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Arctic Yearbook 2013
Bennett
In 2008, the Arctic‘s five littoral states issued the Ilulissat Declaration, underscoring the role of
sovereignty and national rights in dealing with the Arctic‘s environmental problems. The declaration
stated that the existing framework of international law ―provides a solid foundation for responsible
management by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national
implementation and application of relevant provisions‖ (2008: 1-2). Though the littoral states pledge
to cooperate with each other, each state ultimately determines its own national environmental laws,
recalling the preeminence of the state in the 1973 International Agreement on the Conservation of
Polar Bears. Since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, the nation-state has been increasingly linked to the
territory that it occupies, a relationship reproduced through public education and citizenship
(Lefebvre, 1991). Territory, going beyond mere mountains, tundras, and oceans, is a ―rendering of
the emergent concept of ‗space‘ as a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated,
bordered, and controlled‖ (Elden, 2007: 578). These material and symbolic linkages make it
theoretically difficult for states to share territory on land or at sea, as that would threaten the
supposed power and inviolability of the nation-state. Overall, the Arctic littoral states‘
demonstrations of sovereignty, such as with the creation of national parks, challenge popular
proclamations that globalization is causing the deterritorialization or retreat of the state (Ohmae,
1995; 1999; Strange, 1996). In fact, Russia and Canada are trying to cement and signify state power
as international flows become a stronger force in the Arctic.
National Regulations over Arctic Waterways
In broad terms, the evolution of international maritime law since the 1980s has actually fostered
national sovereignty. UNCLOS, which was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994, allows
ratifying states like Russia and Canada
1
to extend their territorial seas up to 200 nautical miles from
their baselines as exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and potentially even farther depending on
scientific data and agreement with other countries regarding the extent of their continental shelves
(Articles 76 and 77). UNCLOS Article 56 allows states the right to protect the environment and
conduct scientific research in their EEZs, while Article 234 permits states to enact special
regulations pertaining to marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas. Taken together, these
two articles represent the legal point of departure from which I investigate Canadian and Russian
actions in the Arctic.
Canada and Russia seek to expand their sovereignty in their Arctic shipping passages because of
both the aforementioned growing regionalization of maritime space and specific, perceived threats
to their control, especially as shipping traffic increases.
2
Moscow and Ottawa view the NWP and
NSR, respectively, as internal waters.
By contrast, it is in the interest of government officials from
the world‘s major economies, such as the United States, China, and the European Union, to
promote Arctic waterways as international straits in order to ensure freedom of navigation for their
large commercial fleets. Canada, in particular, has a history of enacting environmental legislation
when it perceives challenges to sovereignty in its seas. After the American icebreaking oil tanker SS
Manhattan
controversially transited the NWP in 1969 and 1970, the Canadian Parliament assertively
responded by passing the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA). This set strict rules for
ships coming within 100 miles of Canada‘s Arctic coastline at a time when international law only