Arctic Yearbook 2013
Heininen, Exner-Pirot & Plouffe
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The novelty in that era was to construct cooperation within and across the Arctic region, whereas
the current era of regionalization has been overshadowed by efforts to promote Arctic cooperation
outside the region, whether with states, corporations, NGOs/INGOs or International
Organizations. But it would be a mistake to consider sub-regional influence and growth to be over.
In the North American Arctic, for the first time, formal Arctic cooperation has developed under the
guise of the Arctic Caucus (Alaska, Yukon and Northwest Territories) of the Pacific Northwest
Economic Region (PNWER) of western American states and Canadian provinces. Nordic, West
Nordic, Barents, and Baltic cooperation is stronger than ever. And if the Arctic Council, and the
Arctic region, begins to adjust its balance in favour of environmental protection towards sustainable
development, then it will be sub-regional organizations and sub-state units that will need to lead
those efforts, in terms of job creation, infrastructure development, accessibility of relevant education
and improvement of health services. Canada‘s Arctic Council chairmanship agenda (2013-2015)
provides an indication, but not a promise, of where a focus on these issues may lead the future work
of Council members.
The Globalized Arctic
But while regionalism dominated the past, and will need to play a much larger role in the future,
2013 was the year of the globalized Arctic, although globalization is not totally new in the Arctic (see
Heininen and Southcott, 2010). It was the year that the relationship between Asia and the Arctic got
serious; ‗exhibit A‘ was the accession of a number of Asian states (China, India, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea) as Observers to the Arctic Council (Kiruna Declaration, 2013). The
free trade
agreement
between China and Iceland, as an adjunct to the AC observership, made even more acute
the impacts of globalization on the Arctic. Asian intentions are not ignoble, but they are global:
transnational shipping, resource development, and climate change science.
Then of course was the resource development – or in some situations, a lack thereof. The scope and
size of Arctic projects makes them inherently global in nature, as only the largest of corporations can
pull them off. It also makes them vulnerable to global price trends and market developments.
Correspondingly, their potential impacts on the environment have ignited unprecedented ―anti-
development‖ movements, most visible through the actions of Greenpeace.
The combination of market and economic pressures can be paralyzing. Note the decline of the
Shtockman project in the Barents; Shell‘s ‗pause‘ from the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas after the
Kulluk platform incident in January; and France‘s Total‘s unexpected warnings about oil drilling in
Arctic waters. Meanwhile a growing interest in rare earths feeds speculation in and impacts politics
in Greenland. The commodities market is a global one, and the Arctic economy is based on
commodities. Despite the very local implications of resource development, it will get harder to
divorce the Arctic from the global economy going forward.
Finally, there is the growing influence of Arctic indigenous peoples far beyond their traditional
lands. In 1996, indigenous groups were given a seat at the table of the Arctic Council as Permanent
Peoples. In 2013, they are sitting at the head of the table, in the person of Inuk Leona Aglukkaq,
Nunavut‘s representative to Parliament and Canada‘s Minister to the Arctic Council (and Minister of