Arctic Yearbook 2013
India‘s Arctic Engagement
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Indian commentators have hailed their country‘s successful application for observer status at the
Arctic Council (approved by the Arctic member states and indigenous permanent participants at the
Kiruna ministerial meeting in May 2013) as an ―Arctic victory‖ and ―a major diplomatic
achievement‖ for foreign minister Salman Khursid (Ramachandaran, 2013). Accepting new
observers, however, is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. The real question facing the Council is
how it will manage the interests of new actors clamouring for a say in scientific research, resource
development, transportation, and regional governance more generally (Lackenbauer, 7 May 2013).
Most Indian commentators agree that responsible environmental management and cooperative
scientific research and exploration are essential to any Arctic governance regime, but they do not
offer a unified voice on other issues. What do they mean when they refer to the Arctic as a ―global
commons‖? How do they interpret the relevance of scientific research in the region, Arctic resource
assessments, and prospects for investments or new technological capabilities to exploit these
resources? How does China‘s growing interest in the Arctic, and the most basic question of prestige,
factor into India‘s Arctic outlook?
To introduce the contours of popular and academic debate on Arctic issues in India, this study
critically examines the writings of five Indian commentators: Indian Council of World Affairs
research director Vijay Sakhuja, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran, retired Army colonel P.K.
Gautam and Navy commander Neil Gadihoke, and political scientist Sanjay Chaturvedi of Punjab
University. These Indian commentators, like other Asian observers, tend to view the Arctic through
a
polar
lens. Accordingly, they situate Arctic issues in a global perspective rather than the national or
regional perspective that dominates most commentaries emanating from the Arctic states (Manicom
and Lackenbauer, 2013). For Arctic scholars and policy-makers to better understand what appear to
be peculiar (and even confrontational) positions on regional issues, they should look to India‘s
experiences in Antarctica and Svalbard, broader geostrategic interests, and the corresponding frames
that Indian thinkers apply to geopolitics and governance in the Arctic.
Through Antarctic Eyes: India‟s Polar Engagement
Indian commentators emphasize that their country has been involved in polar scientific research and
governance for decades. Although Sakhuja traces India‘s stake in Arctic governance to 1920, when
British signed the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) Treaty 9 on behalf of its overseas dominions (Sakhuja
2011), India‘s political and research interests have typically focused on Antarctica, given its
comparatively close proximity across the Indian Ocean and its link to the country‘s geostrategic,
resource, and meteorological interests (Dodds 1997: 135-55; Chaturvedi 1990: 161-162).
When engaging the ―Antarctica Question‖ during the Cold War, India repeatedly attempted to
internationalize governance on the southern continent – an idea that continues to inform and even
frame its polar perceptions and aspirations. The Indian delegation first attempted to bring the
question to the United Nations General Assembly in February 1956, on the heels of Jawaharlal
Nehru‘s unveiling of the non-aligned movement at the Bandung Conference the previous year.
Initially, Krishna Menon, India‘s representative at the United Nations (and one of the architects of
India‘s non-aligned foreign policy) proclaimed that sovereignty claims in Antarctica perpetuated
European colonialism. He also emphasized Antarctica‘s important influence on global climate