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Knecht
institutions like the AC Secretariat may create and recreate international norms and progressively
promote a regional perspective (Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004).
The Secretariat‘s position in the Council structure is of strategic relevance as it, beyond purely
administrative functions, also assists the rotating Council Chairmanship in writing meeting
documents and final reports as well as communication and outreach plans ―at the request of SAOs
and Permanent Participants‖ (ibid). Deepened interaction with indigenous organizations, working
groups and observers may further put it in a gateway position for these actors to influence the wider
agenda and day-to-day practices in Arctic regional governance. This, in turn, enhances the
Secretariat‘s bargaining power vis-à-vis the
Arctic Eight
. With this in mind, the Arctic can be seen as
on the brink of becoming a
regional community
, that is a ―process whereby the region increasingly turns
into an active subject with a distinct identity, institutionalised
or informal actor capability, legitimacy
and structure of decision making in relation with a more or less responsive regional civil society‖
(Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000: 466).
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the legally-binding arrangements already adopted, i.e. the 2011
Maritime SAR
and 2013
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response
agreement, provide the Council with
authority for Arctic-wide monitoring and, while less likely, enforcement to ensure compliance
(Bradley and Kelley, 2008: 12-14). While this is currently at odds with the littoral states‘ claim for
unrestricted national sovereignty and the Council‘s main role as a venue for deliberation, it may
prove to be both more effective and efficient for the eight Arctic states to grant the AC authority in
this context. Even soft measures such as direct monitoring of state performances in the respective
areas may put AC members under peer pressure and in consequence lead to policy adaptations or a
‗race for best practices‘.
Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to explore the Arctic‘s status as a political region in a broader
theoretical and historical context. The literature on
New Regionalism
(NRA) offers valuable insights
into the kinds, degrees and levels of regionness. Because the Arctic differs from the general
consensus within this literature due to its marine geography, causes, processes and effects of Arctic
Ocean regionalism were thoroughly accounted for. While it would indeed go too far to call the
Arctic an integration region as it was difficult to imagine for Griffiths a quarter of a century ago
(1988: 4), the Arctic today can be classified as a
regional society
with attributes of a
regional community
.
There is clear indication that the Arctic Council develops discretionary power based on operational
capacities and information asymmetry to the benefit of the Secretariat, Senior Arctic Officials
and
AC working groups.
As always, this article has limitations and there is much room for future research. Any analysis of the
AC‘s formal and informal authority will have to account for the domestic impact the Council wields
and the regional agenda it promotes in Arctic affairs and even beyond, e.g. in inter-institutional
relations with other organizations and regimes. This is all the more essential in the case of
implementation and enforcement of the first two legally-binding agreements. Also, the mechanisms