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Arctic Yearbook 2013
Filimonova
The delay of the decision on adoption of subsoil legislation liberalization and the allocation of
subsoil use licenses to Rosneft and Gazprom without auctions clearly demonstrate the winning
position of the state-controlled companies‘ alliance. However, the alliance between Gazprom and
Rosneft for advocating their interests and stance on continental shelf deposits development has
been destroyed by the emergent opportunities for Rosneft‘s gas policy expansion in both internal
and external energy markets.
Rosneft vs. Gazprom: Prospective Strategies for Expansion
In Autumn 2012, Rosneft acquired a 51% share of the gas company ITERA, with proved reserves
accounting for 372.4 billion cubic meters of gas and 15.7 million tons of condensate (Melnikov and
Mordushenko, 2013). The shares acquisition has been done in the framework of cooperation
between the two companies aiming at the creation of a joint venture. The merge with ITERA meant
for Rosneft an access to the gas market and to existing contracts for gas supply; and for ITERA,
energy sources. In 2013 Rosneft continued its gas policy expansion by undertaking certain steps
towards reducing Gazprom‘s gas monopoly policy. During his speech at the Investors‘ Day in
London in April 2013, the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin announced the company‘s plans to produce
100 billion cubic meters of gas by 2020 that will correspond to 19-22% of the Russian gas market
(Chodyakova, 2013).
A month before that, the company expressed its interest in obtaining certain subsoil use licenses, on
which Gazprom had a previous claim. One of the major reasons for allocating the licenses to
Rosneft was expressed in the letter by the company‘s Deputy Chairman of the Director Board
Nikolay Laverov, stating that a certain part of the granted licenses would be explored by Gazprom‘s
subsidiary, the private company Gazprom Neft, which represents a direct violation of the subsoil
legislation. In addition, the company radically changed its position and supported the stance of the
private gas company NOVATEK to diminish Gazprom‘s gas company monopoly on LNG export.
The changes in the company‘s position have been backed by certain factors. Firstly, the
development of the gas strategy by the company satisfied the goals of the ―Russian Energy Strategy
up to 2030‖ to create efficient conditions for independent gas producers in Russia. Secondly, 40% of
Gazprom‘s long standing contracts are due this year and not all of the customers share an interest in
the contracts‘ prolongation (Skorlygina and Motushenko, 2013). Thirdly, Rosneft obtained 40
licenses for offshore field‘s development, which are predominantly gas deposits. According to Igor
Sechin, such an amount of gas cannot be implemented in the domestic market (Serov, 2013).
In the dispute between Rosneft and Gazprom the government took a cautious stance. The positive
remarks towards LNG export liberalization were expressed by the Russian President Vladimir Putin
during the Presidential Commission for the Strategic Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector
and Environmental Security meeting and by the Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev during the latest
World Economic Forum in Davos. However, the statements did not contain any concrete plans.
Recently, the Ministry of Energy announced its plans to introduce new legal mechanisms of the
united LNG export policy by September 2013. Due to Gazprom‘s rigid position towards its
monopoly preservation, it is doubtful that a total abolition of Gazprom‘s LNG monopoly will occur.
The company claims that the existing monopoly on gas exports compensates the huge financial and