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almost half of the growth in world energy consumption‖ (Downs, 2006: 1). There is no sign that
China‘s energy consumption will slow down; on the contrary, it is expected to steadily increase.
Modeling and scenario building for China looking all the way to 2100 forecast more than a doubling
of China‘s energy consumption, despite great gains in energy efficiency (Shan et al., 2012; Liu, Chen
& Liu, 2011; Rout et al., 2011). What is of particular importance for discussing China and the Arctic
is the much expanded role of oil in the energy mix of China in the future, where China will steadily
become more and more dependent on imported oil with consequences for China‘s energy security.
To reach its aim of a ―harmonious society‖ and ―the Chinese dream‖ of President Xi Jingping of
doubling the 2010 GDP per capita by 2020 (the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party) and
being a fully developed country by 2049 (the centennial of the People‘s Republic of China) (Kuhn,
2013), China will have to utilize every fuel source available including investment on renewable
energy and expansion of nuclear power. It is expected that China‘s import of oil and natural gas will
increase at a steady rate. In connection with its rising energy import, especially of oil, the issue of
energy security becomes very important for China (Xu, 2006; Erickson & Collins, 2007; Leung,
2011; Zhang, 2011, 2012; Cao & Bluth, 2013; Rainwater, 2013).
The objective of this article is to discuss China‘s nascent Arctic interests and strategy within the
context of the core interests
1
of the Chinese leadership and thus provide a framework for
understanding its Arctic interests and strategy. In recent years China‘s possible interests and strategy
in the Arctic have received much initial media and policy interest with Jakobson (2010) as the
landmark study and subsequently academic interest in the West and in China as referenced in this
article. We seek to place Chinese Arctic interest and possible strategy in the broader context of
Chinese leadership core interests.
It is therefore the argument of this article that China‘s Arctic interests and possible strategy must be
seen within the context of China‘s phenomenal economic and political rise, how the Chinese
leadership manages this rise as a ―Peaceful Rise‖, and how the existing dominant Western and other
powers in the international system respond to this rise. China sees itself as a rising power with a
legitimate role in the governance of regions around the world, including the Arctic, which leads
China to pursue, for instance, a science agenda worthy of a great power (Jakobson, 2010; Lasserre,
2010; Blunden, 2012; Jakobson & Peng, 2012; Jakobson, & Lee 2013). Science is the first step and
bridgehead for China into the Arctic to pursue interests defined by the core interests of the Chinese
leadership: political stability, territorial integrity and economic growth. Therefore, China‘s scientific
involvement in the Arctic and other Arctic activities should be seen in the context of these core
interests (Jakobson & Peng, 2012; Jakobson & Lee, 2013).
China defines itself as a ―socialist market economy‖ (People‘ Daily, 2007) and is governed by a
Communist Party, whose legitimacy is based on economic and nationalist performance. This
leadership sees its survival based on delivering economic growth, which is where the Arctic comes in
in a number of ways. Much of Chinese science focuses on climate change, and Arctic climate change
is of importance for Chinese climate and therefore agriculture and food security, which translates
into social stability and legitimacy for the Communist Party. Secondly, as pointed out, the
phenomenal Chinese growth has made China into a major importer of sea-borne energy and raw