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Arctic Yearbook 2013
Knecht
Today, Griffiths‘ analysis requires a profound re-evaluation given both empirical and theoretical
advancements over the past two and a half decades. First, global pressures as well as intra-regional
developments have spurred region-building and institutionalisation in the Arctic, whose regional
status today exceeds cooperative agreements of the late 1980s in terms of substance, scope and
liability (see Heininen and Southcott, 2010). Recent agreements on
Maritime Search and Rescue
(SaR)
(Arctic Council 2011) and
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response
(Arctic Council, 2013a) negotiated
under the Arctic Council are points of reference here. Second, scholars associated with the so-called
new
or
second wave
regionalism have over the past quarter of a century brought forward a fine-grained
toolbox of complementary, yet distinct concepts to trace, analyse and ultimately compare regionalist
movements in contemporary world politics (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000; Hettne, 2003; Schulz et
al., 2001).
It is worth mentioning, however, that the international relations (IR) and comparative politics
literature on regions as both an analytical concept and an object of study in world politics are elusive
at best and confusing at worst. The only truism in regionalism research is that there still is no
commonly accepted conceptualisation of what is or makes a political region. It is hardly feasible here
to enlighten this densely ―clouded‖ (Fawn, 2009: 11) debate based on all too new empirical grounds.
Neither is it desirable to simply iterate the different strands that persist in debates of what should be
ontologically understood as ‗region‘, ‗regionalism‘ and ‗regionalisation‘. Instead, this paragraph will
outline and reason a certain understanding of these concepts drawn from
second wave
regionalism
research, which is believed to sufficiently serve the purpose of tracing the origins and development
of the circumpolar North as a political entity.
The
New Wave of Regionalism
to Arrive in the Arctic
Within the IR literature, two benchmarks are generally set for a region to be regarded as such: (1)
increasing social, economic or political transnational interdependencies between, (2) states in relative
geographical proximity (Nye, 1968; for an application to the Arctic case, see Exner-Pirot, 2013).
From
this perspective, states merge into separate regional blocs for the sake of preferential or free
trading
agreements (PTA/FTA) (Mansfield and Milner 1999)
or because of some kind of socio-
historical, economic, political or organizational ‗cohesiveness‘ (Hurrell, 1995: 38). However, these
indicators are of little analytical value as they say nothing about why and how regions
emerge
(disparately), change (differently) or even dissolve (occasionally).
Further, even a quick glance reveals that the Arctic is at odds with at least one of these criteria. Not
only does the vast Arctic marine territory of approximately 14 million square kilometres make the
term ‗geographical
proximity‘ a dubious one. Also
, low population densities and mobility,
rudimentary industrialisation and underdeveloped infrastructure on adjacent onshore territories set
limits to social interaction and economic interdependencies which would entail region-wide
arrangements. Hence, not all ‗roads‘ (and ‗waterways‘) to regionalism (Börzel et al., 2012) are built on
ever-closer trade relations or cultural homogeneity. Why then did the Arctic emerge as a regional
entity? What caused its rapid evolution? And what consequences does this development have for
circumpolar governance? As will be explained in more detail further below, due to its ‗liquid‘