What is ‘Arctic’ about ‘Arctic security’?

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This work focuses on the governance of the Arctic, through the prism of security, by analyzing arctic strategies and security policies from coastal countries around the Arctic Ocean in order to understand how they apprehend the changing Arctic. A series of interviews conducted in Norway and Canada in the Winter and Spring of 2019 complete this discourse analysis. In this exploratory work part of an ongoing research, we explore the Arctic dimension of Arctic security discourses. Since 2007, the label of Arctic security is more and more used, as a symptom that global geopolitics have reached the Arctic and that the age of exceptionalism is over. We want to question processes behind this label, trying to identify what could be specifically Arctic about Arctic security, in the changing contemporary context. This paper broadly delineates the security system at play in the Arctic today (1) through an analysis of the actor network at play and the definitions of security put forward in Arctic strategies, with a focus on the coastal states around the Arctic Ocean. It then questions current developments within this system (2), to question the scale of ‘Arctic Security’ and how it faces external powers getting more and more interested in the region.

Introduction

In February 2019, the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COECSW) organized a side-event at the Munich Security Conference titled “In from the cold: The end of Arctic Exceptionalism”. The premise was that “So far, the Arctic has been discussed under the frame of being a zone of exceptionalism, where cooperation and not confrontation is the fundament for problem solving” (COECSW, 2019) and that we were now “entering a new era of great power competition” (idem). Then later on, in the beginning of May of the same year, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave a vehement speech on the eve of the ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council. During the meeting *per se*, he refused to include Climate Change in the declaration, which meant that for the first time in the history of the Arctic Council, a ministerial meeting did not end up in a joint declaration. As it is a consensus-based organisation, this is saying a lot.
At the end of the Cold War, the Arctic slowly emerged as a distinct region in international society (Young, 2000). The 1987 Soviet proposal that the Arctic could be a “zone of peace” (Gorbachev, quoted in Åtland, 2008; Taubman, 1987), a “Territory of dialogue”, or even a “mosaic of cooperation” (Young, 2005) became dominant. It would then be understood as a “unique region detached from global political dynamics” meaning an “apolitical space of regional governance” based on functional cooperation and peaceful coexistence (Käpylä & Mikkola, 2015: 5). In this context, the Arctic Council embodies this will of peaceful cooperation. The Ottawa Declaration, the founding agreement of the Arctic Council, explicitly states that this high level forum will allow cooperation and discussion on common Arctic issues – excluding military security (Arctic Council, 1996). Those ministerial meetings have thus made a point of excluding global geopolitical issues and power competition, even in the midst of crises like in 2014, after Russia invaded Crimea and faced international sanctions (Byers, 2017; Rahbek-Clemmensen, 2017). The idea of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, meaning a region somewhat insulated from politico-strategic dynamics, was then used to describe Arctic governance. The change of tone in Pompeo’s speech, emphasizing a ‘new era of competition’ (Pompeo, 2019), coupled with an increasing number of discourses about Arctic security would then contribute to the idea of a crumbling exceptionalism.

But if this speech emphasizes the rise of new powers which might constitute a threat to the unipolar world as we knew it since the end of the Cold War, it was not the first time that this idea emerged (See for example Lasserre & Plouffe, 2013; Murray, 2012): in that sense, this speech was not disruptive whatsoever. Substantially, there was indeed nothing new, but the form was different: what changed was the framing of power practice and security issues in the Arctic region. This, therefore, questions discourses about security in the region. Many discourses tackle the issue of what is labelled “Arctic security”, but there isn’t really any consensus about a definition of what it would be. Under this label, we can read haphazardly about human security, environmental security (Gjørv, Bazely, Goloviznina, & Tanentzap, 2013), securitization, or desecuritization (Jensen & Hønneland, 2015), militarization of the Arctic, or rather now, about remilitarization (Lamothe, 2018). There isn’t even, really, any consensus about what the Arctic is, and we could argue, as Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv puts it, that the mere act of talking about “Arctic security” is political (Center for Peace Studies, 2019). We aim here to question this political stance: what would be ‘Arctic’ about “Arctic security”? How have framings of ‘Arctic security’ evolved and why?

**Definitions & literature review**

**Framing the Arctic**

The map below shows several lines can be used to define the Arctic region: from the Arctic Circle to the treeline or the discontinuous permafrost, many defining features can be highlighted – depending on the context and the discipline. Framing the region according to a definition or another may also already be a political choice, as Elana Wilson Rowe underlines it: “the idea of ‘what’ or ‘where’ the Arctic is has been fascinatingly fluid and contested, depending on the political context and constellation of actors at hand” (Wilson Rowe, 2018: 6). Many examples can illustrate this, beginning with the definition of Arctic states. Founders of the Arctic Council count eight countries, including Iceland even though its coastline is predominantly under the Polar Circle. When the Arctic coastal states met in Ilulissat in 2008 on the other hand, Iceland, Sweden and Finland were not invited. The meeting had as an objective the signing of a declaration stating that coastal countries in the region would claim extended continental shelves according to the UN
Convenion of the Law of the Sea (UN, 1994). This has been analyzed as a political move to re-territorialize the ocean and insist on the fact that the Arctic was not a terra nullius to be grabbed (Dodds, 2013; Steinberg et al, 2015).

The framing of the region was therefore very specifically centered around the Ocean as a core territory of definition, with the de facto exclusion of Iceland, Finland and Sweden from the treaty. After the Russian flag planting episode of 2007 and the claims that there was going to be a race for the Arctic, and to address talk coming especially from the EU to neutralize the Arctic via a treaty inspired from the 1991 Madrid Antarctic Treaty (Lasserre, 2010a; Offerdal, 2011), states chose a more restrictive framing of the Arctic region, “collectively and individually reinforcing their sovereign rights and jurisdiction from their coastlines seaward” (Berkman & Young, 2009). Depending on the framing, we then have two distinct definitions of Arctic countries: the “A8”, meaning the eight member countries of the Arctic Council, and the “A5”, referring to the 5 signatory countries of the Ilulissat declaration. When China describes itself as a ‘near-Arctic State’ (The People’s Republic of China, 2018) – just like the UK (HM Government, 2018)2, but drawing far more media coverage than the British narrative – the framing is geographically much wider. Depending on the context and the set of actors at play, framing the region has a political significance, but it also has practical consequences in the way the concrete policy debate is shaped (Wilson Rowe, 2018).
For the purpose of this paper, we chose a definition of the Arctic centered around the Arctic Ocean, considering coastal states or the A5 as the center of interest. However, considering both the strategic position of Iceland and the fact that it can be considered a coastal state, it will be included in our territory of definition. The figure on the left shows two different definitions of the Arctic Ocean. The one circled by the black line corresponds to the definition of the International Hydrologic Organisation. The deep blue one corresponds to the definition used by the CIA in its World Factbook (Grataloup, 2015) and highlights the inclusion of Iceland. As we want to investigate the Arctic dimension of Arctic security, we chose to focus on the more restrictive geographical framing of the region to be able to draw comparisons in further work later on.

**Security as a complex issue**

It is easier to define what security is not, rather than what it actually is. Definitions are usually quite vague: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers, 1952: 485) and there can be no agreed upon definition as long as those try to be more precise. Balzacq then talks about an “essentially contested concept” (2003: 3): there can be no consensus over the definition of security because of an intrinsic ideological dimension in the concept (Balzacq, 2003; Little, 1981). In sum, he argues that there can be no neutral definition of security because security is linked with power. This draws upon Emma Rothschild’s work on the definition of security in which she argues that one of the four purposes – or definitions – of security is to “influence directly the distribution of money and power” (Rothschild, 1995: 59). This takes us back to the notion of framing which we alluded to when defining the territory of study: framing a definition of security implies a purpose and comes with political means.

In the Arctic, while security was largely understood in the military sense during the Cold War (Tamnes & Holtsmark, 2014), the shift towards a larger understanding of the issue happened even before the end of the conflict, the Murmansk speech of 1987 being a famous turning point in this respect (Åtland, 2008). Now it seems security is omnipresent in discourses about the region, whether we are talking about human, environmental or economic security. This is why we will frame our working definition on the state and use a state centric definition – what is usually referred to as ‘military security’ (Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998) or ‘state security’ (Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014). However, we do not want to have a sectoral approach isolating one sector from the others. We consider that those sectors are interconnected and that state security issues can have a – direct or indirect – impact on human security issues, as well as on other sectors, much like in a system. We investigate here through policy documents, how states consider these overlapping sectors, or definitions, in their own definition of security in the region. In that sense, we consider security as a “complex issue”, that is to say one that can be seen from multiple
perspectives, one that is constantly evolving and which has no linear solution or way to address it, but rather multiple, sometimes competing perspectives (Horst & Webber, 1973).

To try and take into account this complexity, this paper will use a systemic approach to study the Arctic subsystem within the global system. Broadly defined, a system is a set of units, linked together by a set of interrelations, so much that when there is a change in one unit or in one interrelation, it has effects on the other units and interrelations (Battistella et al, 2012). Then the entire system has to exhibit properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts (Jervis, 1997). We therefore consider the Arctic Ocean system, through the prism of geopolitics, with a focal on security.

Cooperation and security in the Arctic

Cooperation is a very strong component of Arctic governance, and it serves the interest of every national actors that it remains so (Deng, 2016; Lackenbauer & Lalonde, 2019; Lasserre, 2010b; Scopelliti & Conde Pérez, 2016; Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014; Zagorsky, 2010).

However, even though cooperation is a driving force in the region, a lot has been written on a changing Arctic security environment, associated with different key drivers for change, such as climate change and the melting of sea ice (See for example: Anderson, 2009; Borgerson, 2008; Heininen & Exner-Pirot, 2019; Kraska, 2011; LeMiere, 2017; Zellen, 2009). This opening up of the region is often accompanied by discourses about a race or a scramble for the Arctic (see for example: Byers, 2010; Dodds & Nuttall, 2016; Howard, 2010; Sale & Potapov, 2009). The Arctic is changing, and this would have consequences on regional security and cooperation. Talking about Arctic security also requires one to think about scale: the Arctic as a geographical but also political space is so diverse that we would agree with Østhagen et al. (2018) saying that it would be more relevant to talk about local security configurations – or local subsystems, rather than talking at the regional scale about one generic and almost void ‘Arctic security’ (Østhagen, Sharp & Hilde, 2018) – and this questions the framing of the issue as well, as talking about ‘Arctic security’ seems to imply a regional scale.

So what exactly is ‘Arctic’ about security in the region? Are the discussed changes shaping a specific meaning of the concept in the region? Is it just a political label or can we actually outline ‘Arctic specific’ issues in the security system in the region? Safety wise, the ice environment makes some safety issues stand out. Security wise however, the picture seems much less clear when it comes to distinguish what would be specifically Arctic.

Data collection and methods

This article is based on an analysis of Arctic strategies of the selected states (see annex 1). We focused during the first step on Arctic policy frameworks established by the relevant states, to establish a discursive framework of Arctic governance. The idea was to outline the general discursive framework of Arctic governance and apparent priorities, to consider where security fits. This then drew upon previous work, either comparative (Heininen, 2012), or analyzing Arctic strategies by country (See for example Dodds, 2011; Honneland, 2014; Plouffe, 2017; Zysk, 2010). Recurring concepts have then been outlined, which allowed us afterwards to proceed to an analytical coding, based on the main themes which emerged (Hay, 2016), in order to compare discourses about security around the Ocean, and try to identify the main drivers of definition for
‘Arctic’ security. After this step, we conducted some semi-structured interviews in Norway and during conferences in the first quarter of 2019 with diplomats and politicians from around the Arctic, to add some perspective to the analyzed data. We then supplemented this analysis with references to newer texts and policies, often with a narrower scope or relevant for one set of actors (i.e., the Coast Guards). As this is an ongoing research project, the following results and discussion are mainly exploratory, setting the framework for the project.

Results & discussion

Defining security

We started with an analysis of the basic discursive framework of Arctic countries. We then processed overarching policy frameworks (see annex 1) to highlight the main themes.

As we want to outline the general discursive framework for Arctic governance, we deliberately excluded from this figure the word “arctic” and country names, in order to focus on the most common and recurring themes. A few terms stand out: “international”, “cooperation”, “region”, “resources”, “Indigenous” … This tends to fit with the idea of “exceptionalism”, meaning that geopolitics in the Arctic are driven by a number of special features (Heininen, 2012, 2018b; Lackenbauer & Lalonde, 2019; Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016).

As this is an Arctic specific framework, we then want to understand how security definitions integrate those issues, and if the stated priorities fit the ones outlined there. The second step is then to analyze those definitions to see how they fit in this discursive framework.

Of course, security is always associated with defense issues and the question of the military. It is however only explicitly linked to national security concerns in the Russian and US strategies, as

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the overarching goal: “the United States is establishing an overarching national approach to advance national security interests, pursue responsible stewardship of this precious and unique region, and serve as a basis for cooperation with other Arctic states and the international community as a whole to advance common interests” (US Government, 2013: 4). For the Russian Federation, national security also appears as a main objective, in both 2009 and 2013. In the primary goal section, we can thus read that one of them is “to create a complex safety system for protection of the territories, population and objects of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation which are crucial for the national security of the Russian Federation” (Russian Federation, 2009). It remains relatively similar in the 2013 version of the strategy: “The strategy defines the basic mechanisms, ways and means to achieve the strategic goals and priorities for the sustainable development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the national security” (Russian Federation, 2013). In other countries considered, national security is not put forward as an overarching goal, but rather as a priority among others. In the Norwegian strategy then, security policy corresponds to a subparagraph, and presents security in the Arctic through a more collaborative approach, especially through NATO: “Membership of NATO and the transatlantic security community is the cornerstone of Norway’s security policy” (Norwegian Government, 2017: 18). But security is referred to in many more sections. It is not considered only through the prism of state security, but rather as a multidimensional problem. The newly released Canadian Arctic policy framework devotes an entire chapter to security and addresses several referent objects, from national security (objective 2): “The Government of Canada is already taking steps to increase its Arctic and northern footprint in support of regional safety and security. This effort is anchored in Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, which recognizes that the Arctic region is of critical importance to the national security and defence of Canada and of North America” (Government of Canada, 2019), to human security (objective 6). In every definition considered however, a broad security spectrum is considered, which fits what Heininen coins as the “Post-Cold War’s security nexus”, i.e. where geopolitical stability balances military presence in a global space, and what dominates is the joint “commitment to maintain peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic” (Heininen, 2019: 124). Security is not limited to the state and encompasses many more dimensions, more actors and more factors are considered in its definition, starting with climate and the environment which are standing out in fig. 1, and could constitute a specific feature of Arctic security (idem: 125). But does this translate into actual political action, which would then lead to a specific definition of security in the Arctic, or ‘Arctic security’? 

**Back to the basics?**

In this section, we added to our analysis policy documents which are focused on the Arctic region and represent a specific actor in the field of security in the region. This mainly includes departments of defense and national coast guards. We saw that premises for security showed some specific features in the Arctic and we now want to see if/how this translates into political action. According to Heininen’s periodization (Heininen, 2019), if we analyze the “Post-Cold War period” – which follows a transition period and starts in the 2000s – can we find evidence that would convey a new definition for security that would be Arctic specific?

In the latest documents available, we can read somewhat of a change in tone. The shift from a common understanding of security and a cooperative framework for security is especially apparent
in the US Coast Guard strategy, released in May 2019. We can find all the vocabulary identified above (cooperation, stability…). But the tone is much more direct, especially in the second part: “Today’s realities” (US Coast Guard, 2019). The analysis of the geostrategic change takes no detour when it comes to China and its presence in the Arctic: “China, a non-Arctic state, continues to expand its influence and seeks to gain strategic advantage around the world […] China’s pattern of behavior in the Indo-Pacific region and its disregard for international law are cause for concern as its economic and scientific presence in the Arctic grows” (US Coast Guard, 2019: 10). It is also singularly direct about Russia: “Russia has demonstrated a willingness to use its power globally to coerce other nations around the world in an effort to expand its sphere of influence” (idem: 10).

In the Canadian defense strategy Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017: 79), the question of external actors is explicitly mentioned, though the tone is much less aggressive: “The Arctic is also becoming more relevant to the international community […] Arctic and non-Arctic states alike are looking to benefit from the potential economic opportunities associated with new resource development and transportation routes”. The safety and security chapter of the new policy framework sums it up: “While the Canadian Arctic has historically been — and continues to be — a region of stability and peace, growing competition and increased access brings safety and security challenges to which Canada must be ready to respond” (Government of Canada, 2019). Interviewees on the other hand almost unanimously insist on the important discursive emphasis that is put on these actors.

The Arctic Strategic Outlook for the US Navy, which is the new document of reference, superseding the 2014 Roadmap, describes the region as having a “low risk of conflict, because nations have demonstrated their ability to resolve differences peacefully” (US Navy, 2019: 5). The document seems to convey a low interest for the military in the region, and it is interesting to compare it with the US Coast Guard’s newly released strategy which is much more detailed and provides an in-depth analysis of global developments in the region. In practical terms, this would suggest that soft security issues and actors remain the priority in the region. It would then be an oversimplification to say that we are ‘back to the basics’ of global geopolitics as it can sometimes be read (see for example Lamothe, 2018; Shea, 2019): the tone might have changed, but a classic realist security approach is not more relevant today to understand security dynamics in the region. They have to be understood in their context and their complexity.

From a “High North, Low tension” paradigm to a “High North, Underlying tensions” one?

Three main types of systems can be outlined: closed systems, which have no relations with others, open systems, which have relations of interdependence with others and, finally, autonomous systems, which are open on their environment, but able to counter or filter system effects such as feedback or retroactive loops (Thibault, 2003). The post-Cold War Arctic is based on institutional international cooperation, which is supported by Arctic non-state actors such as Arctic Indigenous peoples or NGOs (Heininen, 2018a). The issue of security is taken out of the equation as the region remains – in discourses – a zone of peace. The only panarctic institution – the Arctic Council – excluded issues of military security. Cooperation is the main governance mechanism, leaning on a wide set of actors, governmental and not. The system is essentially built on environmental cooperation (Exner-Pirot, 2013), as attested in the 1991 Helsinki Declaration and the 1996 Ottawa Declaration. In systemic terms, that means that connections with the global system are mainly considered on the environmental side of things, for example addressing issues
of long-range pollution. Hard security issues are filtered out, and their retroactive loops are actively kept out of the debates.

Interviews conducted are almost unanimous on one point: in 2014, the annexation of Crimea changed how the system behaved. Cooperation was built on the respect of international law and this episode set a precedent which had an unexpected feedback effect on the Arctic governance system. Yet, the system only partially broke down. Michael Byers (2017), argues that cooperation prevailed even in times of crisis because of mechanisms of “complex interdependence”. Building his argument on the Ukraine crisis of 2014, he demonstrates that those mechanisms helped contain the crisis – even though they were severely affected (Byers, 2017). He argues that the Arctic meets the criteria for complex interdependence, namely transgovernmental and transnational channels of contact and the near irrelevance of military force. This implies that in case of a crisis, if some channels are dismissed, others will act as a safety net because dialogue between two parties does not rely only on one set of issues but on several sets of multifaceted ones. In the Arctic then, cooperation remains a driving dynamic in the governance of the region, but “it should not be taken for granted” (idem: 395). We saw in Arctic strategies that security was associated with a set of issues which laid the basis for peace and cooperation. The annexation had practical consequences on this security system and several avenues of dialogue were suspended. For example, military cooperation was suspended with Russia but cooperation between Coast Guards remained effective (Østhagen, 2016). It can be argued then that this episode thus contributed to opening this Arctic system: security issues could not be completely filtered out and had consequences on other nodes of the system. Two interviewees explained for example that cooperation on a scientific level within a working group of the Arctic Council got affected. This “negative effect” as per Jervis’s typology (Jervis, 1997) would support the idea that the system is opening up and becoming less impervious to outside issues. Some actors took it even further affirming that a conflict emerging within the Arctic would be quite unlikely or even “completely irrational” (Norwegian officer, closed conference with Emerging Leaders participants, 2019), but that there is an effective risk of a spillover effect. Tensions are not out in the open, they are underlying and mainly emanating from outside of the Arctic. We could thus say that we moved from a “High North, Low tension” paradigm to a “High North, Underlying tensions” one.

Framing Arctic security: A matter of scale and context

Scale and context are two very important variables when it comes to the identification of what could be Arctic about Arctic security. Recent developments show that there is a perceived growing interest in the region from non-Arctic actors, Scotland being the latest non-Arctic actor to launch its Arctic policy framework (Vidal, 2019) For the A5 and the A8, it resulted in a stronger affirmation of themselves as Arctic nations (Steinberg et al, 2015; Wilson Rowe, 2018). Iceland is an interesting case study in this respect, asserting in its Arctic strategy that “it is of great importance that consensus is reached across the political spectrum on an Arctic policy which aims at positioning Iceland among those countries that have the greatest influence on future development in the region” (Government of Iceland, 2011: 4). Coastal state status has grown in significance (Dodds & Ingimundarson, 2012) and looking at the US’ newly released documents, it looks like the trend is getting stronger. This was clearly stated in the Coast Guard Strategy (2019) and is also quite apparent in the strategy released by the Department of Defense last June: “The United States does not recognize any other claims to Arctic status by any State other than these eight nations
[the A8]” (US Department of Defense, 2019: 3). The new strategy also insists on the fact that the Arctic is a “part of the U.S. Homeland”. One of the three main points of the DoD strategic approach is to “build Arctic awareness”. This would suggest that the Arctic is now being framed as a national matter in a move to assert the country’s legitimacy in the region, in opposition to non-Arctic states. Non-Arctic states use of a different, wider frame, considering their connection to a ‘global Arctic’ (Wilson Rowe, 2018), suggests the importance of scale – both geographical and reticular, in the definition and framing of Arctic security.

**Conclusion**

It thus seems that discourses have changed in scale. Before 2014, results show that discourses about the Arctic were very Arctic-centered and focused on a consensual set of issues (cooperation, stability, the environment…). They were rarely put into global perspective, thus conveying the idea of an autonomous system. The annexation of Crimea and the unexpected feedback effect it had on cooperation in the region questioned the system and Arctic relations had to be considered also in regard to relations outside of the Arctic. The Kerch Strait incident of 2018 revived this crisis, emphasizing the importance of global geopolitics on cooperation in the region and the regional security system (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016). With the rise of growing interests of new external actors, discourses now envision the Arctic at the global scale, and seem to be less and less Arctic-only centered. Two main framings seem to be competing: a regional one, especially favoured by Arctic countries, and notably the A5, a reticular one. This questions tensions between national and international scales in the framing of security stakes: are they defined in the Arctic or are they integrated into broader security schemes that reflect them?

This analysis questions the Arctic dimension of what is labelled ‘Arctic security’. It appears that apart from a definition of security based on soft security stakes, it is hard to isolate Arctic specific stakes or dynamics that would allow one to talk about Arctic security as being something other than a discursive construction or a political stance – for now.

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**Notes**

1. This is the name of an international forum about Arctic politics held in Russia since 2010. ([https://forumarctica.ru/en/](https://forumarctica.ru/en/))
2. The official British Arctic policy says Britain is not an Arctic state, but is its “nearest neighbour.”


4. See (Østhagen et al, 2018) for details about Norway and NATO in the Arctic.

5. On 25 November 2018, an incident occurred between the Russian and Ukrainian Navy. Three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to pass from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol (Ukraine) were captured. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia claims the Kerch Strait is internal waters that are not subject to innocent passage rights.

**Annex – List of Arctic policy documents considered**

**Canada**
- Canada’s Northern Strategy *Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*, 2009
- Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, *Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad*, 2010
- *Strong, Secure, Engaged. Canada’s Defence Policy*, 2017
- Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, 2019

**Denmark**
- Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020

**Iceland**
- A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy, 2011

**Norway**
- Norway’s Arctic Policy, 2014
- Norway’s Arctic Strategy, *Between geopolitics and social development*, 2017

**Russia**
- Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period Till 2020 and for a further perspective, 2009
- The Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, 2013

**The United States**
- NSPD 66 / HSPD 25: Arctic Region policy, 2009
- National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 2013
- Implementation Plan for National Strategy for Arctic Region, 2014
- Executive Order --- Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic, 2015
- US Coast Guard, *Arctic Strategic Outlook*, 2019
- The US Navy Strategic Outlook for the Arctic, 2019
- Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, 2019

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