

Emergent regions? A historical perspective on ArctiC-EUrope relations (1970s-2008)

Emilie Canova

Since European Union (EU)-Arctic relations have been increasingly under scrutiny both by the media and researchers since 2008. Yet, because there was no EU policy documents dedicated to the Arctic region before 2008, the literature is scarce on their relations pre-2008. This has consequences for how post-2008 relations have been framed and understood as Europe-Arctic and even EU-Arctic relations predate 2008. A historical perspective adding nuances and context is thus lacking in our current understanding of the relations between the Arctic and its governance (the ArctiC) and EU/Europe (EUrope). This paper fills in missing links and knowledge gaps by examining how EUrope and the ArctiC interacted as 'macro-regions' through a close historical analysis of their relations from the 1970s to 2008. Documents from Arctic and European institutions' digital archives have been studied using critical geopolitics and region building approaches. Three periods with key documents are analysed. Gorbachev's Murmansk speech in 1987 and Stoltenberg's Rovaniemi speech in 1992 are first scrutinized. It then moves on to describe how Arctic Council SAO meeting minutes and EU's Northern Dimension documents respond to each other from 2000 to 2007. Finally, it focuses on the emergence of the proposition by the European Parliament of an Arctic treaty (2005-2009) as being part of a longer trend of geopolitical reconceptualization of the ArctiC and EUrope. The paper highlights the dynamic interactions between the evolving geographical and political entities that EUrope and the ArctiC have been and traces shifts in power relations.

Introduction

European Union (EU)-Arctic relations have been increasingly under scrutiny both by the media and researchers since 2008. Yet, because there were no EU policy documents dedicated to the Arctic region before 2008, the literature is scarce on their pre-2008 relations. This has consequences for how post-2008 relations have been framed and understood. A historical perspective adding nuances and context is thus lacking in our current understanding of these relations. Having a better knowledge of pre-2008 relations is important not only for the sake of it but because they shaped later relations and therefore are key to the understanding of the EU's difficulties in becoming recognized as a legitimate actor in the Arctic after 2008.

One of the difficulties for researchers comes from the evolution in time of the entities under scrutiny in terms of political institutions, geographical extent, and actors involved. Indeed, the

Arctic starts to emerge as an international region in the 1990s, and especially after 1996 with the creation of the Arctic Council (Keskitalo, 2004). The European institutions have also undergone drastic changes over the period both in terms of deepening political integration and geographical extent. The conceptualization of a European geopolitical unity, created by political and economic integration, really developed after 1992 and the Maastricht Treaty (Bachmann, 2021). However, European encounters with the Arctic go back to commercial whaling and the exploration and colonisation age, from the first expeditions in the sixteenth to the twentieth century (e.g. Loukacheva, 2007; Salvadori, 2021). During the Cold War parenthesis of bloc confrontation in the Arctic, the European Communities (EC)¹ did not have a direct relationship with the Arctic despite the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark to the EC in 1973. Indeed, Greenland left the EC in 1985 following a referendum and has since held the status of an Oversea Country and Territory (OCT). The accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU in 1995 meant that the EU formally extended above the Arctic Circle. Finland proposed the creation of EU's Northern Dimension policy that includes part of the Arctic under its geographical scope (Heininen & Käkönen, 1998). Despite the mention of the Arctic, no EU policy documents define the Arctic before 2008.

There is a strong scholarship on the Northern Dimension or the Barents region (e.g. Heininen & Käkönen, 1998; Browning, 2003; Heininen & Nicol, 2007; Archer & Etzold, 2008; Zimmerbauer, 2013; Elenius *et al.*, 2015; Bailes & Ólafsson, 2017). However, links between earlier EU engagement in the North through these programmes and its subsequent Arctic policy need further investigations (Airoldi, 2008; Heininen & Nicol, 2007; Powell, 2011, 2013; Wegge, 2011). Moreover, the EU's interactions with the Arctic and its governance during the 1990s and early 2000s have been studied through EU documents only (Airoldi, 2008; Jacquot, 2019; Maurer, 2010; Raspotnik, 2018). Therefore, this period needs more investigation from the sources directly, especially on the Arctic side. It was also necessary to complicate the main narrative of a single political entity (the EU) engaging itself in a geographical area (the Arctic).

This paper fills in missing links and knowledge gaps by reconceptualising how EU/Europe (EUrope) and the Arctic and its governance (ArctiC) interacted as 'macro-regions' (Mareï & Richard, 2020; Väättänen, 2020), and through a close historical analysis of EUrope-ArctiC relations from the 1970s to 2008. The aim is to understand the scalar and inter-regional links between EUrope and the ArctiC over time. Three key aspects and moments are taken from the period 1970s-2008 and explored to highlight these evolutions and inter-actions at different scales and involving different actors and geographical and geopolitical imaginaries. I first examine Gorbachev's Murmansk speech in 1987 and Stoltenberg's Rovaniemi speech in 1992. I then move on to describe how AC Senior Arctic Officials' (SAO) meeting minutes and EU's Northern Dimension documents respond to each other from 2000 to 2007. Finally, I focus on the emergence of the proposition by the European Parliament of an Arctic treaty (2005-2009) as being part of a longer trend of geopolitical reconceptualization of the ArctiC and EUrope.

By exploring the documents with a critical geopolitics approach on region-building and inter-regionalism (Börzel & Risse-Kappen, 2016; Hänggi, 2005; Paasi, 1991; Toal, 2003) and focusing on the geographical representations, I shed light on the dynamic interactions between the evolving geographical and political entities that EUrope and the ArctiC have been. The paper highlights the dynamism and fluidity of the concepts we are used to in international relations but also contextualizes and unearths continuity and ruptures in power relations.

Geostrategic interdependence of two emergent *regions*

Gorbachev's Murmansk speech in 1987: peace in Europe through peace in the Arctic

The end of the 1980s saw the emergence of the Arctic as an international region, as documented by many scholars (e.g. Lackenbauer & Dean, 2021; Osherenko & Young, 1989). One key moment in these developments was the speech given by the former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk on 1st October 1987. Scholars have stressed the importance of considering the speech in the longer-term perspective, highlighting a gradual shift from the start of circumpolar cooperation to ultimately the conceptualization of the Arctic as an international region (e.g. Escudé-Joffres, 2020; Keskitalo, 2004; Powell & Dodds, 2014; Steinberg et al., 2015; Young, 2005). Reading it through the lenses of the history of ArctiC-EUrope relations reveals the interconnectedness from a geostrategic point of view of Europe and the Arctic, understood as world regions, although they did not yet include the current regional political and institutional framework (inexistent in the Arctic and only covering West-Europe).

Gorbachev geographically positions himself “in Murmansk, the capital of the Soviet Polar Region” (Gorbachev, 1987). This point of view allows him to give a new definition of the Arctic. Pic (2022a) stresses that “beyond the political turning point this speech represented, it also marked an important geographical shift regarding the *discursive production of a coherent Arctic space*, that will eventually lead to the emergence of an Arctic scale”. By defining the Arctic as lands and seas above the Arctic Circle, Gorbachev enlarged the traditional Soviet definition of the Arctic which designated the High Arctic/Arctic Ocean (Olsen, 2020), and extended for the first time the “Arctic regional scale” beyond the ocean basin (Pic, 2022b). By doing so he also revisited the Polar Mediterranean imaginary promoted by the Canadian-American anthropologist Vilhjalmur Stefansson (Stefansson, 1921; Steinberg, 2016; Steinberg et al., 2015). The idea is developed in two different aspects in the speech. The first one is the economic and social development of the area, the idea that “the potential of contemporary civilization could permit us to make the Arctic habitable” (Gorbachev, 1987). This draws on the idea of the Mediterranean pictured as the “cradle of the European civilization” (Tsoukalis, 2022). This imaginary discursively describes the Arctic not only in terms of similarity with a key geographical part of Europe, but also in terms of commonality with the European project as a “civilian” project of economic development (Bachmann & Sidaway, 2009; *Déclaration Schuman*, 1950). The second one is the geographical similarity with the Mediterranean as a sea/ocean surrounded by land and a crossroad of different cultures: “It is the place where the Euroasian, North American and Asian Pacific *regions* meet, where the frontiers come close to one another and the interests of states belonging to mutually opposed military blocs and nonaligned ones cross.”² The various geographical imaginaries and knowledge displayed in the speech highlight a specific vision of the world and link Arctic and Europe in a security ordering of the world. In this context, cooperation in the Arctic is needed not only for its own sake, but primarily “for the benefit of the national economies and other human interests of the circumpolar Arctic states, for Europe and the entire international community”³. The three concentric geographical circles are linked through the security architecture. Policy moves to make the Arctic “a zone of peace” belong to the aim to mitigate the soviet-US nuclear rivalry and to create a “Common European home”⁴. The Arctic is thus important for Europe as part of the security architecture and their construction as secure regions is not possible in isolation. The varied geographical scope of the initiatives proposed by Gorbachev in his speech are to be

understood from this perspective. Not all are directly linked to security, but for the USSR they all had security policy implications (Åtland, 2008). Out of eight initiatives, three were related to the military sector and had the European Arctic as geographical scope, two economic initiatives also had Northern European geographical focus, and the last three in environmental and socio/cultural exchange had a wider circumpolar Arctic geographical scope. The Arctic and Europe were conceptually constructed in relation to one another. An Arctic cooperation could only be envisaged as such because Europe would become a “common home” and vice-versa, and (the demilitarization of) the European Arctic was the enabler. As the aim of the initiatives was to go beyond the division of the world into two political and military blocs, Europe and the Arctic can be conceived as independent regions made of states having commonality.

Whilst security links between the Arctic and Europe were emphasized by the USSR at the beginning to justify the necessity for an Arctic cooperation, the geopolitical transformations triggered by the collapse of the USSR lead to circumpolar cooperation being decoupled from European security perspectives to focus on the Arctic only. The political implementation of Gorbachev’s speech, in the form of Arctic cooperation, has been made from a different geographical (and security) perspective, and in a different geopolitical and historical context than the one in which the speech was made. The security aspects of Arctic cooperation and its link with Europe were abandoned (notably under the impulsion of the US) and replaced by the will of some (such as Canada, Inuit leaders and Finland) to create a circumpolar vision (English, 2013; Keskitalo, 2004; Lackenbauer & Dean, 2021; Tennberg, 1998). Actors reinterpreted Gorbachev’s speech through an Arctic perspective and selected only some propositions. The connection between the environment and security, and between the Arctic and Europe was, however, still present in the Norwegian initiative to establish the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC).

Stoltenberg’s Rovaniemi speech in 1992: the Barents region and the Europeanisation of the North

The Kirkenes Declaration that established the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) in 1993 directly linked the security situation in Europe with cooperation in the Arctic. Notwithstanding the (current) Arctic dimension of the BEAC, the study of the documents reveals that the creation of the Barents region was seen at the time as part of the Europeanisation process⁵ and of the re-composition of the geopolitical landscape in the European North with the application of Finland, Norway, and Sweden to the EC/EU. The European Commission was a founding member of the BEAC. One key document to understand the Norwegian mindset is the speech given by the then Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thorvald Stoltenberg, pronounced in the framework of the conference “From North calotte to Great calotte” in Rovaniemi in October 1992. This followed a conference in September 1992 in Kirkenes at the initiative of the Norwegian government to launch a Barents cooperation. The analysis of this speech shows the evolution of the ideas of regions and interconnectedness between the Arctic and Europe with the *emergence of the Barents sub-regional scale to EUrope-ArctiC relations* in the early 1990s, and the potential development of *institutional* links.

The 18-page long speech focuses on the “place and role of a Barents region in the new Europe” (Stoltenberg, 1992). It provides a historical account of the importance of the region for Norway as a transnational region that traditionally spanned over the Nordic countries and North-West Russia. The presence of the Sami people and their role in building a transnational region is

emphasized. The Norwegian initiative to create a Euro-Arctic region took place in the double context of the end of the Cold War and of the debate in the Nordic countries about EU accession, with the widespread idea of “Europeanising the North” (Elenius et al., 2015; Stokke et al., 1994). Stoltenberg highlighted the fact that on top of the traditional East dimension of economic and people-to-people cooperation in the region between Nordic countries and West Russia, the initiative would now look South to Europe as well. By doing so, he was positioning the Barents region as Russia’s new way to Europe. The characteristics of the region are very close to the one that are still highlighted nowadays (resource rich, strategic importance of the North-East...). He mentioned the Rovaniemi process on environmental protection but clearly separates the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS) launched in 1991 as an “Arctic question” (“arktiske spørsmål”) from the process taking place in the Barents region. The use in Norwegian of the word “arctic” and not “high north” («Nordområdene») also signals that Norway saw the AEPS as having a different geographical scope and interest from the traditional understanding of the Arctic, but as clearly circumpolar in nature (Medby, 2017). He situated the Barents initiative in the context of the Nordic countries striving to Europe and EU-membership seen as “the key to full-fledged co-operation in the North”:

“For the Russians, co-operation in the North is also interesting because it is a window to co-operation with Western Europe. It is my impression that the Russians would find a Barents region more interesting if it were linked to the EC, because they are interested in the widest possible window. [...] the Nordic Region can become a link between EC co-operation and North-West Russia. Such ties exist today with the Danish membership of the EC, and ties will be strengthened if other Nordic countries join the EC. [...] It is not inconceivable that the EC will be expanded by just one or two new Nordic members. This could mean that a new border line will cut across the North Calotte at a time when we are keen to demolish or minimise divisions. [...] it may mean that the North Calotte will be divided in the sense that part of the North Calotte will orientate itself in one direction towards one set of institutions, while the rest of the North Calotte will orientate itself in another direction and towards other institutions. [...] There are also aspects of the current EC regulations that are unsuitable for the North Calotte. [...] It is therefore important to develop a separate set of regulations for the Arctic EC.” (Stoltenberg, 1992)⁶

Stoltenberg foresaw the situation as it is now, with North Europe divided over EU membership, which has consequences on the EU’s place and role in the Arctic (Canova, 2023). Later in the speech, Stoltenberg also pointed to the risk of centre-periphery divide with EU decisions made far away from the North, on “the continent.” To prevent that, he stressed the need for reciprocal relationships and the need for the EU to develop a strategy with regards to the North, both for internal questions (such as agriculture) and external ones to balance out the centre of gravity of Europe that was still in the South at the time. This was also the idea behind the Finnish proposition of a “Northern Dimension for the EU policies” (European Council, 1997; Finnish government, 2006).

In the Kirkenes Declaration, the Barents region is depicted as an Arctic region in terms of natural, geophysical and social characteristics, with the same vocabulary that is used in the AEPS documents (AEPS, 1991, 1993; Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1993). However, there is a clear discrepancy between the introduction of the declaration and the rest of the document where the

BEAC region is described as belonging to Europe in terms of security and political architecture. Cooperation on the Arctic environment is presented as a need for European security and in the Barents region in order to create closer ties between Northern Europe and the rest of the European continent. This echoes the Murmansk speech propositions, but the main difference is that cooperation with Russia is conditioned to reforms: “support for the ongoing process of reform in Russia which aims *inter alia* at strengthening democracy, market reforms, and local institutions, and which is therefore important for closer regional cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region” (Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1993).

The period from the end of the 1980s to 1996 was a time of rapid changes. It witnessed various political actors, from states’ representatives to Indigenous peoples, trying to put forward their interests and create or integrate regional (Arctic or European) political institutions accordingly. Institutional and political contacts between actors in Europe and the Arctic existed, however, they were not yet framed as EU-Arctic relations. Relations with the US and Canada were seen as transatlantic, relations with Russia were framed as East/West confrontation, relations with the Nordic countries were framed as part of the process of Europeanisation and enlargement of the EEC/EU. In the Soviet view, Europe and the Arctic were linked from a security and strategic perspective and framed as geostrategic/confrontation theatres. Yet, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post-Cold War dynamics changed the context in which development towards regionalisation in the Arctic had begun. Their interpretation and subsequent development in the 1990s, therefore, shifted from the initial impetus and allowed for certain actors (such as Finland or Canada) to position themselves in a changing international order. On the other side, the political integration in Europe and the notion of a common space in geographical terms really took off in 1992, and especially with Schengen in 1995 (Foucher, 2000). Russia was already integrated in the negotiations of Arctic cooperation programmes in the 1980s-90s, but from a European perspective, the end of the Cold war meant that the EU could extend its influence and “civilise” Russia by integrating it with wider Europe. European integration deepened and expanded through advancing Europeanisation in the North. The security link between environmental cooperation in the Arctic and Europe was thus reduced to a sub-regional level – the Barents region – whilst cooperation in the Arctic continued for its own sake, with specific features due to the push back from the Americans on security issues and legally binding regional institutions during Arctic Council negotiations. There is continuity between IASC, AEPS and the AC in the way the Arctic region is characterized and represented, mainly with a fragile environment in need of scientific knowledge, economic development and political protection.

As a result, different region-building dynamics occurred in each of the regions. The Arctic was being referred to through physical and biological attributes and primarily for states (and other entities, including later the EU) to take care of. Europe was being referred to through political institutions. These institutions encompassed Europe incompletely, but nevertheless the EU gradually became the metonymy of Europe after Maastricht.

The attempt to create an *inter-institutional* dialogue between the Arctic Council and the European Union in the 2000s

In January 1995, Finland, and Sweden (and Austria) officially joined the EU. The enlargement of the EU to the North formally linked the EU to the Arctic region where the Arctic Council (AC) was formally established in September 1996. The creation of the AC broadened Arctic

cooperation, and gave it more political weight, despite the exclusion of military issues (Arctic Council, 1996). In December 1997, Finland proposed the Northern Dimension (ND) to the EU policies and that entered into force in 2000. The ND policy included part of the Arctic in its geographical scope. These events changed the dynamics between the regions but also continued previous trends.

The creation of the AC and the development of the ND policy meant that documentation is more abundant with minutes of SAO meetings, internal reports and policy documents being accessible online. It allows the construction of a detailed chronology of the relationships between entities and study of their mutual influences on each other. Even though there were no AC documents dedicated to the EU, the minutes of the AC SAO meetings disclose that cooperation with the EU was discussed in every single meeting from 2000 to 2007. Ministerial declarations also mention possible forms of cooperation with the EU through the ND. They reveal interactions between the EU and the AC at a technical level, especially through the representatives of the European Commission sent to the SAO meetings. The table (see table 1) shows how AC SAO meeting minutes and EU's Northern Dimension documents responded to each other from 2000 to 2007 with the EU and the AC commenting on the work of each other, contradicting the idea that the EU "discovered" the Arctic in 2008.

Table 1. Table of documents mentioning Europe/the Arctic (1997-2004)

Arctic Council documents and events	EU institutions documents and events
	Finnish proposal of a "Northern Dimension" to the EU policies to the Council in Dec 1997 (European Council, 1997)
	Nov 1998 Commission communication on "A Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union" : adds an external relations component to the Finnish proposition (Commission of the European Communities, 1998)
	<i>April 1999 European Parliament (EP) (Resolution A4-0073/99 on a new strategy for agriculture in arctic regions, 1999)</i>
	April 1999 EP report on the ND (European Parliament, 1999): Finnish rapporteurs; Urges the Commission to participate in the work of the AC.
	ND ministerial conference in Helsinki in Nov. 1999 : Commission to draft an action plan for 2000-2003: Greenlandic Prime Minister Motzfeldt launched the idea of an "Arctic Window" in the ND; links AC working groups-ND: representatives from PAME and AMAP participated in the conference
SAO meeting in Washington in November 1999 (Arctic Council, 1999): Finnish SAO presented a document on the "Environmental	

aspects of the Northern dimension” and updated the SAOs about the ND ministerial; Russian SAO suggested that the AC could be “the EU’s window on to the Arctic” and to formalise a cooperation with the ND	
Fairbanks SAO meeting in April 2000 (Arctic Council, 2000a): Finnish SAO reported on developments in the BEAC and in the ND	
	The Northern Dimension Action plan for 2000-2003 was endorsed by the Council in June 2000 (Council (general affairs), 2000; Council of the European Union, 2000): The AC (not listed in the first ND documents) is now listed among the institutions for cooperation; Greenland is not included in the geographical scope of the plan; no mention of the circumpolar Arctic
	EU Commission President Romano Prodi visited Greenland in July 2000 supported the idea of the “Arctic Window”
AC ministerial meeting in Barrow in October 2000 and declaration (Arctic Council, 2000b) the EU was invited and attended for the first time	
Finland Chairship programme (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2001): aim to “make the European Union an Arctic co-operation partner”; proposition that “the Commission becomes a permanent Observer in the Council”	
SAO meeting in June 2001 in Rovaniemi (Arctic Council, 2001): DG RELEX, presented the “Arctic policies and activities of the EU”; mentioned the Greenlandic Arctic Window initiative	
SAO meeting in May 2002 in Oulu (Arctic Council, 2002a): Denmark had the presidency of the EU; announced the organisation of a ND conference in Greenland in August 2002	
	ND Ministerial Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland on Aug. 2002, with report written by Greenlandic government (Parliament of Greenland, 2003): the concept of the Arctic Window was further developed and included in the conference conclusions
SAO report to the ministers for the Ministerial meeting in Inari in October 2002 + Inari	

declaration (Arctic Council, 2002c, 2002b): Canada was pushing for more Arctic to be incorporated in the next ND action plan; section dedicated to “Cooperation with European Commission”	
	Oct 2002 3rd ministerial conference of the ND with Presidency conclusions and guidelines for a new action plan for 2004-2006 (Third ministerial conference on the Northern Dimension, 2002): Inclusion of a section on the Arctic
	Nov 2002 annual progress report (internal document) on the implementation of the ND action plan (Commission of the European Communities, 2002): Cooperation with CBSS, BEAC and AC is mentioned; indication that the Commission participated in SAO meetings and some working groups.
Icelandic Chairship programme (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, 2002): strengthening of cooperation with the EU was inscribed	
	Jan 2003 EP resolution on the ND (Resolution P5_TA(2003)0521 on the Northern dimension, 2003): mentions the AC ministerial meeting in 2002; highlights the need to improve coordination between the EU, the AC, BEAC, and other forums involved “in arctic and regional matters”.
SAO meeting in April 2003 in Reykjavik (Arctic Council, 2003b): EU Commission representative updated the SAOs on the development of the New ND plan to be endorsed end of 2003	
The Icelandic chair sent two letters to the SAOs ahead of the SAO meeting in October 2003 (Arctic Council, 2003c): aiming to build on the momentum and concretely implement the synergy between the AC and the ND	
The Chair also sent two letters to the Commission (Arctic Council, 2003a): AC’s input into the development of the ND action plan with a detailed list of AC activities that could be developed as ND projects; asked for concrete cooperation mechanisms.	
	In October 2003, the new ND action plan was presented (European Commission, 2003): apparition of a section dedicated to the Arctic

	region; Greenland is included in the geographical scope.
	EP resolution November 2003 (Resolution P5_TA(2003)0020 on the Northern dimension New action plan 2004-2006, 2003): tabled in by Finnish MEPs; has a much stronger Arctic dimension; points out that the Arctic Window is not developed enough and that cooperation with the US and Canada are not mentioned in the new action plan
Selfoss SAO meeting in May 2004 (Arctic Council, 2004a): listed the projects of the AC for “possible cooperation between the AC and the Commission on Arctic issues”; list was sent to the European Commission in preparation for the workshop in Brussels planned for the Summer 2004.	
	AC-ND workshop took place in July 2004 in Brussels
	<i>EP resolution on Arctic agriculture (Resolution P5_TA(2004)0014 on Arctic agriculture, 2004)</i>
Reykjavik SAO meeting in November 2004 and Reykjavik Declaration in 2004 , (Arctic Council, 2004c, 2004b): the EU ND is still mentioned; show the disappointment of some Arctic stakeholders for the lack of follow-up by the EU on the July workshop; For the first time since the Barrow meeting in 2000, the EU did not send a representative. But this meeting had also the lowest attendance from observers ever.	

I analysed the documents from a triple perspective: representations of the regions in the documents; tracing the actors involved, and the geographical scope/scale linked with the narrative/aims of cooperation.

From 1996 to 2004, the relationship was driven by Arctic actors, especially by the AC at a time when the forum sought *international recognition* and to position itself as the “voice” of the Arctic (Arctic Council, 2003a). The EU was one of the key partners identified, as it was developing its own programme that partially encompassed the geographical remit of the Arctic. In this context, the AC attempted to create real coordination and partnership with the EU through the ND. The word “window” was a recurring term that is used by at least three different actors, starting with Stoltenberg in his 1992 speech. It was then used by the Greenlandic Premier calling for an “Arctic window in the Northern Dimension” in 1999, notably to include Greenland in the policy. Finally, the Russian SAO also described the AC as a possible window for the EU into the Arctic. This is an interesting metaphor in the aftermath of the Cold War, characterized by the famous metaphor

of an “iron curtain” (Churchill, 1946). Windows can be associated with transparency, which leads to trust from both sides but also opportunity. However, in the end, someone must open it for the opportunity to be seized and real cooperation to happen, and exploring this period reveals *missed opportunities that disrupted momentum*.

In EU documents, the Arctic region was framed through the lenses of regional development and had a fluctuating geographic scope, illustrating the influence of Arctic actors but also the indecisiveness of the EU. Some political entities played a key role and had leeway to shape the relationships between the AC and the EU. 2002 was particularly dense in exchanges during the preparation of the new ND action plan, in which the AC (especially the Finnish and Icelandic chairships⁷) and Greenland played a key role in trying to further engage the EU in the Arctic. Despite a few political events, these exchanges remained primarily at the technical level between the SAOs and a few people from the Commission. The attempt to influence the second action plan to introduce a circumpolar scale and to widen the scope to Greenland was only superficially successful. In the second action plan, a section on the Arctic was added and Greenland was incorporated in the scope of the programme, but the focus remained very much on the North/East and Russia in the context of preparing the 2004 enlargement, a process that would see ten new Eastern European Member States joining the EU. The lack of concrete follow-up on the AC initiatives disappointed the SAOs (see table 1). The attempts to establish a real institutional dialogue and cooperation mechanism stumbled due to two interlinked problems. The first one was institutional. The EU Commission refused to participate formally in the AC and did not ask for observer status. The second one is more of a political nature. Both regional institutions had different aims and reasons for cooperating with the other despite common goals for themselves, such as sustainable development.

Indeed, the analysis also shows that the EU and the AC had two different geographical scopes in the Arctic. The AC was trying to build a truly circumpolar vision and international recognition as a primary cooperation body for the region, whilst the EU was focused on deepening European integration and preparing for geographical enlargement. In this context the EU was interested in Europeanising the European Arctic. From that perspective, the ND and BEAC areas were of interest for the EU. The EU envisioned the Arctic as a neighbourhood and thus as part of the Europeanisation process as well as as part of its policy towards Russia. On the Arctic side, the geographical representations were quite different. The AC wanted cooperation with the EU because the EU had a policy that partly covers the Arctic, and shared normative goals (sustainable development, peace, etc.). As such, the EU was seen as a *natural institutional partner*. That was very much encouraged by Finland, which positioned itself as a liaison between the institutions. The discursive framings of the EU and of the Arctic have obscured the interdependence between the Arctic and Europe, and between environment and security. During this period, the geostrategic and security dimension of Europe-Arctic relations was clearly absent. The Arctic was portrayed in terms of environment protection and sustainable development, and progressively climate change as well. The security dimension remained centred in the ND and the Barents region, but the solution was Europeanisation to bring Russia closer to European values and economic growth. Two separate political regions thus continued to be discursively (re)produced.

During this period, the Arctic was progressively and consistently associated with themes that shaped how external actors perceived of the Arctic region. We saw the evolution of the Arctic

being associated with purely environmental degradation and protection to being associated with climate change concerns and its role in the global climate system (Arctic Council, 2004c). In the EU's documents, the Arctic region is systematically associated with the environment, research and increasingly climate change. In the Inari Declaration, for the first time, a whole section is dedicated to climate change (that was previously merged with environmental concerns), and the warming of the Arctic is mentioned (Arctic Council, 2002b). Additionally, we can see the insertion of Arctic-specific themes in international discussions and the implementation of international agreements by Arctic states that concern the Arctic. During the Icelandic chairship, SAOs discussed the idea of integrating the findings from the Arctic Climate Change Assessment (ACIA) in the IPCC report of 2002 (Arctic Council, 2002b). It goes hand in hand with the fact that the AC is also developing an international profile that shapes the Arctic region even more prominently with specific concerns. Its relations with external entities, such as the EU, played a role in pushing the forum to gain an international Arctic identity while also speaking for a region that it was simultaneously shaping by its association with certain topics. The goal of the AC, which was to develop knowledge about the region, was solidified by the publication in 2004 of two ground-breaking reports: the Arctic Climate Change Assessment (ACIA) and the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR). Despite these achievements, the drop in attention from Observers started during the 2002-2004 Icelandic chairship, and continued during the 2004-2006 Russian chairship (Knecht, 2017).

2004 was a pivotal year for both the EU and the AC. Around 2004, the (re)-emergence of power relations between the Arctic and Europe through geographical and geopolitical framings at different interrelated scales can be observed. Two sets of representations of the Arctic emerged in the EU documents. On the one hand, the Arctic is described in positive terms of peace and cooperation, but also in terms of an endangered pristine environment to be protected, which reproduced the description of the region found in the AC documents. On the other hand, the European Arctic is described as a challenging region to be developed and democratised on the Russian side. In both cases, the EU is positioning itself as a "helper" and provider of solutions which create unequal power dynamics. The security environment of the EU was cause for concern and "The European security strategy" was published in December 2003. For the first time, a joint threat assessment *at the European scale* was conducted and clear objectives for advancing the EU's security interests were outlined. However, the Arctic is not mentioned in this document. In this context, one of the reasons for the drop in interest from the Observers to the AC during this period could be that the Arctic was seen as a peaceful region which did not require strategic attention compared to other EU neighbourhoods (the Balkans or the Middle East, for instance). However, precisely when security became a European concern, references to European integration and security stopped in the BEAC documents. From 2003 onwards, the emphasis was put on cooperation with other structures, such as the AC or the ND. The declarations have become more technical. The declaration for the 10th anniversary of the Kirkenes declaration is key in that regard (BEAC, 2003). It marked the shift from considerations on security to sustainable development, and by doing so, from considering the Barents region as part of the European process of regionalisation to considering it primarily as an Arctic sub-region. It is thus important to note that although both are not mutually exclusive and that the Barents region had a double nature and regional identity from the beginning, this shift in its regional "belonging", going from a strong European anchor to stressing more and more its Arctic identity, is far from innocent and plays out at different intertwined scales. Regional developments at the Arctic or European scales

influence the way the Barents sub-region is characterised, and on the other hand, the characterization of the Barents region as either predominantly Arctic or European has consequences at the regional scale, as it changes the limits of EUrope or the Arctic and contributes to blurring the political limits of the regions.

The years from 2004 to 2008 are key to understand the 2007-2008 shift in the Arctic, in Europe, and globally, with the development of crucial trends. This period has been studied slightly more (Airoldi, 2008; Maurer, 2010; Raspotnik, 2018), but it is also very dense and is a turning point in the relationship. Therefore, it needs careful attention to trace the actors involved and the shifts/evolutions in geographical representations (Powell, 2011). The EU started to develop as a geopolitical subject, but the Arctic region was not (yet) represented as a geopolitical theatre. Within a few years, this changed, and new actors emerged as drivers of these relations.

Moreover, another set of political actors start to show interest in the *Arctic Ocean* and become interested in the governance of the region. The number of questions concerning the Arctic and the Northern Dimension asked by MEPs illustrate this inversion dynamic (see Figure 1). There was a growing concern with climate change globally and especially in the Arctic.




Figure 1. Data source: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

In the EU, the internal political debate about the nature of the EU and the future Constitutional Treaty,⁸ as well as its enlargement, changed the nature of the EU. The EU transformed both in its institutional and political nature and in its geographical extent with its enlargement to ten new Member States (MS) between May 2004 and 2007. The internal political consolidation and debate on the nature of the EU goes hand in hand with the evolution of the role of the EU on the international stage as a unitary actor (Habermas, 2011). Moreover, scholars point out that the “reconfiguration of the political space is at the heart of the project of European integration” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2005). The enlargement to the East also meant that the EU would have new neighbours, and thus a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was implemented in 2004 with two different areas: the South/Mediterranean area and Eastern Europe/Caucasus area⁹. This

initiated the process of giving an institutional and legal shape to values that also have geographical dimensions: the question of *where* Europe is and what the EU's purpose is. These values were re-debated between an opposing free-market vision (British vision) and a more geopolitical vision for Europe as a new international subject (Bialasiewicz, 2011; Bialasiewicz et al., 2005). At the same time, Russia's behaviour on the international stage became more and more assertive, as illustrated by the Munich speech in 2007 and the war in Georgia in 2008 (Devyatkin, 2023; Laruelle, 2018). In this context, the ND was not included in the European Neighbourhood Policy framework but there were clear commonalities in the objectives, as both aimed at the dissemination of values and democracy and economic prosperity beyond EU's borders as well as the use of the same instruments as the ENP (partnership with Russia, Interreg, accession instruments, structural funds). After a year with almost no EU documents dedicated to the ND or the Arctic, 2005 saw a return of interest from both the Commission and the Parliament.

Table 2. Table of documents mentioning EUrope/the ArctiC (2005-2009)

Arctic Council documents and events	EU institutions documents and events
	May 2005 a non-paper ¹⁰ by the Commission called "ND options beyond 2005" was drafted and distributed to the MS, Norway, Iceland and Russia in order to start negotiations in view of the November ministerial meeting (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a)
	Sept. 2005 a plenary debate on the ND was organised + resolution on the future of the ND (Resolution P6_TA(2005)0430 on the future of the Northern dimension, 2005): called for the first time for a "charter for the Arctic governance"
Yakutsk SAO meeting in April 2005 (Arctic Council, 2005a): for the first time the topic of cooperation with the EU was not at the agenda	
SAO meeting in Khanty-Mansyisk in October 2005 (Arctic Council, 2005b): representative of the EU Commission in Moscow attended; mentioned the ND ministerial meeting that would take place in Brussels in Nov. 2005; presented the EU priorities in view of the new ND in 2006.	
	ND ministerial took place in Brussels and political declaration Nov. 2005: participation of Sergey Lavrov; guidelines for a new ND political declaration were adopted. Turning point in the ND policy: from the end of 2006, it would shift from being an EU policy to being a Common policy of four partners

SAO meeting held in Syktyvkar in April 2006 (Arctic Council, 2006a): the EU was not at the agenda for the second time	
	June 2006 report on the ND for 2005 (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a)
	June 2006, Commission green paper “towards a future maritime policy for the Union: A European vision for the oceans and seas”. (Commission of the European Communities, 2006b): the Arctic was mentioned for the first time in another document than a ND document or an EP resolution.
Salekhard ministerial declaration signed in October 2006 (Arctic Council, 2006b): still mentioned the EU and the ND	
	Feb. 2007 ND parliamentary conference in Brussels: Charter for the Arctic mentioned but not criticized by Arctic representatives present (European Parliament, 2007)
April 2007 SAO meeting minutes in Tromsø: EU ambassador to Norway presented the new ND and the new articulation with the AC (Arctic Council, 2007a)	
	June 2007 President of the Commission Barroso visits Greenland
	Oct. 2007 Commission “Integrated Maritime policy for the EU”: mentions the Arctic Ocean and geopolitical implications of climate change and ask for a strategic report on the Arctic Ocean (Commission of the European Communities, 2007)
Narvik SAO meeting, November 2007 (Arctic Council, 2007b) ND not at the agenda for the 3 rd time but Finnish SAO requested that it is next time; EEA statement on work with AMAP; observers wanting more prominent role	
May 2008 Ilulissat declaration Arctic 5 coastal states reaffirming their roles, the Arctic Ocean governance and legal framework	
	Oct. 2008 EP (Resolution P6_TA(2008)0474 on Arctic governance, 2008): Treaty proposition
	Nov. 2008 Commission communication (The European Union and the Arctic region, 2008):

	asked for observer status for next Ministerial conference in 2009
SAO report and Tromsø Ministerial meeting 2009 (Arctic Council, 2009a, 2009b): EU/ND not mentioned anymore in AC SAO meetings minutes but Observer status debate in April 2009; postponed decision on Observer applications	

In May 2005, a new political framework for the ND was discussed. The new geopolitical situation created by the EU enlargement required the change of the ND legal and political framework. The new ND, based on the political declaration, would be of a permanent nature. It still exists today and does not encompass the circumpolar Arctic. The change in the ND framework also affected the dynamic with the AC, which was not considered as the forum to implement the ND programmes anymore (Airoldi, 2008; Archer & Etzold, 2008; Zimmerbauer, 2013). In this context, within the European Parliament (EP), some MEPs started to take interest in the ND and the Arctic more seriously, leading to yet another resolution on the future of the ND calling for a “charter for the Arctic” for the first time (see Table 2) with many follow-up questions from Diana Wallis, a British MEP. However, the answer by the Commissioner for external relations shows that the EU was not yet planning to apply as an Observer.¹¹

Precisely when we observe a rise in the European geopolitical interest for the Arctic, there is a decrease in the AC’s interest for cooperation with the EU, fuelled by disappointment in the lack of EU’s follow-up, but also by shifting representations and reactions to the geopolitical context.

The construction of two types of regions: the Arctic as geopolitical theatre and the EU as a geopolitical actor

In October 2008, the EP passed a resolution on “Arctic governance.” This resolution and the ban on seal products that was proposed in July 2008 (COM(2008) 469 proposal for a regulation of the EP and Council concerning trade in seal products) and implemented in 2009 (Regulation 1007/2009 seal products banned from internal market) have been widely criticised by Arctic actors for ignoring the reality of the Arctic Indigenous peoples (Raspotnik, 2018; Sellheim, 2015). These two events crystallised resentment against the EU and a narrative about the EU’s insensitivities which hindered its legitimacy in the region for a long time. A lot has been said about these two events and their long-lasting impact on Europe-Arctic relations. I focus on the EP resolution¹² and show how a recontextualization in the longer term also help explain why it had such deep consequences.

In the resolution, the proposition of an Arctic Treaty was not well received by Arctic actors who feared European interference. This resolution is certainly contradictory. Whilst it mentions UNCLOS, the Arctic Council and the Ilulissat Declaration signed in May 2008, it also says that the Arctic “is currently not governed by any specifically formulated multilateral norms and regulations” and deplores the “lack of proper governance”. It has been brandished as showing the ignorance of the EU on the realities of the Arctic because it proposes a Treaty similar to the Antarctic one. It is certain that the MEPs who drafted the resolution were not experts on the Arctic and had little understanding of the complexity of the area. Nevertheless, the proposition of

the Treaty is accompanied by a comment limiting the scope of the Treaty to the Central Arctic Ocean that shows that they knew the difference between the Arctic and the Antarctic:

having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as supplemented by the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting the fundamental difference represented by the populated nature of the Arctic and the consequent rights and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic region; believes, however, that as a minimum starting-point such a treaty could at least cover the unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre of the Arctic Ocean (Resolution P6_TA(2008)0474 on Arctic governance, 2008).

Notwithstanding, it triggered reactions from the Arctic States accusing the EU of a lack of knowledge, but also of interference in their backyard (Kobza, 2015; Raspotnik, 2018). Another aspect of the EP proposition that has been under-emphasized in previous works is the influence of French and British MEPs on the early EU stance towards the Arctic (Plouffe, 2012; Powell, 2011). Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister instrumental in the Antarctic Madrid Protocol and Ambassador to the Poles from 2009 to 2016, and Diana Wallis, Vice president of the European parliament, pushed forward the 2008 EP resolution and the idea of a Treaty for the Arctic Ocean. The proposition of a Charter or Treaty had been made before and in the presence of Arctic representatives without causing as much stir (see figure 3). Moreover, a draft Treaty published by a French NGO, the *Cercle polaire* in September 2008, managed to go unnoticed despite the direct link it has with the EP resolution¹³ and the fact that it goes further than merely a proposition (Groupe d'études sur l'Arctique (GEA) du Cercle Polaire, 2008).

These two events can be looked at as “storms in a teacup”, that is events that symbolise that geopolitical framings and the power relations they define are at stakes (Wilson Rowe, 2018). We therefore need to look for underlying trends in the documents that crystallised in a changing context and reactivated geopolitical representations in both regions, and look at the reactions from specific actors to counter these.

In 2007, internal and external events in each region impacted and shaped Europe-Arctic relations. The International Polar Year (IPY) gave momentum and attracted the attention of a wider public to the poles. In the Arctic, the work of the AC on climate change, but also the publication of the report on hydrocarbon resources and the planting of the Russian flag at the bottom of the sea at the North pole, politicized the debates and triggered external attention, projecting geopolitical lenses to the region (Bruun & Medby, 2014; Dittmer et al., 2011; Dodds, 2010; Powell, 2008; Powell & Dodds, 2014). In Europe, the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007, and Russia was reassessed as a threat to the stability of the neighbourhood. Thus, the link between the Arctic and security in Europe was revived. The changes in the Arctic (climate change) and to the perception of the Arctic, and in Europe and to the EU itself (Lisbon Treaty), fundamentally changed the situation. With the EU seeking to integrate the European periphery with its core, its borders were shifting following enlargements and the inclusion of new Member States. Moreover, political geographers also highlighted that by doing so the EU reactivated geopolitical imaginations of Europe that had specific historical genealogies. The moral responsibility of the EU to engineer “European unity” came along with neighbourhood regions constructed as specific geopolitical sites where the EU has a transformative power vis-à-vis its “outside” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2005). In the Arctic, this is also the case, but was met with resistance from some actors, and was also

complicated by the fact that it is not only a “neighbourhood,” but a partly overlapping regional system of its own. Moreover, in the EU, beyond the Commission, *non-Arctic* MEPs and Member States (like France and the UK) tried to draw attention to the Arctic for the first time. By the end of 2007, there were several calls for the EU to develop a document or a policy on the Arctic. However, they came from different actors, had different (geographical) angles and scope, and various interests and themes. The political and institutional framework and the type of document that should be developed remained unclear (see Table 2).

In the Arctic, the increased geopolitical attention to the region had consequences on its governance and on the perceptions of the Arctic actors towards external ones. During the Norwegian chairship, we can see a transformation in the formatting of documents with the apparition of the AC logo and a standardisation of the minutes of the SAO meetings. Interestingly this comes with less information about the discussions being displayed in the minutes. Whilst previous minutes were almost verbatim type documents, the later ones become a summary of the discussions without any details on the position expressed by the different representatives. There is no trace, for instance, of the discussions on the Observers applications, only a reference of the decision to postpone the decision (Arctic Council, 2009b). It was also decided to create an AC Secretariat in Tromsø to ensure continuity for the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish chairships. Moreover, a shift in the relations to external actors is also noticeable, from the AC reaching out to entities for collaboration and calling for increased attention to the Arctic, to trying to keep control and limit the number of external entities involved in the Council and debating their role (Wilson Rowe, 2018). At the same time Observer precisely started expressing their wish to have an increased role in the AC. All these changes also affected the EU in the context that we have just described. When the EU Commission finally published its Communication and applied for Observer status in 2008, it was in a very different context than the one of the early 2000s when the AC was pushing for it.

From 2009 onwards, precisely when the EU institutions started producing documents devoted to the Arctic, cooperation with the EU was no longer on the agenda of the SAO meetings and the EU was not mentioned in the minutes. Thus, when the EU finally showed political interest in the Arctic, this interest was perceived as a threat by Arctic actors for several reasons. It was not the interest that the Arctic actors in the AC had wanted, but an interest triggered by global and external changes affecting the ways in which the Arctic was perceived. This was reinforced in the EU by its own changes that reactivated geopolitical imaginaries in order for the EU to find its place and role on the international scene. The combination of these factors were crystalized by two particular events or “storms in a teacup” (Wilson Rowe, 2018) that affected the EU’s potential role in the Arctic.

These events are reflective of deeper power relations. Inter-regionalism and critical geographical analytical frameworks allow us to put emphasis on the power relations at play rather than just focus on contextually dependent factors. Power relations start to emerge that differed from the ones defining the post-Cold War period, producing new geopolitical representations, but also reusing enduring representations in a different context. Towards the end of the 2000s, the environment would again be linked to security through climate change. The Arctic region had been framed as territorially linked with environmental issues and climate change, hence the EU was able to connect climate/environment to security and the Arctic. At the same time the behaviour of Russia in the European Eastern neighbourhood as well as in the Arctic relinked both regions in terms of military

security and geopolitics. Thus, when the EU self-defined itself as a geopolitical subject, it is logical from this perspective that it must play a role in the Arctic, which was being reframed at the time (and still is) as a geopolitical theatre. The logic behind the co-construction of the two regional spaces through geographical imaginaries is very visible here. Inherent to this process was the position of Russia on the international stage, both in the EU neighbourhood (Georgia in 2008) and in the Arctic, that again linked EU security directly to the Arctic. Climate change and the potential transformation of the area was perceived as a “threat multiplier” by the EU (Council of the European Union, 2003).

Conclusion

This paper sought to advance knowledge on EU-Arctic relations by shedding light on three interlinked blind-spots identified in the literature. First, there was little scholarly engagement with pre-2008 EU-Arctic relations. Second, the relations had been studied only through EU policy documents, and the Arctic perspective was missing. Third, the narrative of a single *political* entity suddenly entering “new” a *geographical* area in 2008 was too simplistic. The combination of the absence of EU documents dedicated to the circumpolar Arctic region before 2008, and the Eurocentric perspective explain the lack of attention to the period before. However, when looking at Arctic documents and the dialogue instituted with the EU, this paper revealed that relations existed and were driven by Arctic political actors. This paper thus engages with broader academic debates on de-centering inter-regional relations and the making of the EU’s regional strategies by examining Europe from the outside (Acharya, 2016; Fisher-Onar & Kavalski, 2022). The ‘macro-regional’ scale and critical genealogical perspective allowed us to overcome the problem of the evolution of the entities under scrutiny in terms of political institutions, geographical extent, and actors involved. Considering Europe-Arctic relations as the reciprocal ones of two ‘macro-regions’ in construction helped us refine the analysis and encompass actors, spatialities and scales that were looked over. By doing so, the paper brings to light the historical co-construction of the regions and traces precisely the institutions (evolution of the EU institutions and states involved), the actors (from individuals MEP to states), the representations (Arctic and Europe as different regions with specific characteristics demanding specific political actions), and the different scales (circumpolar, Barents sub-region, etc.) involved in the process. It identifies three shifts in geographical representations: from two geo-strategically interdependent *regions* to two unequal *institutional partners*, and finally two different geopolitical regions: the Arctic as geopolitical *theatre* and the EU as a geopolitical *actor*.

These shifts do not simply have academic implications regarding the nature of regions but also have crucial consequences from an empirical and policy perspective. As the EU now faces challenges to act as a geopolitical actor in the Arctic and globally, and is aware of being too reactive and of lacking unity in times of crises (Borrell, 2022; European Commission & EEAS, 2021), looking at this period of time when the Arctic was not considered a strategic region might bear lessons for the EU. This paper shows that Arctic actors were proactive but the EU’s failure to take them seriously led to missed opportunities in the early 2000s to act and gain a more permanent role in the Arctic governance. The Eurocentric perspective considered the Arctic as a strategic space depriving it of actorhood at the regional scale. The neglect of the AC as an institution and of the wish from Greenland to be included in the ND might have contributed to the mistrust towards the EU after 2008. The lack of interest towards the Arctic region during this period was not unique

to the EU. However, compared to other European countries at that time, the EU was not an Observer, and the AC had more interest in cooperating with the EU given its ND programme and political weight. Thus, this disinterest had more impact on the EU's role in the Arctic¹⁴. The "mistakes" of the EU in 2008-9 are to be considered in the longer term of shifts in geopolitics and geopolitical representations to understand fully their impact EU-Arctic relations. A paradoxical situation appeared: the AC had wanted more political interest for the Arctic from the EU but when the EU's political interest arrived it was perceived by the Arctic actors as potentially depriving them from their agency (Indigenous people) or from their privileged position in the Arctic region (Arctic States).

This study thus draws the attention to the importance for the EU of not being dismissive towards calls for cooperation, not clinging to its own representations of power projection onto a space where actors strive to form another form of region-building, to be more reflexive on its imperial and colonial past when reviving enduring geopolitical imaginaries such as the geostrategic narrative. It also emphasizes that "hidden actors" and individuals (MEPs, Commission representatives, SAOs...) have more impact (detrimental or positive) when dealing with areas or topics that are considered as peripheral for the EU. The presence of knowledgeable individuals and efforts towards concrete proposals that are followed-up might thus have more importance in the Arctic than other areas that have broader attention. This is exacerbated by the fact that both Europe and the Arctic are complex entities across different jurisdictions with complex organisations. Relying on certain texts only tells simplistic narrative: conflicting narratives need to be considered even if sometimes they cannot be fully reconciled.

Notes

1. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1993. It created the European Union based on three so-called "pillars": 1. the European Communities – EC (grouping the 3 original organisations: the European Economic Community, European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom); 2. a common foreign and security policy; and 3. cooperation between EU governments on justice and home affairs.
2. My translation: «Здесь смыкаются евроазиатский, североамериканский и азиатско-тихоокеанский регионы, сходятся границы, пересекаются интересы государств как принадлежащих к противоположным военным блокам, так и не входящих в них.»
3. My translation: «[...] на благо народнохозяйственных и других человеческих интересов и приарктических государств, и Европы, и всего международного сообщества. А для этого в первую очередь надо решить накопившиеся здесь проблемы безопасности.»
4. My translation: «Мне не раз приходилось высказываться на тему об «общем европейском доме». Потенциал современной цивилизации позволяет обжить Арктику.»
5. Europeanisation is the promotion of European solutions such as free market, democracy, regional multilateralism inside and outside of the EU (Jones, 2011).
6. My translation from Norwegian.

7. In 2023, Norway introduced the term ‘chairship’ instead of ‘chairmanship’, preferring a gender-neutral term. Following this, I use this term throughout. After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 it was replaced by the Lisbon Treaty signed in 2007.
8. The two areas received later each their own strategy under the umbrella of the ENP: the Union for the Mediterranean (French initiative) was launched in 2008 and the Eastern Partnership in 2009 (Swedish-Polish initiative).
9. “A non-paper is an informal document, usually without explicit attribution, put forward in closed negotiations within EU institutions, notably the Council of Ministers, in order to seek agreement on some contentious procedural or policy issue. Often circulated by the presidency of the Council, an individual member state or the European Commission, non-papers seek to test the reaction of other parties to possible solutions, without necessarily committing the proposer or reflecting his or her public position up to that point.” (Teasdale, 2012)
10. Resolution on Northern Dimension (Arctic Governance) 13.12.2005, WRITTEN QUESTION E-4860/05 by Diana Wallis (ALDE) to the Commission, OJ C 327, 30/12/2005 and Written Answer given by Mrs Ferrero-Waldner on behalf of the Commission, 23.8.2006, OJ C 327, 30/12/2006
11. For the seal ban issue see for instance: (CBC, 2009; Østhagen, 2013; Sellheim, 2015)
12. Michel Rocard was the Chair of the group and drafted the EP resolution: (*Le Cercle Polaire - Michel Rocard*, s. d.)
13. The EU still does not have the full Observer status at the AC.

References

- Acharya, A. (2016). Regionalism beyond EU-centrism. In *The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism* (p. 107-130). Oxford University Press.
- AEPS. (1991, juin). *Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy*. http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf
- AEPS. (1993, septembre). *The Nuuk Declaration on Environment and Development in the Arctic*. <https://iea.uoregon.edu/MarineMammals/engine/Documents/1-0279-0287.htm>
- Airoldi, A. (2008). *The European Union and the Arctic: Policies and actions*. <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:norden:org:diva-1019>
- Archer, C., & Etzold, T. (2008). The EU’s Northern Dimension: Blurring Frontiers between Russia and the EU North? *Nordeuropaforum*, 18.
- Arctic Council. (1996, septembre). *Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (1999, novembre 18). *Minutes of Senior Arctic Officials Meeting in Washington D.C. (ACSAO-US02)*. <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/273>
- Arctic Council. (2000a, avril). *Minutes of the SAO meeting in Fairbanks (ACSAO-US03)*. <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/>

- Arctic Council. (2000b, octobre). *Barrow Declaration on the occasion of the second ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/87/02_barrow_declaration_2000_signed.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2001, juin). *Minutes of the SAO meeting in Rovaniemi (ACSAO-FI01)*. <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/>
- Arctic Council. (2002a, mai). *Minutes of the SAO meeting in Oulu (ACSAO-FI03)*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/553/ACSAO-FI03_Oulu_minutes%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2002b, octobre). *Inari declaration on the occasion of the Third ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/88/03_inari_declaration_2002_signed.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2002c, octobre). *SAO report to Ministers Inari (ACMM03)*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1552/ACMM03_Inari_2002_SAO_Report_to_Ministers_En.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2003a, février). *Overview of Arctic Council Priorities and Activities presented to the European Commission in connection with the development of the Northern Dimension (ACSAO-IS01)*.
- Arctic Council. (2003b, avril). *Minutes of the SAO meeting in Reykjavik (ACSAO-IS01)*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/329/ACSAO-IS01_Minutes_SAO_meeting_Reykjavik_April_2003%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2003c, octobre). *Letters from the Chairship on Northern Dimension (ACSAO-IS02)*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/328/ACSAO-IS02_11_Letter_Northern_Dimension.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2004a, mai). *Minutes of SAO meeting in Selfoss (ACSAO-IS03)*.
- Arctic Council. (2004b, novembre). *Minutes of the SAO meeting in Reykjavik (ACSAO-IS04)*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/348/ACSAO-IS04_Draft_Minutes_SAO_Reykjavik.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2004c, novembre). *Reykjavik declaration on the occasion of the fourth ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/89/04_reykjavik_declaration_2004_signed.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2005a). *Minutes of SAO meeting in Yakutsk, Russia (ACSAO_RU01)*. Arctic Council Secretariat. <http://hdl.handle.net/11374/350>
- Arctic Council. (2005b, octobre). *Minutes of the SAO meeting Khanty-Mansiysk (ACSAO-RU02)*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/366/ACSAO-RU02_Khanty-Mansiysk_minutes%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Arctic Council. (2006a). *Draft agenda SAO meeting in Syktyvar April 2006*. <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/0831022e-03ff-4d6c-b66a-380bc5d96a6f/content>
- Arctic Council. (2006b, octobre). *Salekhard declaration on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Arctic Council and Fifth AC ministerial meeting*. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/90/05_salekhard_declaration_2006_signed%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

- Arctic Council. (2007a, avril). *Minutes of the SAO meeting in Tromsø (ACSAO NO01)*.
- Arctic Council. (2007b, novembre). *Minutes of the SAO meeting in Narvik (ACSAO NO02)*.
- Arctic Council. (2009a). *Tromsø declaration on the occasion of the 6th ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council*. <https://oarchive.arctic-council.org/items/e338fb6f-5096-44b1-9807-76e784ba1c2c>
- Arctic Council. (2009b, avril). *SAO report to Ministers Tromsø (ACMM06)*. https://oarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1555/ACMM06_Tromsøe_2009_SAO_Report_to_Ministers_En.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Åtland, K. (2008). Mikhail Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization of Interstate Relations in the Arctic. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 43(3), 289-311. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836708092838>
- Bachmann, V. (2021). Visionary geographies and European Studies. *Progress in Human Geography*, 03091325211033644. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03091325211033644>
- Bachmann, V., & Sidaway, J. D. (2009). Zivilmacht Europa 1: A critical geopolitics of the European Union as a global power. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 34(1), 94-109. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2008.00325.x>
- Bailes, A. J. K., & Ólafsson, K. Þ. (2017). The EU Crossing Arctic Frontiers: The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, Northern Dimension, and EU-West Nordic Relations. In N. Liu, E. A. Kirk, & T. Henriksen (Éds.), *The European Union and the Arctic* (p. 40-62). Brill. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctt1w8h3gv.8>
- BEAC. (2003, janvier). *BEAC 10 year anniversary declaration*. <https://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/>
- Bialasiewicz, L. (2011). *Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of European Space*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315580838>
- Bialasiewicz, L., Elden, S., & Painter, J. (2005). The Constitution of EU Territory. *Comparative European Politics*, 3(3), 333-363. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110059>
- Borrell, J. (2022). Europe in the Interregnum: Our geopolitical awakening after Ukraine - Groupe d'études géopolitiques. <https://geopolitique.eu/en/2022/03/24/europe-in-the-interregnum-our-geopolitical-awakening-after-ukraine/>
- Börzel, T. A., & Risse-Kappen, T. (Éds.). (2016). *The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism* (First edition). Oxford University Press.
- Browning, C. S. (2003). The Region-Building Approach Revisited: The Continued Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in the European North. *Geopolitics*, 8(1), 45-71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714001005>
- Bruun, J. M., & Medby, I. A. (2014). Theorising the Thaw: Geopolitics in a Changing Arctic. *Geography Compass*, 8(12), 915-929. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12189>
- Canova, E. (2023, août 8). The European Union and its Member States in the Arctic: Official Complementarity but Underlying Rivalry? *The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies*. <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/european-union-member-states-arctic-official-complementarity-underlying-rivalry/>
- CBC, C. B. C. (2009, avril 29). Canada against EU entry to Arctic Council because of seal trade ban | CBC News. *CBC*. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/canada-against-eu-entry-to-arctic-council-because-of-seal-trade-ban-1.806188>

- Commission of the European Communities. (1998, novembre). *Communication of the Commission A Northern dimension for the policies of the Union COM(1998) 589 final*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>
- Commission of the European Communities. (2002, novembre). *Commission staff working paper—2002 Annual Progress Report on the implementation of the northern Dimension Action Plan SEC(2002) 1296*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>
- Commission of the European Communities. (2006a, juin). *Commission staff working document 2005 annual progress report on the implementation of the Northern Dimension Action plan*.
- Commission of the European Communities. (2006b, juin). *Green Paper Towards a future Maritime Policy for the Union : A European vision for the Oceans and Seas (COM(2006) 275 final)*.
- Commission of the European Communities. (2007, octobre). *Communication from the Commission An integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union (COM(2007) 575 final)*.
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - The European Union and the Arctic region COM(2008) 763 final, COM(2008) 763 final (2008). https://ec.europa.eu/archives/docs/arctic_region/docs/com_08_763_en.pdf
- Conference of Foreign Ministers. (1993, janvier). *Declaration Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region*. https://www.barentsinfo.fi/beac/docs/459_doc_kirkenesdeclaration.pdf
- Council (general affairs). (2000, juin). *European Council, Feira 19/20 June 2000 Conclusions on the Action plan for the Northern Dimension 2000-2003 (9401/00—NIS 76)*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html>
- Council of the European Union. (2000, juin 14). *Northern Dimension—Action plan for the Northern Dimension with external and cross-border policies of the European Union 2000-2003*. <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9401-2000-INIT/en/pdf>
- Council of the European Union. 2003. « European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World. » Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2860/1402>.
- Déclaration Schuman*. (1950). https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu/1945-59/schuman-declaration-may-1950_fr
- Devyatkin, P. (2023). Arctic exceptionalism: A narrative of cooperation and conflict from Gorbachev to Medvedev and Putin. *The Polar Journal*, 13(2), 336-357. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2023.2258658>
- Dittmer, J., Moisiu, S., Ingram, A., & Dodds, K. (2011). Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics. *Political Geography*, 30(4), 202-214. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.04.002>
- Dodds, K. (2010). Flag planting and finger pointing: The Law of the Sea, the Arctic and the political geographies of the outer continental shelf. *Political Geography*, 29(2), 63-73. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2010.02.004>
- Elenius, L., Tjelmeland, H., Lähteenmäki, M., Golubev, A., Niemi, E., & Salo, M. (Éds.). (2015). *The Barents Region : A transnational history of subarctic Northern Europe*. Pax Forlag AS.
- English, J. (2013). *Ice and water : Politics, peoples, and the Arctic Council*. Allen Lane.
- Escudé-Joffres, C. (2020). *Coopération politique et intégration régionale en Arctique (1996-2019) : Construction d'une région—Naissance, développement et remise en cause d'un nouvel espace politique régional* [Thèse de doctorat]. Sciences Po.

- European Commission. (2003, juin). *Commission working document—The second Northern Dimension Action Plan 2004-2006 (COM/2003/0343 final)*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52>
- European Commission, & EEAS. (2021). *Joint communication—A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic*. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021JC0027&qid=1652177774735>
- European Council. (1997, décembre). *Luxembourg European Council (12/97): Presidency Conclusions*. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lux1_en.htm
- European Parliament. (1999, avril 22). *Report on the Communication from the Commission A Northern Dimension for the policies of the union*. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/>
- European Parliament. (2007). *Parliamentary conference The new Northern Dimension* [Conference report].
- Finnish government. (2006). *The Northern Dimension a Finnish perspective*. https://www.ndphs.org/internalfiles/File/Publications%20-%20general/The_Northern_Dimension--a_Finnish_Perspective.pdf
- Fisher-Onar, N., & Kavalski, E. (2022). From Trans-Atlantic Order to Afro-Eur-Asian Worlds? Reimagining International Relations as Interlocking Regional Worlds. *Global Studies Quarterly*, 2(4), ksac080. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksac080>
- Foucher, M. (2000). *La République européenne*. Belin.
- Gorbachev, M. (1987). *Речь товарища Горбачева М.С.* <https://helion-ltd.ru/gorbachev-speech-part-4/>
- Groupe d'études sur l'Arctique (GEA) du Cercle Polaire. (2008, septembre). *Projet de Traité relatif à la protection de l'environnement arctique*. http://www.lecerclepolaire.com/images/cerclepolaire/pdf/Traite_arctique.pdf
- Habermas, J. (2011). *Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay* (Sonderdruck, Erste Auflage, Originalausgabe). Suhrkamp.
- Hänggi, H. (2005). Interregionalism as a Multifaceted Phenomenon : In search of a typology. In *Interregionalism and International Relations*. Routledge.
- Heininen, L., & Käkönen, J. (Éds.). (1998). *The new North Europe : Perspectives on northern dimension*. Tampere Peace Research Institute.
- Heininen, L., & Nicol, H. N. (2007). The Importance of Northern Dimension Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of the Circumpolar North. *Geopolitics*, 12(1), 133-165. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040601031206>
- Jacquot, M. (2019). *L'action multidimensionnelle de l'Union Européenne en Arctique : Une contribution à l'action extérieure de l'Union européenne* [Phdthesis, Université de Bretagne occidentale - Brest]. <https://theses.hal.science/tel-03048258>
- Jones, A. (2011). Making Regions for EU Action : The EU and the Mediterranean. In *Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of European Space* (p. 41-58). Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Keskitalo, C. (2004). *Negotiating the Arctic : The construction of an international region*. Routledge.
- Knecht, S. (2017). The politics of Arctic international cooperation : Introducing a dataset on stakeholder participation in Arctic Council meetings, 1998–2015. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52(2), 203-223.

- Kobza, P. (2015, janvier). Civilian Power Europe in the Arctic : How Far Can the European Union Go North? *College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper*. <https://www.coleurope.eu/website/study/eu-international-relations-and-diplomacy-studies/research-activities/eu-diplomacy>
- Lackenbauer, P. W., & Dean, R. (2021). *Canada and the Origins of the Arctic Council—Key documents, 1988-1998* (No. 18; Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS)). <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/18-DCASS-Canada-Origins-Arctic-Council-PWL-RD-upload.pdf>
- Laruelle, M. (2018). *Russian Nationalism : Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429426773>
- Le Cercle Polaire—Michel Rocard*. (s. d.). Consulté 21 octobre 2021, à l'adresse <http://www.lecerclepolaire.com/fr/le-cercle-polaire/membres-dhonneur/15-le-cercle-polaire-francais/cerclepolaire-fr/membres-dhonneur-fr/39-michel-rocard>
- Loukacheva, N. (2007). *The Arctic promise : Legal and political autonomy of Greenland and Nunavut*. University of Toronto Press.
- Marei, N., & Richard, Y. (2020). *Global Regionalization Processes and (Macro)-Regional Integration. In Favor of Generalization in Geography*. 21.
- Maurer, A. (2010). *The Arctic Region – Perspectives from Member States and Institutions of the EU* (Working Paper FG 02, 2010/04). Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/Mrr_WP_Geonor_ks.pdf
- Medby, I. A. (2017). *Peopling the State : Arctic State Identity in Norway, Iceland, and Canada*. 247.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. (2001). *Program for the Finnish Chair of the Arctic Council 2000-2002*. <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/2a2d7c80-51ab-45df-a90c-4fd1f959a0da/content>
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland. (2002). *Program for the Icelandic Chair of the Arctic Council 2002-2004*. <https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/5d1d2017-d16b-4cce-ba73-db9b16d4fcdf/content>
- Olsen, J. (2020). Adaptive capacity of Arctic communities in the context of climate change and shipping growth : A review of Russian and Western literature. *Polar Record*, 56. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247420000297>
- Osherenko, G., & Young, O. R. (1989). *The age of the Arctic : Hot conflicts and cold realities*. Cambridge University Press.
- Østhagen, A. (2013). The European Union – An Arctic Actor? *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 15(2). <https://jmss.org/article/view/58096>
- Paasi, A. (1991). Deconstructing Regions : Notes on the Scales of Spatial Life. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 23(2), 239-256. <https://doi.org/10.1068/a230239>
- Parliament of Greenland. (2003). *Inatsisartuts samlinger* [Governmental]. Inatsisartut. https://ina.gl/groenlands_landsting/landstingssamlinger/fm_2003/dgopkt_behdato/red egoerelser_og_beretninger_03fm/12/del_1.html
- Pic, P. (2022a). The politics of Arctic scales. *The Polar Journal*, 12(2), 281-302. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2022.2137089>

- Pic, P. (2022b). *Une sécurité arctique ? : Analyse des échelles de la sécurité dans une région à géométrie variable* [Thèse de doctorat, Université Laval]. <https://corpus.ulaval.ca/entities/publication/4108df61-6caf-46be-84c7-f225b8718f1c>
- Plouffe, J. (2012). Thawing Ice and French Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Assessment. *Arctic Yearbook 2012*, 51-79.
- Powell, R. C. (2008). Configuring an 'Arctic Commons'? *Political Geography*, 27(8), 827-832. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.08.008>
- Powell, R. C. (2011). From the Northern Dimension to Arctic Strategies? The European Union's Envisioning of the High Latitudes. In *Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of European Space* (p. 105-126). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315580838-6>
- Powell, R. C. (2013). Subarctic Backyards? Britain, Scotland, and the Paradoxical Politics of the European High North. *Northern Review*, 37, Article 37. <https://thenorthernreview.ca/index.php/nr/article/view/287>
- Powell, R. C., & Dodds, K. (2014). *Polar geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes*. Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781781009406/9781781009406.00008.xml>
- Raspotnik, A. (2018). *The European Union and the Geopolitics of the Arctic*. Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112093>
- Resolution A4-0073/99 on a new strategy for agriculture in arctic regions, European Parliament (1999). <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/>
- Resolution P5_TA(2003)0020 on the Northern dimension New action plan 2004-2006 (2003). <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/>
- Resolution P5_TA(2003)0521 on the Northern dimension, P5_TA(2003)0521, European Parliament (2003).
- Resolution P5_TA(2004)0014 on Arctic agriculture (2004).
- Resolution P6_TA(2005)0430 on the future of the Northern dimension (2005).
- Resolution P6_TA(2008)0474 on Arctic governance, P6_TA(2008)0474 (2008). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-6-2008-0474_EN.pdf
- Salvadori, P.-A. (2021). *Le Nord de la Renaissance—La carte, l'humanisme suédois et la genèse de l'Arctique*. Classiques Garnier. <https://doi.org/10.15122/isbn.978-2-406-10702-6>
- Sellheim, N. (2015). The goals of the EU seal products trade regulation: From effectiveness to consequence. *Polar Record*, 51(3), 274-289. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247414000023>
- Stefansson, V. (1921). *The friendly Arctic: The story of five years in Polar regions*. The Macmillan co.
- Steinberg, P. (2016). Europe's 'Others' in the Polar Mediterranean. *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie*, 107(2), 177-188. <https://doi.org/10.1111/tesg.12176>
- Steinberg, P., Tasch, J., & Gerhardt, H. (2015). *Contesting the Arctic: Politics and imaginaries in the circumpolar North*. I.B. Tauris.
- Stokke, O. S., Tunander, O., Fridtjof Nansen-stiftelsen på Polhøgda, & International Peace Research Institute (Éds.). (1994). *The Barents region: Cooperation in Arctic Europe*. SAGE.
- Stoltenberg, T. (1992). *Barentsregionen: En ny dynamisk ramme for samarbeidet i nord*. <https://barents-council.org/documents/barents-euro-arctic-council>

- Teasdale, A. (2012). *Non-paper* [Billet]. The Penguin Companion to European Union. https://penguincompaniontoeu.com/additional_entries/non-paper/
- Tennberg, M. (1998). *The Arctic Council: A study in governmentality*. University of Lapland.
- Third ministerial conference on the Northern Dimension. (2002, octobre). *Presidency conclusions on the future of the Northern Dimension policies for the European Union—Guidelines for a new action plan*. <http://ue.eu.int/>
- Toal, G. (2003). Re-asserting the regional: Political geography and geopolitics in world thinly known. *Political Geography*, 22(6), 653-655. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298\(03\)00073-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(03)00073-8)
- Tsoukalis, L. (2022). *The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003335337>
- Väättänen, V. (2020). *Political geographies of the 'changing' Arctic: Perspectives on the interface between politics and the region as a process* [Academic dissertation]. Oulu.
- Wegge, N. (2011). *The EU and the Arctic: European foreign policy in the making*. 24.
- Wilson Rowe, E. (2018). *Arctic governance: Power in cross-border cooperation*. Manchester University Press.
- Young, O. (2005). Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosaic of Cooperation. *Global Governance*, 11, 9-15. <https://doi.org/10.2307/27800550>
- Zimmerbauer, K. (2013). Unusual Regionalism in Northern Europe: The Barents Region in the Making. *Regional Studies*, 47(1), 89-103. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2011.644236>