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Arctic Yearbook 2013
Nord
embraced an Arctic identity in the same way that Canada, Russia or Norway have today or in the
past. Only a relatively small portion of its territory is to be found within the Arctic Circle and its
northern, largely rural population is miniscule in comparison to the dominant urban communities
found in its south.
1
It is also one of the three countries of the Arctic Eight that lacks a coastline
bordering on the Arctic Ocean. In a Swedish context, the whole region of the circumpolar north
seems both geographically and conceptually remote.
As such, there was not an established foundation of interest in Arctic affairs when the Swedish
government announced that it would take on leadership responsibilities for the Arctic Council in
2011. While there was some underlying national pride that Sweden, again, would be asked to chair
another international body, most Swedes had only a limited awareness of what the Arctic Council
was all about and what particular contribution their country might make to its efforts. Like the
Arctic region itself, the Arctic Council and its work was
terra incognita
for most Swedish citizens.
2
Nor did the international community have much sense of what Sweden‘s role at the helm of the
organization might portend. Up to that point, Sweden had not been a very visible player in Arctic
affairs with well-articulated views and opinions on key issues of concern. As the last of the Arctic
Eight states to step into a leadership role in the Arctic Council, it did not possess a strong record of
significant contributions to northern dialogue or decision-making. Several of its fellow Council
members openly wondered what its position might be on a number of looming regional problems.
Sweden had not published an overall government policy statement on its views towards the Arctic.
It was to do so, rather belatedly, on the day it assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council.
3
Some observers, both internally and externally, contended that Sweden‘s priorities in its foreign
policy were not Arctic-focused. The country and its government seemed far more interested in the
Baltic region, the European Union and the broader questions of international politics discussed at
the UN and in other global forums. It was suggested that Sweden had only, reluctantly, taken part in
the activities of the Arctic Council out of a long-standing commitment to act in solidarity with its
Nordic neighbors. Thus it was not surprising that when Sweden‘s pending chairmanship was
discussed, it was done so primarily in the context of being the third installment of a ―common
umbrella program‖ offered jointly by Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm. Sweden was to be the
dutiful partner who would complete leadership initiatives begun by Norway and Denmark.
Yet it seemed to others that such a limited role for Sweden in the Arctic Council‘s chairmanship was
not consistent with the much more developed posture which Sweden had demonstrated in other
international and regional leadership positions. The country had a long and distinguished record in
international diplomacy and had chaired a variety of international organizations and conferences
over the past several decades. It had performed well in leading UN, EU and Nordic Council bodies
through complex issues and demanding agendas. It was an acknowledged global force in
international environmental deliberations and had played an important role in helping to establish
the Arctic Council‘s predecessor, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).
4
Sweden
was a nation that embodied deep values and commitment to international cooperation and dialogue
across a wide number of other significant global concerns. Perhaps, then, Sweden might be expected