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Arctic Yearbook 2013
The Drivers of Chinese Arctic Interests
China‘s interest in the Arctic is clear from its scientific investments and its diplomatic investments to
become a permanent observer in the Arctic Council to gain as much access to information and
(future) influence as a non-Arctic rising power can aspire to. However, it must also be kept in mind
that China is a power with a very demanding domestic agenda for its leadership and global interests.
The Arctic is a peripheral region in these concerns, which is clearly illustrated by the Chinese
punishment of Norway for the Nobel committee awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo
despite China‘s close Arctic partnership with Norway previously. A Chinese Arctic strategy is
therefore not to be expected for years to come (Dhanapala 2008; Lasserre 2010; Alexeeva &
Lasserre 2012a, 2012b; Jakobson 2010; Jakobson & Peng 2012; Jakobsen & Lee 2013; Stensdal 2013;
Stokke 2013; Tang 2013).
Conclusion
China has experienced phenomenal growth since the open door policy of Deng Xiaoping in the late
1970s. This growth has made China into an emerging super power and strategic competitor of the
USA. It has also made China into one of the world‘s major importers of energy (especially oil) and
raw materials. China‘s growth has been based on manufacturing for export, real-estate and
infrastructure, which has been highly energy and raw material intensive, while energy, raw materials
and exports overwhelmingly travel by sea. China describes itself as a socialist market economy and is
governed by a Communist Party, which bases its legitimacy on economic and nationalist
performance. The interlinked core interests of the national leadership are, therefore, political
stability, territorial integrity and economic growth. The international systemic framework for China‘s
development is US hegemony and global naval domination, while China is a rising continental power
but a historically weak sea power. This complex raises a number of energy and maritime
transportation security issues for China. For energy, China is much dependent on the Persian Gulf,
which is unstable and militarily dominated by the USA. The energy, raw materials and exports which
are crucial for the core interests of the Chinese leadership travel on sea lanes dominated by strategic
competitors such as the USA or India or are threatened by piracy. These energy and maritime
transport security challenges are the framework for China‘s nascent Arctic interests and possible
strategy.
China‘s soaring demand for energy in connection with its export-oriented economy poses a variety
of new challenges for its foreign policy: the country will become more and more dependent on the
purchase of natural resources abroad for sustaining its economic development. Any crisis to its
access to overseas resource and maritime shipping routes will have a negative impact on China‘s
growth and trade-dependent economy. China will endeavor to protect the strategic areas concerning
its national interest. In recent years China‘s energy diplomacy in the context of the political economy
of global energy developments has drawn the attention of the West especially in connection with the
sensitive regions, such as the Middle East and Africa. As one Chinese scholar bluntly states, ―[t]he
determining factor shaping the rise and fall of a country ultimately is not just the size of its total
economic volume but also the strategic ability of the country; that is, the ability to use national
forces to achieve political goals‖ (Zhang, 2006: 22).