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Arctic Yearbook 2013
Knecht
indigenous concerns, the promotion of confidence-building measures as well stringent arms control
in a prospectively nuclear-free Arctic region (see Åtland, 2008). It is no exaggeration to refer to this
speech as the origin of Arctic regionalism.
The Arctic Council: Institutionalising Regional Governance
Given the sudden window of opportunity that was now open for appeased international relations in
the Arctic, Russia more and more committed to multilateral agreements.
After the
Arctic Eight
started to meet on a regular basis and to discuss prospective modes of environmental governance
from 1989 onwards, they also agreed on the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
(AEPS, 1991) two
years later. Its principal objective was to gather and review relevant information on the status of the
Arctic environment, give indigenous people a voice and to address
transboundary pollution. Yet, the
initiative was unclear about the Arctic‘s territorial boundaries, but, as in the case of oil pollution
control, left room for ‗extending the geographic scope of these instruments‘ (ibid: 21). Both
geographical coverage and adequate scientific instruments for Arctic environment assessments have
been later specified, when
the AEPS in 1996 resulted in the establishment of the Arctic Council. The
AC is a special forum for intergovernmental deliberation with
the primary objective
to:
provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the
Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other
Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable
development end environmental protection in the Arctic‘ (Declaration on the
Establishment of the Arctic Council, 1996).
With the AC, affairs have been stabilised institutionally, but remained overall complex. The agenda
was limited from the very beginning and focused primarily on potential threats to the common
Arctic environment. Neither did the Arctic Council have any discretionary power to implement
rules, monitor state performance and ultimately sanction noncompliance with regards to the advice
it gave the states through its working groups.
4
Nor did the Council contest states‘ authority over
national territory and jurisdictional rights. The Arctic states have rather substantiated their national
sovereignty by restricting membership and excluding at that time still sensitive issues such as military
security from the agenda (ibid: note no. 1).
On the other side, the Arctic Council had two innovative strengths. First, the body promoted and
formalised a circumpolar perspective through scientific assessments and monitoring reports released
by its working groups. This ‗knowledge-producing‘ mandate has so far delivered relevant reports like
the
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
(2005), the
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
(2009), the
Arctic
Human Development Report
(2004) and
Artic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines
(1997, 2002, 2009). These
assessments are available to all members and the wider public, gather knowledge on pan-Arctic
transformative processes and in this way raise awareness for the ‗common North‘. Recent studies
support this argument and show that Arctic littoral states today indeed narratively configure
non-
competitive ‗arcticulations‘
and therewith present and target the Arctic as a common space of and
for collaborative governance (Knecht and Keil, 2013). Second, the Arctic Council is unique
compared to many other regional organisations. Next to its founding members, the
Arctic Eight
,
indigenous peoples‘ representations have a special status as ‗Permanent Participants‘ and hold full