on pause (and presumably will continue to do so until Russia finds a way to restore a trusted place in the international system). It commits to increasing contributions to the Council and to preparing for its third chairship of the forum from 2029-31.

Climate change remains a central theme in Canada’s policy, characterized as “both the most pressing and the most proximate threat to Canada’s security in the Arctic.” The linkages between climate change and security remain vague, however, apart from the common refrain that a reduction in sea ice in the Arctic Ocean opens new paths for encroachment on Canadian sovereignty (perpetuating an overgeneralized misconception about greater regional “accessibility” without attentiveness to domain or heightened uncertainty¹⁷). Unfortunately, the CAFP conflates climate change mitigation and adaptation, as well as threats amplified by climate change and those caused by it, leaving vague how the like-minded Arctic states might work together to address this “global problem.” Leveraging the expertise of NATO’s new Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE), based in Montreal and created “to promote research and knowledge sharing on climate security threats in the Arctic and elsewhere,” may help to articulate clearer, practical pathways forward.

The policy also continues to adopt a “whole of government” or “whole of society” framework, acknowledging that “to address the complex range of threats faced in the Arctic, Canada must conceptualize security not only in military terms.” The whole-of-government reference reflects language adopted during the Harper government, which also broadened the discussion across the defence-security-safety spectrum.¹⁸ The CAFP specifies that “security in the Arctic includes community security, research security, economic security, security against disinformation and any other form of interference and physical and digital infrastructure security.” This entails “work with Public Safety Canada to support efforts to strengthen Canadian national resilience to counter malign influence and activities of foreign powers,” and to strengthen defence of critical infrastructure to “protect northern communities against foreign interference.”¹⁹

What has changed

Russia, which was framed as a potential partner in the ANPF, is now clearly identified as a competitor that seeks to fundamentally undermine the rules-based international order and does not respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, or international law. It is referenced 53 times in the policy. “It is clear that Russia has no red lines,” Joly insisted at the CAFP launch.²⁰ While the document shows how Russia poses a threat to North America as a “geographic vector” for weapons systems that would pass through the Canadian Arctic to strike at strategic targets, it remains opaque about the threat that Russia poses to or in the region itself. What “vulnerabilities” is Russia seeking to exploit in the Canadian Arctic, and what exactly are the “increasingly sophisticated” threats that must be “kept in check”? It remains for commentators to imagine these threats, with some still spiralling into bizarre scenarios involving hoards of Russian land forces streaming through Alaska or over the melting polar ice cap in the Central Arctic Ocean to invade Canada, or pushing oil rigs into the Canadian Arctic to seize resources and usurp sovereignty.²¹

China, which is referenced 19 times in the CAFP, is clearly positioned as a non-Arctic state competitor.²² China’s ambitions to be a more influential regional actor are well documented, and the Canadian policy casts it as a challenger to Arctic state supremacy that “can be expected to use all the tools at its disposal to advance its geopolitical interests, including in the Arctic.” The policy raises concern about China’s “regular deployment of dual-use—having both research and military application—research vessels and surveillance platforms to collect data,” as well as malign economic influence. It also leaves space for “pragmatic diplomacy,” asserting that “Canada will challenge China when it ought to and cooperate when its interests align with China’s,” such as addressing “pressing global issues—such as climate change—that have impacts on the Arctic.” While these concerns are not new, their direct inclusion in a Canadian Arctic foreign policy statement is.²³ In response, the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa wrote that it “firmly opposes” Canada’s “so-called ‘Arctic Foreign Policy’ which distorts and misinterprets China’s Arctic policy and discredits China’s normal Arctic activities in accordance with international law.”²⁴

Sino-Russian relations in the Arctic also appear to be changing, with Minister Joly stating at the launch event on 6 December 2024 that Russia is “reversing its historic posture by facilitating Chinese access” to the region, and particularly the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.” The CAFP notes that the two countries conducted joint military exercises in July, their warships have also participated in joint patrols in the Bering Sea, and their military aircraft were detected, tracked and intercepted by the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) while flying into Alaska’s air defence identification zone (but not transgressing US sovereign airspace. “This

demonstrates the continued deepening of Chinese-Russian military cooperation, particularly in the North Pacific approaches to the Arctic,” the policy statement observes. While China’s desire to enter the Arctic and enhance its regional profile and prestige is well established, there is active debate on the Sino-Russian Arctic relationship in the region. Some call it a burgeoning “alliance” and others see as a circumscribed transactional relationship with deep-seated issues of mistrust remaining. The CAFP seems to treat the Sino-Russian partnership as a preordained conclusion at this point, rather than a precarious relationship with friction points that could be exploited.²⁵

The statement notes that, “while the risk of military attack in the North American Arctic remains low, the region represents a geographic vector for traditional and emerging weapons systems that threaten broader North American and transatlantic security.” This is not new, although the document points to emerging threats such as “increased Russian activity in Canadian air approaches, China’s regular deployment of dual-use ... research vessels and surveillance platforms to collect data, and a general increase in Arctic maritime activity.” The statement also emphasizes that “adversaries and competitors also employ disinformation and influence campaigns, malicious cyber operations and espionage and foreign interference activities to target Canadians, including northerners.” Few details are presented, but these disconcerting revelations are a clear indication of fear about nuclear and conventional aerospace threats, as well as “gray zone” or hybrid threats that span the defence-security spectrum.²⁶

NATO is referenced 22 times in the text, reinforcing that Canada accepts the relevance and importance of the Alliance in the region. With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, all five Nordic countries are now allies. The CAFP notes that “Canada remains committed to contributing to NATO and NORAD’s awareness of the threat environment across the Arctic region, including in the North American Arctic.” It explicitly connects “Arctic security and continental defence investments made in *Our North, Strong and Free* and NORAD Modernization” with support to “NATO’s deterrence and defence agenda by protecting the Alliance’s Northern and Western flanks.” This “ensures that Canada can engage in the world and deploy from a secure base in support of NATO allies, when needed.” After astutely noting that “the defence architecture and threat picture differ across the circumpolar north,” the Government of Canada commits to “continue to share information on threats in the Arctic with allies and to support NATO operations and presence in the European High North.” Details are not provided beyond reiterating that “Canada will continue to be an active participant in NATO exercises and operations.”

The CAFP also refreshingly identifies the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) as a partner in defence and security, emphasizing its role in maritime domain awareness and assistance to Arctic scientific research expeditions. It promises to expand Canadian partnerships with coast guards from like-minded states (which the *Canadian Coast Guard Arctic Strategy*, released in August 2024, says includes non-Arctic states such as the United Kingdom and Germany²⁷), but does not provide details. It also references but does not explain the role of the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, created in 2015, which aims to strengthen operational collaboration and coordination of activities between the eight member states. Is the latter an example of the “pragmatic diplomacy” where Canadian representatives can interact with their Russian counterparts? Whatever the case, the Canadian Coast Guard’s official integrated into the Canadian Defence Team in September 2025 does not change its status as a civilian Special Operating Agency, although it will mean tighter information sharing and operational coordination with the Canadian Armed Forces.²⁸

While ONSF projected military spending to reach 1.76% of GDP by 2029-30, the CAFP updated this figure to reach NATO's target of 2% of GDP spending by 2032. This reflected Minister of National Defence Bill Blair's announcement at the Washington NATO Summit on 10 July 2024 that the Royal Canadian Navy would purchase of up to 12 conventionally powered, under-ice-capable submarines.²⁹ This commitment has grown even more since that time, propelled by the increasingly volatile international security environment (including the disruptive influence of the Trump Administration). In June 2025, Prime Minister Carney, announced that Canada and its NATO Allies agreed to a new Defence Investment Pledge of investing 5% of annual GDP by 2035 to ensure individual and collective security: 3.5% for core military capabilities, and an additional 1.5% in "critical defence and security-related expenditure, such as new airports, ports, telecommunication, emergency preparedness systems, and other dual-use investments which serve defence as well as civilian readiness."³⁰

What is "new"

Various elements of the CAFP are more novel, such as formally recognizing the North Pacific, through the Bering Strait, as a key approach to the North American Arctic. Canadian leaders have understood this reality since the Second World War, when Canadians joined their American counterparts in the Aleutian Campaign against the Japanese.³¹ Since the Cold War, Canada has traditionally focused on the North Atlantic-Arctic connection, including the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. By broadening the aperture to include North Pacific-Arctic interconnections, the CAFP connects to Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy and also clarifies the extent of NATO's "Western approaches."³²

The foreign policy statement also announced that Canada would appoint an Arctic Ambassador, with an office in Canada's North to help address the Northern mantra of "nothing about us, without us." Canada first appointed a Circumpolar Ambassador in 1993, with Mary May Simon, now the Governor General of Canada, serving in the position from its inception until 2003. The position was abolished under the Harper Conservatives in 2006. Under this new plan, Canada's Arctic ambassador will "work with Arctic allies and domestic partners including Indigenous Peoples and territorial and provincial governments to make linkages between Canada's domestic and foreign policy agenda, advance Canada's polar interests in multilateral forums, and raise awareness internationally of Indigenous rights in the Arctic context." The ambassador will also work with Canada's Chief Science Advisor³³ on issues related to Arctic science and research. In July 2025, Prime Minister Mark Carney appointed Iqaluit resident Virginia Mearns, "a respected Inuit leader with a long-standing commitment to advancing Inuit self-determination and community well-being in Nunavut," as Canada's new Arctic Ambassador.³⁴

The more general pledge to expand Canada's diplomatic presence in the Arctic states also has novel elements – although this may also represent a reconsideration of recent decisions to contract that footprint.³⁵ For example, Canada closed its consulate in Anchorage in 2012,³⁶ after which time consular services have been provided by the Consul General in Seattle, Washington, and CAFP committed to re-establish "a new consulate" in Anchorage. The announcement open a Canadian consulate in Nuuk, Greenland, more accurately reflect the moniker of being "new." The U.S. opened a consulate in Nuuk in 2010 (having closed its previous one in 1953)³⁷ and Iceland has a consulate general there.³⁸ Canada's announcement to open a consulate there reciprocates the Government of Greenland's announcement in its February 2024 Arctic strategy that it will establish

a diplomatic representation in Ottawa and further develop its cooperation with Canada,” when it encouraged Canada to do the same in Greenland.³⁹

The CAFP also commits Canada to initiate an Arctic security dialogue with the ministers of foreign affairs of like-minded states in the Arctic. While Canada participates in the Arctic Chiefs of Heads of Defence meetings, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, and other bodies which discuss “hard” Arctic security issues, there is no established dialogue mechanism on Arctic security between the foreign ministers of the seven like-minded Arctic states, all of whom are NATO members. Presumably this group will adopt a broader definition of security than the defence-oriented fora, although the parameters remain unspecified.

Other novel elements of the policy are more domestic focused, including expanded information sharing with relevant territorial and provincial governments and Indigenous leaders on emerging and developing international Arctic security trends, including foreign interference threats. This may seem like an oddly placed announcement coming from Global Affairs Canada to include in a foreign policy document, given that it relates primarily to internal Canadian information sharing, but it points to calls from the Territorial Premiers and Northern Indigenous leaders to be more engaged in foreign and defence policy decisions.

The CAFP also contains new provisions related to strengthening research security in the Arctic. The new focus on Arctic science, and particularly marine scientific research (MSR), through a security lens reveals a burgeoning awareness of how competitors use science as a vector for data collection, intelligence gathering, espionage, and foreign influence. *ONSF* also states that the Government of Canada is seeing “a growing number of Chinese dual-purpose research vessels and surveillance platforms collecting data about the Canadian North that is, by Chinese law, made available to China’s military.”⁴⁰

Another significant change commits Canada to launch boundary negotiations with the United States regarding the Beaufort Sea and to finalize the implementation of the boundary agreement between Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark regarding Tartupaluk (Hans Island). Although the commitment to resolve longstanding boundary disputes peacefully, and in accordance with international law, is a staple of Canadian Arctic foreign policy statements, this one provides more specific timelines and parameters. On 24 September 2024, Global Affairs Canada and the U.S. State Department announced that they had created a joint task to negotiate the Beaufort Sea boundary, a significant unsettled bilateral maritime dispute. At issue is a 21,197 km² wedge of ocean and seabed that both sides claim, as well as an overlapping continental shelf beyond the 200 NM Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Resolving this longstanding dispute which will signal how “common interests in the region have served as the foundation of our bilateral Arctic relations for many decades and will continue to guide our Arctic cooperation in the future.”⁴¹ The likelihood of this being a priority given introduced into the Canada-US relationship by the Trump Administration, however, now seems very low. Implementing the Canada-Denmark agreement signed on 14 June 2022 seems comparatively straightforward, but provisions to ensure “continued access to and freedom of movement on the entire island for Inuit and local people living in Avanersuaq, Kalaallit Nunaat, and in Nunavut, Canada, including for hunting, fishing, and other related cultural, traditional, historic, and future activities” are complicated, given the Schenegen Agreement and other factors. Nonetheless, it may be a way to signal tighter Nunavut-Greenland relations, and may serve as a precedent for other transnational Indigenous mobility rights.⁴²

Reflections

“Canada is an Arctic nation, and we are at a critical moment. We live in a tough world, and we need to be tougher in our response,” Joly said at a press conference on 6 December 2024. “I don’t think the Arctic will be the primary theatre of conflict. I see the Arctic as the result of what is happening elsewhere in the world.”⁴³ Given the discussion about melting ice as a security threat, Russian militarization of its Arctic, and China’s ambitions in the region, this emphasis on the “spillover” of conflict from elsewhere might seem quite different than the way that Arctic dynamics are depicted in the policy itself. Unfortunately, the distinction between threats through, to, and in the Arctic remains rather opaque in Canada’s strategic messaging.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the CAFP provides helpful language parsing the North American Arctic and the European Arctic, linking NORAD and NATO, and articulating strategic challenges facing the region that require diplomatic, military, and whole-of-government responses.

A key challenge remains in trying to situate the CAFP into Canada’s broader foreign policy, given that Canada has not produced a comprehensive statement on the topic since issuing its *International Policy Statement* (IPS) under the Paul Martin government in 2005.⁴⁵ There is a similar challenge with respect to national security issues that fall outside of the mandate of the Department of National Defence. *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy*,⁴⁶ which articulated Canada’s core national security interests and how the government intends to address these threats, was released in 2004. The world has changed a lot since then, as the CAFP highlights. This means that readers have to try to discern for themselves where the CAFP and its various commitments fit in Global Affairs Canada’s overall priorities.

As noted earlier, *Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy* rests upon the longstanding assumption that “the United States is Canada’s closest partner and ally in the Arctic, and this collaboration extends across many shared interests” rooted in “a unique relationship shaped by geography, history, shared values, common interests and strong people-to-people connections.” This continues in deep collaboration on defence and security (including NORAD modernization, with various Arctic components), border management, energy security, and critical minerals. However, by declaring his intent to make Canada the “51st state,” launching a “tariff war” and using “economic force” to seek this outcome, and threatening to take over Greenland (without ruling out the use of force to do so), President Trump has raised deep-seated concerns amongst Canadians about sovereignty and its relationship with the US more generally. Furthermore, the Trump Administration’s climate skepticism, moves to remove restrictions on oil and gas drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska, antipathy or indifference towards Indigenous rights, and lack of interest in some issues (Indigenous cross-border mobility, marine and terrestrial conservation, and the protection of transboundary species such as salmon and the Porcupine caribou herd) all portend divergent paths. A May 2025 poll found that 37% of Northern Canadian respondents named the United States as the most serious threat to the Canadian Arctic, compared with 35% who said Russia, and 17% who said China. In response, most Northern Canadians favour a more assertive Arctic policy, with 62% agreed that Canada should pursue a firm line in defending its sections of the Arctic, with 26% preferring a more diplomatic approach.⁴⁷ In these respects, the unabashed optimism about the Canada-US partnership in CAFP already seems outdated.

Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy suggests that “the diplomatic initiatives in the Arctic foreign policy will complement all of these [national defence] investments by better aligning Canada’s strategic

approaches and by strengthening its relationships with Arctic allies.” Providing foreign policy “top cover” or context for Canada’s 2024 defence policy update is timely and important. After the release of the CAFP on 5 December 2025, the *Globe and Mail* passed along information from a senior government official that the new policy would receive \$34.7-million in initial funding and \$7-million in continuing funding over five years.⁴⁸ Presumably, most of this will go to the new ambassador position, consulates, and funding for youth, and Indigenous and Northern participation in various international forums and domestic engagement initiatives.

While circumpolar engagement and cooperation remain highly constrained and limited, Canada still envisages playing a leadership role in regional affairs – albeit in what it recognizes as a world of heightened geopolitical competition. The CAFP’s language around “pragmatic diplomacy” speaks to pursuing interests, while its aspirations around Arctic governance, the rules-based international order, and Indigenous rights speak to values. Perhaps Canada’s most distinctive feature remains its deliberate intent to include Indigenous rightsholders as full partners, and to ensure that Northern and Indigenous populations – which are disproportionately affected by changes in the Arctic – are the primary beneficiaries of Arctic policies. “By placing the invaluable perspectives, knowledge, and wisdom of Indigenous Peoples in the North, who have called the Arctic home since time immemorial, at the foreground this new policy and its implementation, we will ensure that the Arctic remains a vibrant, prosperous, and secure region now and for future generations,” Minister of Northern Affairs Dan Vandal promised.⁴⁹ The real test, of course, is the action that a policy inspires – and whether this will be sufficient to maintain regional security and prosperity in a tumultuous world.

Note

An earlier version of this commentary was published as a NAADSN *Policy Primer* on 16 December 2024.

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⁴ Dylan Robertson, “Joly crafting ‘Arctic foreign policy’ amid regional tensions, not a full strategy,” *Globe and Mail*, 12 June 2024, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-joly-crafting-arctic-foreign-policy-amid-regional-tensions-not-a-full/>; GAC, *Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy* (2022), <https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/assets/pdfs/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique-en.pdf>.

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⁶ Melanie Joly, statement at the launch of Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy, 6 December 2024.

⁷ For background, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, *From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World* (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009); Ryan Dean, "Speaking Security: Constructing Canada's 2009 Northern Strategy," *The Polar Journal* 12, no. 2 (2022): 303-321; and P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, "A 'Profound Change of Direction'? Canada's Northern Strategy and the Co-Development of a 'New' Arctic and Northern Policy Framework," in *Arctic Fever: Political, Economic & Environmental Aspects*, ed. Anastasia Likhacheva, 241-273 (Singapore: Springer Nature, 2022).

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¹⁴ See, for example, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "'Global Arctic Leadership' in an Era of Cooperation and Competition," *Canada's Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex*, ed. John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, 67-73 (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019); Lackenbauer, "Canada's Emerging Arctic and Northern Policy Framework"; Heather Exner-Pirot, "Friend or faux?: Trudeau, Indigenous issues and Canada's brand," in *Canada, Nation Branding and Domestic Politics*, ed. Richard Nimjeane and David Carment, 46-62 (New York: Routledge, 2020); Laurence Cros, "A Comparison of Stephen Harper's and Justin Trudeau's Arctic Narratives: Toward a New Geography of the Canadian North," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 62 (2024): 5-38.

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¹⁸ See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Toward a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Security and Safety in the Arctic,” in *Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic*, ed. Wilfrid Greaves and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, 137-167 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021).

¹⁹ Specific tools specified include the *Investment Canada Act*; by strengthening Canadian cyber security systems; and through new legislation to address foreign interference.

²⁰ Quoted in Ian Austen, “Canada Moves to Protect Arctic From Threats by Russia and China,” *New York Times*, 6 December 2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/06/world/canada/canada-arctic-russia-china.html>.

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