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Knecht
Second, the transboundary effects occurring within a shared ocean territory cause interdependencies
between adjacent states and societies even though social, economic or political linkages may not
exist in the first place. The receding Arctic ice sheet more and more uncovers the common legacy of
a transformative Arctic Ocean environment so that the
Arctic Eight
are ‗urged to merge‘ into
regionalism in order to effectively address collective action problems they may not be able to solve
in alternative settings. In contrast to temperate regions, where transnational capital flow and socio-
economic linkages are assumed to be primary sources for interstate cooperation within a given area,
uninhabitable marine regions like
the Arctic, ―rather than having a ‗natural‘ character of their own,
are defined only by the existence of common interests in the oceans‖ (Alexander, 1977: 108-109).
No state alone can stem the
impact of global climate change on the region or mitigate its
environmental, social and political consequences. Nor can any single state be assured of sustainable
fisheries management and resource extraction, ecological preservation, social welfare, low-polluting
shipping and tourism or comprehensive maritime safety and national security if not all partners
contribute to previously agreed objectives.
The regional agenda, however, is restricted predominantly to issues of environmental governance
and sustainable development in and of the common maritime space. Analysing the Arctic region as
an environmental security complex, Exner-Pirot notices that the ―ocean-based nature of the Arctic
region has contributed negatively to many of the issue areas that other international regions
collaborate on‖ (2013
: 9). It
is rather unlikely that Arctic regional politics will either exceed collective
action problems arising from the shared ocean territory or incorporate policy issues better addressed
unilaterally or at other regulatory levels or institutions, respectively. States will especially repudiate
claims for regional initiatives in areas that touch their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Hence, third, state sovereignty and means to maintain it are key issues in Arctic governance and
stressed by all coastal states in their Arctic strategy documents (see Heininen, 2012; see also Knecht
and Keil, 2013). The diminishing ice crust incites these states to re-imagine their northern borders
vis-à-vis their neighbours and lets them strive for additional sovereign rights over seabed of
extended continental shelves. New geopolitical perceptions have so far not led to any major dispute
or diplomatic conflict between Arctic
states and signs are positive that any claims will be regulated
under the primacy of international law, here the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), to which the states
have committed themselves to in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration.
Nevertheless, competing sovereign claims cast a shadow of uncertainty over Arctic affairs and may
hinder both negotiation and implementation of common regulatory initiatives.
In contrast to many
land-space regions, which evolved either to overcome or to reinforce state sovereignty, the Arctic
remains a space of contested sovereignty (see Gerhardt et al., 2010).
Yet,
the prevalence of
sovereignty in circumpolar politics is further questioned from outside the
region. Several non-Arctic actors want to make their voice heard in circumpolar governance due to
stakes they have in the region or the concern for serious repercussions from environmental
processes therein. These actors constitute an ever larger group of AC observers and those that have
applied for observer status, e.g. a number of Southeast Asian states, several EU member countries
2
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like
Greenpeace
and the
World Wide Fund for Nature